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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
Poor, small farmers are especially susceptible to income variability because of weather-
related risks to their crops. In fact, even those rural poor who are not directly involved in 
agricultural production get affected because their incomes are often tied to the success of 
the agricultural production {Barnett and Mahal, 2007). 
Traditionally, small farmers and the rural poor have used various types of mitigation 
techniques for weather-related risks to their income. These include savings, selling their 
assets, selling their livestock etc. However, the implied premium on these types of 
techniques was estimated by Rosenzweig and Biswanger (1993) to be as high as 35%. 
Weather derivatives are a newer form of derivatives, which can be used for hedging the 
risks associated with weather. The first of such contracts was signed in 1997 in the 
United States of America. 
The impact of weather on business activities is enormous and, obviously, varies with the 
business, the location and with climate change. In the agricultural sector, the amount of 
rainfall could make a significant difference to the yield patterns. This would be even 
more prominent in developing countries like India, where about 60% of the agricultural 
produce is dependent on the rainfall. The risk that is covered by weather derivatives 
includes the potential adverse impact of the weather on expected costs, revenues and 
cash flows. In India, most importantly, crop produce could be hedged against weather 
through weather derivatives. 
Justification for the Study "^  
There has been a prolonged debate on the use of weather derivatives in the Indian 
conditions. Weather derivatives could be an effective hedge against the vagaries of 
weather, which could result in a lower-than-expected agricultural output. And this would 
be true both, at an individual farmer level, or collectively at a larger level. Once again, 
the same argument would hold true for many other sectors where sales and revenues 
earned would be weather-dependant. 
An interesting and required area of research is the potential need for weather derivative 
products. In the initial stages, for the market to grow, there would be need for a large 
number of market players. Taking the agricultural sector in India as the one which could 
benefit the most, this could be a good starting point for research. Research into the 
demand for weather derivatives and willingness to invest in such products would give an 
insight into the potential market and the manner in which they could be structured. Such a 
study has not been done in India, and this could possibly boost the market, while 
simultaneously be a feed into regulatory and policy issues which would have to be in 
place as the market takes off. 
India has experimented with the crop insurance progranune for many years. Whilst most 
of the schemes have been government programmes, a few private players have ventured 
into the field. However, the primary question has been of not just what an Indian farmer 
is able to pay, but also of what he is willing to pay. Unfortunately, most debates start with 
an assumption that a farmer would not be able to pay for hedging his yield, and so the 
government would necessarily have to subsidise any scheme that is floated. 
An empirical study into farmers' willingness to pay for a weather derivative would give 
the required insight into the structuring of such products, whether such products can be 
introduced without any government subsidy, as has been the case with all crop insurance 
thus-far, and the viability of private players coming up with innovative hedging products 
for farmers. 
Literature Review 
The review of literature has been done in two parts. The first is on the various crop 
insurance schemes which have been floated in India, and the lessons learnt from these. 
This also discusses the commodity derivative exchanges and commodity derivatives 
trading in India, and the lessons learnt from these. Part two brings out the history of 
weather derivatives and structures commonly used. It also brings out methods which 
could be used for pricing weather derivatives and techniques for determining willingness 
to pay for such products. This sets the pace for the study on the prospects and challenges 
of introducing weather derivatives in India. 
The Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) and the National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NAIS) of the Government of India, as well as the Varsha Bima 
scheme of the Agriculture Insurance Company of India, have been studied in order to 
draw on the lessons learnt from crop insurance in the Indian context. What emerges is 
that the traditional crop insurance schemes in India have been plagued with many 
problems and have met with very limited success. Some of the predominant issues relate 
to moral hazard, adverse selection, delays in payouts and the very high payout to 
premium-receipt ratio. Crop insurance in India has become a sort of loan-insurance. The 
benefit actually goes to the providers of the loan, whilst the premium is paid by the 
farmer. 
A study has also been done of the commodity markets in India. The Indian Commodity 
markets are far behind those in developed countries. This is mainly because of the long 
period of prohibition in forward trading in major commodities. There are a lot of lessons 
to be learnt from the process of introduction of derivatives trading in securities which 
have been to quite an extent extrapolated to trading in commodity derivatives. Lessons 
from both these experiments need to be kept in mind when the introduction to weather 
derivative trading takes place in India. Both, the LC Gupta committee report and the JR 
Varma group report, have been studied in detail, since these went into the regulatory 
issues prior to introduction of derivatives in India. 
A limited amount of research has been done on weather derivatives the world over. This 
is especially so with regard to willingness-to-pay and with regard to valuation techniques. 
While various types of indices have been used to varying extents, the most common 
index used in the US and Europe is the temperature index. This is probably because one 
of the major factors for the growth of Weather Derivatives was the deregulation of the 
energy markets in the US (Alaton et al, 2002). Until a few years ago, 98-99% of Weather 
Derivatives traded were based on temperature (Garman et al,2000) 
In spite of the obvious need for universal pricing in the Weather Derivatives market, no 
standard pricing models are in place. Unlike other financial markets, there is no real 
common language in the weather market. Many market makers have developed their 
own models which they use only for their purposes and which they rarely share with 
others. 
Methods of evaluating willingness-to-pay have been studied. One of the methods, which 
has been used fairly extensively is the Contingent Valuation (CV) method. Contingent 
Valuation uses surveys to obtain responses to hypothetical situations and then determines 
preferences through respondents' willingness to pay for a service which is proposed to be 
introduced or for an improvement in an existing service. The method is named so because 
it determines 'willingness to pay' values which are contingent upon a hypothetical 
situation or market which is described to the respondent. 
Research Objectives and Methodology 
There were three major objectives of this research: 
• Theoretically estimate the amount that a typical farmer might be willing to pay for 
weather-risk hedging and the magnitude of the basis risk, which is considered an 
important limitation for these products. Thereafter, empirically evaluate the 
appeal of weather derivative products to farmers and their willingness to invest in 
these products in order to hedge weather related risks, through a survey. 
• Study the policy and regulatory framework for derivative trading in India and see 
how these could be adapted for weather derivatives trading in the Indian context. 
• Study existing models for pricing weather derivatives and to study how they could 
be adapted for Indian conditions. 
The empirical framework of the study attempts to bring out farmers' preferences vis-a-vis 
various services related to hedging of crop yield through stated preference techniques. It 
then uses the contingent valuation technique to value their willingness to pay for such 
products. 
The questionnaire finally designed covered questions that concern 
• Demographics of the sample (age, education, family size, income etc.) 
• Type of losses suffered, attributable to weather 
• Awareness of weather risk issues 
• Awareness of weather risk hedging methods 
5 
• Willingness to invest in weather derivatives to hedge weather risks 
• Preferences for various types of weather derivative products 
A bidding game is used in the questionnaire to determine yes or no responses to various 
bids for weather derivative pricing. A Random Utility model is used, and logit and probit 
estimations are done using LIMDEP software. 
Theoretical Analyses 
A theoretical framework is attempted which would be able to give an estimate of the 
'willingness to pay' for hedging the weather risks. This is based on the expected utility 
for a farmer growing a crop. It builds in some simplifying assumptions and includes the 
cost of and the gain from a possible hedge on the portion of yield variability, which could 
be attributed to rainfall dependence. An empirical analysis based on the gross production 
of soyabean in the district of Jhalawar in the state of Rajasthan is done to give a rough 
estimate of what would be the aggregate willingness to pay in order to cover yield risk. 
For a farmer growing a crop, his expected utility can be expressed as 
E(U) = E ( S ) - C - R 
Where E (U) is the expected utility, E(S) is the expected sale price, C is the cost of inputs 
and R is a risk premium. 
Utility is maximized with respect to planned production. Thereafter, the case where the 
farmer has an option to hedge the weather risk through purchase of weather derivatives 
is introduced. The cost of hedging, that is, the amount paid by the farmer as premium, is 
included in the cost of inputs. First order condition are got by differentiating expected 
utility at time t, E(Ut), with respect to planned production qt and the amount of hedging h. 
A dataset of soyabean production, inputs etc for the 23 years 1982 to 2004 at Jhalawar 
district in the southern part of the state of Rajasthan, is used for the empirical study. The 
study indicates that the demand for weather derivatives as a shield against volumetric risk 
in the case of soyabean in the district of Jhalawar in Rajasthan exists and would be of the 
order of around 5.47% of the sale price that a farmer would get from his produce. 
^^^^^^ 
One of the major challenges of weather derivatives is that climatic variability occurs on 
spatial and temporal scales. This is not too evident in the case of temperature, but could 
have significant effects on derivatives based on rainfall. 
Geographic basis risk in the case of weather derivatives can be defined as the risk that 
the payout does not correspond with the deviation in the underlying weather parameter at 
the location at which hedging is desired. This, typically comes in when the weather 
station , data from which is used for deriving the index, is located at a distance away from 
the location at which hedging is desired. 
In order to establish the intensity of the issue, data was used from two weather stations 
located close to each other and the correlations in rainfall were studied. Daily rainfall 
data from the India Meteorological Department for the 30 year period from 1975 to 2005 
was used for the study. 
It could be concluded that for short term rainfall-index based weather derivative 
contracts, the location of the weather station vis-a-vis the contract location assumes 
special significance. For longer term contracts, the use of proxy weather stations could be 
justified to a certain extent. 
The Survey 
The questionnaire-based survey was conducted with a broad objective of overall 
assessment of floated crop insurance schemes, appeal of weather derivative products and 
farmers' willingness to pay for such schemes. It was conducted in two districts viz., 
Jhalawar and Tonk of Rajasthan where the AIC has launched crop insurance schemes. 
These districts were chosen based on the district-wise number of policies sold in the 
Varsha Bima-2006 scheme and the Rabi Weather Insurance scheme 2006-07. 
Various elicitation methods were studied, and the bidding-game method was considered 
the one with the maximum advantages in the scenario. Considering the level of the 
presently charged premiums for crop weather insurance, it was decided to start the bid at 
10% of the value of the maximum payout of the weather derivative, ie., the farmer would 
be willing to pay Rs 100 for a possible payout of Rs 1000 from the weather derivative. 
Subsequent steps of the bidding game were kept at 8%, 5%, 3% and finally at 2%. Thus 
there were five steps designed into the bidding game. 
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Prior to the survey, a focus group discussion was held in one of the villages. This was 
followed by pilot testing of the questionnaire. The final questionnaire included a script 
which was used to describe the concept of the proposed weather derivatives. This script 
was tried out during the pre-testing, and was subsequently modified, taking into account 
the learnings from the responses. 
A sample size of just over 500 was used; this gave a confidence interval of 0.042 ie. 4.2% 
with a confidence level of 95%. 
Findings of the Survey 
Expectedly, 98% of the respondents indicated that they go through mental stress, 
worrying about abnormal rainfall and how it would affect their crops. 
While 68% said that worries about abnormal rainfall stresses them to a very large extent, 
31% said that it stresses them somewhat. (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Mental stress - rainfall uncertainty 
Satisfaction levels were found to be fairly high (85%) with the two schemes launched by 
AIC in the recent past - Varsha Bima and Rabi Crop insurance. Between the two 
districts, satisfaction levels were much higher in Tonk. In Jhalawar, most of those who 
had reservations about their satisfaction with the schemes, attributed these to time taken 
in and difficulties related to the receipt of the claim amount. 
Surprisingly, only 36% felt that the procedures of the schemes were very clear and 
transparent. This could very well indicate that a large number of farmers are going in for 
the schemes only because others are opting for them, without being fully aware of the 
nuances. This might not be a sustainable situation in the long-run and indicates a need for 
more branding, awareness building of procedures and larger inputs for training the 
villagers about the schemes. 
Before going on to the section on weather derivatives in the questionnaire, each 
respondent was individually explained the concept behind the derivative products. The 
proposed weather derivative schemes were received fairly enthusiastically by the 
respondents. 92% of them felt that the schemes could help them either to a very large 
extent or to a fair extent. 
About 40% of the respondents would prefer to hedge when rainfall will be below 20 
percent from the normal. Slightly more than one fifth of the respondents wouldn't mind 
risking a 30% variation in rainfall before hedging. A mean of the responses indicates that 
the respondents are willing to take a chance with rainfall being 24.9% below normal 
before they would want to hedge their risk. 
Similarly, farmers would want to go in for a hedge against high temperatures only when 
the temperature levels go to between 5 to 10% above normal. A mean of the responses 
indicates that farmers are willing to take a chance with temperature being 7.1% above 
normal before they would want to hedge their risk. 
Close to 90% of the respondents expressed that they would have a better sense of comfort 
with government controlled and manned weather recording stations than with privately 
manned stations. Also, an extremely large number of respondents preferred to go in for 
weather derivative schemes offered by the government, as against those offered by 
private agencies. 
About a quarter of the respondents indicated a preference for going in for village level 
schemes; however, most either preferred to go it alone or to go in for schemes which 
would permit small, self-formed groups (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 Respondents' preference to buy weather derivatives as individuals or in 
groups 
The valuation section of the survey comprised a bidding game, where respondents were 
asked to indicate with a YES or NO answer whether they would be willing to pay a 
certain amount for a weather derivative which would provide a maximum payout of Rs 
1000. At the end of the bidding game, the respondents were also asked the amount that 
they would be willing to set aside in a month solely for the purpose of hedging their 
weather related risks through purchasing weather derivatives or insurance. 
With the largest number of farmers, the game stopped at a bid of 5%, with a very small 
number taking the game to a bid below that. In fact the number of respondents who 
indicated a Yes at a bid value less than Rs 50 was only 8.7%. 
Expectedly, it was seen that those who indicated a higher amount that they were able to 
save in a month out of their total income, also indicated a Yes at a higher bid value 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Mean of Highest Bid Value - Related to monthly savings 
Since the CV responses were either Yes or No to a particular bid, the response could be 
taken as a binary variable and a statistical model appropriate for a discrete dependant 
variable could be used. The intention was to be able to analyse covariate effects on 
responses eg. the effect of education, age, awareness of insurance schemes etc on the 
willingness to pay. 
The basic concept used is that of the Random Utility Model (RUM) devised by 
Hanemann (1984), where a respondent answers 'Yes' to a payment if he perceives that 
the benefits which would accrue by paying that amount are greater than the cost of 
paying for it. Preferences for Willingness to Pay would differ across individuals based on 
their social-demographic characteristics, and their preferences on the type of structuring 
that the weather derivatives should have. 
In order to understand the determinants of respondents' willingness to pay for weather 
derivatives which would be consistent with intuition and with economic demand theory, a 
series of multivariate regression analyses were performed with the survey data. Those 
variables having little effect on the dependant variable were left out from the final model. 
These included source of income, landholding, type of crop grown, total produce, source 
of worry in terms of yield/price risk, satisfaction levels with previous schemes, whether 
the farmer had taken loans in the past, and whether he had any outstanding loans. 
In our final model, 9 variables viz., education, age, monthly savings, livestock holding, 
perceptions on surety of yield, awareness of crop insurance schemes, preference of 
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weather factor to hedge, preference for time period of contract and preference for 
individual vs group schemes were taken as independent variables. 
Linear random utility probit and logit models are fitted with the model: 
Pr(Yes) = Pr [ 0 < (al edu+ a2age+ a3 mon_sav+ a4 live+ a5 ysrty 
+ a6 iawar+ a7 hpref+ a8 ctim+ a9 gpref - P t)/a ) ] 
Haab and McConnel, 2002 explain WTP in a random utility model as : 
a iZj +p(yj - WTPj) + Sji = ooZj + Pyj +8jo 
where yj = income of jth respondent 
Zj = vector of attributes and characteristics 
e ij = Non observable (inherent to the respondent) component of 
preferences 
So, WTP3=az3/p + ej/p 
Uncertainty from randomness of preferences £) / P has mean zero; so the expectation of 
willingness to pay with respect to preference uncertainty (E) is: 
E^  (WTPj I a, p, Zj) = azj/p 
Both, the Probit and Logit models give close to identical results of willingness to pay, as 
can be seen from tables I and 2. These values are Rs 87.994 and Rs 87.993 respectively. 
Table 1 Calcttlation of mean WTP with normal utility function 
Parameter 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
Coefficient 
0.1276 
0,060084 
0.054596 
0.246784 
0.054495 
Mean 
2.652985 
3.264925 
4.035448 
1.899254 
3.235075 
Coeff*Mean (cxzj) 
0.33852055 
0.196169188 
0.220317329 
0.468706154 
0.17629481 
IVIeanWTP{azj/P) 
rV 
Parameter 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CUM 
GPREF 
Coefficient 
0.287346 
0.116151 
0.12674 
0.089808 
Mean 
1.514925 
2,429104 
4.889925 
1.891791 
Coeff*Mean (azj) 
0.435307518 
0.282142137 
0.619751097 
0.169897421 
2.907106204 
Mean WTP (ozj/P) 
87.99416 
Table 2 Calculation of mean WTP with logarithmic utility function 
Parameter 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
GPREF 
Coefficient 
0.228512 
0.111787 
0.08454 
0.451776 
0.109929 
0.516946 
0.194879 
0.21667 
0.140089 
Mean 
2.652985 
3,264925 
4.035448 
1.899254 
3.235075 
1.514925 
2.429104 
4.889925 
1.891791 
Coeff*Mean (ozj) 
0.606237969 
0.364976571 
0.341156592 
0.858037652 
0.35562826 
0.783134989 
0.473381646 
1.059502379 
0.265018907 
5.107074967 
Mean WTP 
(CCj/P) 
87.99279 
Given that in our questionnaire, when posed with a certain bid amount, the fanners were 
asked to respond with a simple 'Yes' or 'No' response, the probability that they would 
say 'Yes' at a particular bid amount is given by: 
Probability (Yes ) = 1 - { 1 + exp [a Zj - p (bid amount)]} "' 
The probabilities of getting a 'Yes' response at various bid levels are indicated in figure 
4. 
The results make intuitive sense - the probability of a 'Yes' response increases as the bid 
amount decreases. 
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Figure 4 Probability of a 'Yes' response at various bid levels 
Regulatory Issues 
It has been recognised by most users of weather derivatives {Bates, 2004) that the two 
obvious benefits of a regulatory framework for them would be: 
(i) barriers to cross-border business in weather derivatives can be overcome easily 
(ii) it would make sure that these instruments do not get inappropriately treated as 
insurance contracts and get subjected to insurance regulation. 
As for any other derivatives, for the introduction of weather derivatives trading in India, 
there is a need for a regulatory framework. However, the aim needs to be to form broad, 
overall regulations. If the regulatory framework is too prescriptive and too narrow, it 
could curb the development of the weather derivative market, which is already late in 
India, as compared to the USA or Europe. 
The existing legal framework for derivatives trading in India has been studied, both to 
draw out the lessons learnt and to be able to identify initiatives required for weather 
derivative trading in the country. The Forward Contract (Regulation) Act (FCRA) was 
passed by the Indian parliament and came into being in 1952. Although 56 years old, this 
act still governs futures trading in commodities in India. The Securities Contracts 
fH 
(Regulation) Act (SCRA), 1956, the Securities Laws (amendment) Ordinance, 1995, The 
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Bill, 1998 and the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 
1999 have been studied with the specific intent to bring out their relevance to weather 
derivatives in India. 
Some of the regulatory initiatives required for weather derivatives suggested are: 
• Regulatory framework for other derivatives can easily be extended for weather 
derivatives 
Exchange traded and OTC trades must both be catered for 
FII investments would increase depth of market 
Necessity of conducting research and disseminating education on weather 
derivatives needs to be built into the regulatory framework 
Need for easy and readily available weather data 
Accuracy of weather data and its cost 
Dissemination, on a real-time basis, of weather forecasts 
Regulation on advisors 
Should be introduced in existing commodity exchanges 
Re-channeling of government subsidies 
Bare-minimum' approach to regulation till the market takes off 
Tax treatment of weather derivatives, especially for small farmer 
It is also brought out that as there is a build-up of the availability of high quality 
meteorological data and weather forecasts, there will have to be directives for the re-use 
and sale of information generated by the public sector. These would include equitable 
availability of information, clarity and transparency in conditions for as well as charges 
for re-use of information, methods for fixing of charges as well as upper limits for these 
charges etc. 
The Regulatory scope, while being defined, should include a reference to geological 
variables, which might later come into the ambit of innovative weather derivative 
products. As an example, volume of river flow might be a derivative product in future. 
A survey would be the best method of determining the kind of weather derivative 
contracts required. However, a-priori, a large number of contracts with various 
underlying indices and expiry periods, will be useful. 
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Valuation 
While the scope of weather derivatives is enormous, there are the accompanying 
challenges of valuing and pricing the derivatives to not only be financially viable 
instruments, but also be instruments with appeal to the financially weaker sections of 
society, viz. the farmers. 
Whilst the methods of valuing equity options are fairly well defined, this is not so in the 
case of weather derivatives. The major reason is that, unlike as in equity options, we 
cannot assign a monetary value to the underlying ie. the weather, in the case of weather 
derivatives. Thus a no-arbitrage option pricing model such as the Black-Scholes model 
{Black and Scholes, 1973) is not a practical pricing tool for weather derivatives. 
In the case of weather derivatives, two methods of valuation can be perceived. The first is 
to determine the value based on the probabilities of possible outcomes. This is called 
actuarial pricing. The second is to use market price as the value. Obviously the second 
method would only be possible if an observable market for weather options exists. This 
not being the case in India at present, weather options pricing based on actuarial 
techniques is probably the way forward. 
In the absence of a market in the Indian context, a hypothetical market is discussed, and 
how a contract could be structured when weather derivative trading is introduced, is 
suggested. 
One of the main reasons for the upsurge in volumes in the financial derivatives market in 
the 1980s was the general acceptance of the Black-Scholes model for pricing of options. 
Such a common model is still not in place in the case of weather derivatives, which has 
an acceptance across all prospective players. 
This highlights the need for a simple method for pricing weather derivatives, so that it 
can be universally applied and is transparent enough for the players in the market to 
comprehend it. 
Once again, data is considered from the point of view of farmers growing Soyabean in 
district Jhalawar in the state of Rajasthan. The crop is usually harvested in end 
October/November. A hypothetical situation is considered, with the availability of 
rainfall options on an index which is the aggregate rainfall in the period 16 June to 15 
October, and where the farmer has been long in one put option every year in the past. 
The fair price of the option would be the mean of the payout against the sale of the 
option in the period considered. In the method of determining the price of the option 
used, a sensitivity analysis is done on the variation of the tick size, and a tick size is 
determined, which gives the maximum reduction in the average deviation of the farmer's 
income. In other words, we are striving for a situation where the intention is to steady the 
farmer's income to the largest extent possible by hedging the weather risk to his crop 
yield. 
With this social welfare target in mind, an attempt is made to see whether the amount of 
premium determined through using the willingness to pay figures, determined through 
the survey in Jhalawar, would make the put option financially viable from the point of 
view of the seller of the option. 
The incomes of a farmer at Jhalawar, growing soyabean on one hectare of land, in the 12 
years considered in the past, without hedging, and with hedging through being long on 
one put option, are indicated in fig 5. Also indicated on the same graph are the gain/loss 
in each of the years which the farmer would have had. 
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Figure 5 Income of the farmer with and without hedging 
Since the amount of data available (12 years) is small, a monte-carlo simulation was done 
to generate values for the payout from the option with random values for the actual 
n 
rainfall. This was done on EXCEL, using the RISKSIM add-in. A total of 500 
simulations were done. 
The mean value of the payout to the put option over 500 simulations was determined to 
be Rs 161.07 when the strike value is fixed as the mean of the rainfall in the 12 years 
considered. 
This implies that the seller of the option has a surplus of 14.05% over the mean payout, if 
he collects a premium of 8.8%, which is the maximum willingness- to- pay indicated by 
the farmers in Jhalawar for hedging weather risks to yield. This amount is likely to be 
adequate to cover administrative and other costs. 
The figures derived indicate the feasibility of introducing weather derivatives as an 
investment option for small farmers to hedge the weather related yield risk which they 
face. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis looks at the opportunities and the challenges that will be thrown up as we 
adopt weather derivatives as a form of risk management of crop yield, in the country. 
A summary of the important findings in the thesis are enumerated below: 
1. An empirical estimation of the willingness-to-pay by farmers growing soyabean 
in the Jhalawar district of Rajasthan, based on a theoretical model, yields a figure 
of 5.5% of the average MSP for soyabean. 
2. Basis risk is an important consideration in weather derivatives. Based on a study 
of rainfall patterns at two weather stations, located close to each other, it was 
concluded that for short-term rainfall-index based weather derivative contracts, 
the location of the weather station assumes significance. For longer term 
contracts, the use of proxy weather stations could be justified to a n extent. 
3. 98% of farmers go through mental stress, worrying about the affect of abnormal 
rainfall on their crops. 
4. Awareness levels of existing crop insurance schemes are low. 
5. The proposed weather derivatives schemes were received enthusiastically by the 
farmers; 92% farmers feel that weather derivative schemes would help them in 
mitigating weather-related risks. 
6. A very large proportion of farmers prefer to go in for weather derivative schemes 
offered by the government 
\% 
7. Willingness-to-pay for weather derivatives is determined to be approximately 
8.8% of the maximum payout of the weather derivative contract. 
8. Especially in the initial stages of introduction of weather derivatives in India, 
pricing of weather derivatives needs to be done through actuarial techniques, 
keeping in mind the social welfare aspect of stabilising the farmers' income 
against the vagaries of weather. 
9. Some initiatives required while introducing weather derivatives are listed below: 
(i) Infrastructure. One of the important requirements for the spread of 
weather derivatives in India would be the availability and reliability of 
weather data. Infrastructure, in the form of computerized mini-weather 
stations at village level, will need to come up in the form of public goods, 
providing real-time weather data. The government could play a major role 
in this and one suggestion is to divert the money going into subsidies for 
crop insurance schemes to providing weather station infrastructure and 
letting private players come up with innovative weather derivative 
products. 
(ii) Payment facilities. With the spread of ICT kiosks at the village level, 
farmers could be encouraged to trade in weather derivatives and make 
payments/receive money through the internet. This would require a fair 
amount of awareness generation and training, but it could considerably 
lower transaction costs of the weather derivatives. 
(iii) Pilots. The regulatory agency for weather derivatives would need to 
encourage providers to carry out a large number of pilot projects in 
weather derivative products in order to understand the needs, to assess the 
kinds of products structuring required and to address the challenges. 
(iv) Pricing. There are two issues in pricing. Firstly, the market makers, or the 
agencies which decide to, as an example, be short in put options on 
rainfall, would need to be convinced that the pricing of the options is such 
that their risk is either covered, or can be reinsured in some other market. 
Secondly, the pricing has to be such that it is within the amount that 
buyers of the put option, say farmers, are willing to pay. 
(v) Experimentation. The regulatory and policy environment should be such 
that experimentation in innovative products is not discouraged. 
(vi) Dissemination. Results and recommendations from academic studies and 
learning's from pilot projects would need to be actively disseminated. 
This could be done through stakeholder workshops. 
r^ 
(vii) Government role. The government would need to move away from an 
"intervention" role, (for example government intervention takes place 
through subsidizing crop insurance), to that of a "facilitator" for weather 
derivatives. Similarly, subsidies provided by the government would need 
to be re-channeled. Directly subsidizing financial services would 
discourage innovations by providers, in product designs and pilot testing. 
As an example, the various crop insurance products subsidized by the 
Central/State government have dissuaded private players from 
participating by coming up with their own products. 
(viii) Information sharing. Credit information sharing between various 
players could help in reducing risks and costs. This aspect needs to be 
studied further for implementation. 
Limitations of the Study 
A significant number of farmers are either illiterate or unaware of possibilities of weather 
risk hedging. Issues surrounding the provision of a hedge against weather could be 
complex in the face of heterogeneity of opinion on the efficacy of a scheme like weather 
derivatives trading. A lack of awareness of the possible benefits of such instruments, 
itself, might influence the willingness of a farmer to opt for them. Although a very 
serious attempt was made to educate the farmers on weather derivatives, prior to their 
answering the questionnaire, this might not be adequate to give them a comprehensive 
understanding. As such, a study of willingness to invest might be affected by factors 
other than socio-economic factors. 
Regulatory and Policy recommendations suggested would have considerably large 
monetary and fiscal implications, which would have to be borne in mind. 
The Contingent Valuation study to determine willingness-to-pay may have the following 
limitations: 
i. The answers to the valuation questions may actually bring out feelings 
that the farmer may have on the issue at hand, rather than his actual 
willingness to pay. 
ii. There may be a fundamental difference in the manner in which the 
respondent makes a hypothetical decision as compared to an actual 
v^  
decision which he may need to take later, when weather derivatives are 
actually introduced, 
iii. Respondents might not have taken the willingness to pay questions 
seriously, since they do not have to pay the stated amount. 
iv. The starting bid may have had an effect on the respondents' answers 
V. Respondents might have given strategic answers ie. they may have 
answered in a way which they feel might influence the outcome of the 
study to their benefit. 
Scope for Future Research 
The scope for future research in weather derivatives is enormous. Some of the 
areas in which research can be done are: 
i. the appeal, the demand and the willingness-to-pay for weather derivatives 
in different businesses. This would help in structuring weather derivative 
products which would be demand across businesses, 
ii. the possibility and the scope of building a composite index of rainfall and 
temperature. This would be useful for weather derivatives for hedging 
weather risk in some crops, whose growth is highly dependant on both 
rainfall and temperature, 
iii. the costs of setting-up a large network of reliable weather stations, 
iv. the effect of meteorological forecasts on the prices of weather derivative 
products. This could be done after a market for these products is in place. 
V. portfolio effects of weather derivatives, 
vi. correlations between weather derivative contracts and commodity futures 
prices. 
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Preface 
This thesis studies the prospects and challenges of the introduction of weather 
derivatives in India. It specifically focuses on the weather-related risk mitigation 
methods which farmers in a developing country, like India, could use. Keeping in 
mind the fact that in the agricultural sector, the dependence of yield patterns on 
rainfall is very high, weather derivatives have been shown to be a way for 
farmers to hedge their weather related risks. 
The study of literature reveals that a large number of attempts have been made, 
especially by the government, to provide crop insurance in some form or other, 
to fanners. However, these have met with limited success. This thesis brings out 
the feasibility and the advantages of introducing weather derivatives as a means 
of hedging yield risk in the agricultural sector. 
A theoretical analysis of willingness to pay, in order to hedge weather-related 
risk, has been done based on the expected utility for a farmer growing a crop. An 
empirical study on this model has been done using data of soyabean growing 
farmers in Jhalawar district, in order to determine a theoretical figure for 
willingness to pay to hedge yield risk. 
Basis risk is an important element, especially in the case of rainfall related 
weather derivative products. The intensity of basis risk and the pattern of this 
risk has been brought out in the thesis through a study of rainfall data in a 30 
year period at two closely located weather recording stations. 
A major component of the thesis is based on an extensive questionnaire based 
survey done in six villages in two districts in the state of Rajasthan. The survey 
not only brings out awareness levels of weather risk issues amongst farmers, but 
also their willingness to pay for weather derivatives. The method adopted and the 
results obtained would be a pre-cursor to other such surveys, which could be 
done in various locations prior to introduction of weather derivatives. 
The willingness to pay for weather derivatives has been determined through 
contingent valuation, using probit and logit models. The value determined would 
give an indication to the kind of pricing and structuring that could be done when 
weather derivatives are introduced in India. 
The thesis also goes into the regulatory issues linked to derivatives trading, and 
how these could be extrapolated to the weather derivative market. 
Finally, pricing issues are looked at from a social-benefit point of view, and a 
method of valuation based on stabilization of farmers' income is brought out. 
The thesis brings out the feasibility of valuing weather derivatives such that they 
are within the derived willingness-to-pay figures, as well are financially viable 
instruments for the market. 
Introduction 
Agriculture, especially in developing countries, is a sector which is vulnerable to 
risks of various types. Most importantly, weather-related risks play a major role 
in affecting agricultural income. These would include extreme rainfall, both high 
and low, which result in floods/droughts, as well as extreme temperature events. 
Poor, small farmers are especially susceptible to income variability because of 
weather-related risks to their crops. In fact, even those rural poor who are not 
directly involved in agricultural production get affected because their incomes 
are often tied to the success of the agricultural production {Barnett andMahul, 
2007). 
Traditionally, small farmers and the rural poor have used various types of 
mitigation techniques for weather-related risks to their income. These include 
savings, selling their assets, selling their livestock etc. However, the implied 
premium on these types of techniques was estimated by Rosenzweig and 
Biswanger (1993) to be as high as 35%. 
Besides agriculture, with climate change becoming an accepted phenomenon the 
world across, attention is increasingly being paid to the effects of weather on 
businesses. At the same time, it is obvious that whatever the type of weather, or 
whatever the effects of climate change on weather, there will always be some 
businesses, which would gain, and some which would suffer considerable losses. 
Rain, for example, could be beneficial to agriculture, while at the same time 
could adversely affect the business of an event management company. 
In general, whenever risk of any kind is to be hedged, various instruments have 
been developed and have been used in the past. For protection against financial 
loss of some kind there have been various instruments used for hedging. One of 
these is derivatives. A derivative can be defined as a product whose value 
depends on the risk factors of one or more assets. These instruments can be 
used as a means of protection against possible adverse market movements 
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through offsetting exposures or shifting risks. They are particularly useful 
during periods of volatility. 
The main challenge in managing finances comes from market uncertainties. 
Large fluctuations in prices of assets are equally harmful to all parties 
concerned. To hedge against price volatility, different devices have been used in 
the history of business. Forward contracts, used as a means for fixing the price 
for future trading, have been in vogue for long. These then, developed into 
various forms. 
The main mechanism lay in both parties agreeing upon rights to ignore physical 
delivery and accept the settlement of price differentials. Thus, we have contracts 
which are, in a sense, virtual. The risky asset underlies the contract; in other 
words, the contract derives its value out of the volatility of the asset. 
As a realization of the risk management capacity of derivatives grew, markets for 
these products developed. Today, they are widely used to promote efficient 
allocation of capital across economies, so as to increase productivity. This is so 
in India and other developing countries, as well. Commodity derivatives markets 
started in India with cotton in 1875, oilseeds in 1900, and jute and jute products 
in 1912. Forward markets in wheat started at Hapur in 1913 and in bullion at 
Bombay in 1920 (Kolamkar, 2002). The commodity futures trading in India had 
a long and healthy existence until all derivatives trading was banned in the 
1960s. Section 20 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA) 
prohibited all options in securities. In 1969, by a notification under this act, the 
Government prohibited all forward trading in Securities. So when trading in 
derivatives was to be introduced, these prohibitions had to be withdrawn. This 
was done in 1995. 
But the market for derivatives could not take-off since there was no regulatory 
framework in place to govern trading of derivatives. In 1996, the Prof LC Gupta 
Committee was set-up to develop a regulatory framework for derivatives trading 
in India. One of the major recommendations was that derivatives should be 
declared as securities, so that the regulatory framework for securities trading 
could be used for derivatives trading. This was done in 1999, when the SCRA 
was amended to include derivatives within the ambit of 'securities'. However, 
derivatives were defined to include: 
a) a security derived ft-om a debt instrument, share, loan, or any other form of 
security; and 
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b) a contract which derives its value from the prices, or index of prices, or 
underiying securities. 
Derivatives trading then began in June 2000, initially in index futures, and then 
in options on indices as well as on individual securities. Trading in stock futures 
commenced in November 2001. 
This was subsequently followed by derivatives trading in commodities, an area 
which has a direct impact on farmers. For example, future market prices carry 
signals back to farmers and help them to make sowing decisions. Thus a system 
of futures markets can help farmers to improve cropping patterns and 
production patterns based on market prices (Thomas, 2002). 
1.1 Weather derivatives 
Controlling weather is not something we can do very much about - however, 
controlling the risks to a business due to the effect of weather is possible through 
the use of weather derivative products. 
Weather derivatives are a newer form of derivatives. The first of such contracts 
was signed in 1997 in the United States of America. 
A financial weather contract can be defined as a "weather contingent contract 
whose payoff v^ll be in an amount of cash determined by future weather events" 
(Dischel and Barren, 2002). The settlement value of these weather events is 
determined from a weather index, expressed as values of a weather variable 
measured at a stated location. 
Across many countries there have been contracts in the form of "weather 
insurances" and in the form of "weather derivatives". While weather insurance is 
basically a type of weather derivative - since it also derives its payoff value based 
on an underlying weather index, there are essential regulatory issues which 
differentiate the two. 
From other financial derivatives, however, weather derivatives do have some 
major differences. The most important of these is that while the financial 
derivatives are used to hedge an underlying asset, weather derivatives are used 
in an indirect way, being used to hedge the risks associated with the underlying 
asset and not the asset itself. This is because weather cannot be priced. Gold 
derivatives could be used to hedge against fluctuations in the price of gold. But 
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this can be done because gold itself is traded and has a price - and so the price 
of the gold derivative could be derived from the price of gold. However, since 
weather is not priced and is not a tradeable quantity, weather derivatives are 
used in an indirect way, to hedge against the risks associated with weather. 
However, this then leads to the difficulty in pricing weather derivatives. 
The impact of weather on business activities is enormous and, obviously, varies 
with the business, the location and with climate change. As an example, the air-
conditioning industry would be affected by a cooler-than-normal summer, in 
which sales would come down. Similarly geyser manufacturers would have an 
upswing in sales if a winter was colder than normal. Weather could affect many 
industries in many different ways: 
• agricultural produce would be affected by the lack of rainfall 
• ice-cream companies would have less sales when the summer is less 
severe 
• air-coolers and air conditioners would sell less in a milder summer 
• a construction company would have a lower availability of labour when 
the winter is severe / rainfall is very high 
In the agricultural sector, the amount of rainfall could make a significant 
difference to the yield patterns. This would be even more prominent in 
developing countries like India, where about 60% of the agricultural produce is 
dependent on the rainfall. 
In general, almost all businesses are either adversely or favourably affected by 
the weather (Figure 1.1). 
Rgure 1.1. Some of the sectors/industries affected by weather. 
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In the United States of America, it is estimated that about one-seventh of the 
economy is sensitive to vy^ eather risk (Gakos,i999). In India, where there is a 
high dependence on agriculture, a significant portion of the economy would be 
sensitive to weather risk. 
Whilst the weather poses a lot of challenges it, at the same time, throws up a lot 
of opportunities. Trading on the weather could help in hedging risks. Besides 
this, it could be an innovative product in portfolio management. 
Many market makers have been entering the weather markets, and many more 
who are in the risk management market would be able to find value in the 
dynamics of the weather market. Besides swapping risks in different 
geographical locations in the world, holding of weather derivative contracts 
creates a diversity in portfolios, which most risk managers would look for. Cross 
trading of weather and commodities is another arena. For example, sellers of 
rainfall derivatives may buy futures in commodities where the lack of rainfall 
could result in shortages and so drive up prices. The combination of weather and 
related commodity risks adds depth and breadth to the weather market and is 
the source of innovative products in the risk management arena (Sattiah and 
Gunaranjan, 2005). 
Upfront, it is understood that weather derivatives are essentially for hedging 
volume risk and not for price risk — Energy companies hedge the volume of 
energy demand, winter clothing manufacturers hedge the volume of woollens 
sold, farmers can hedge the volume of yield. Pricing and payouts therefore will 
necessarily have to be developed from expectations on the price based on 
historical data or projected data. 
In the conventional form, weather derivatives contracts would have attributes, 
which would be similar to those for other derivatives, albeit with some 
modifications. There would have to be an index, which for example, could be the 
average rainfall over a specified period, a clearly defined contract period, a 
weather station, which would be used as a reference, a tick rate and a pre-
decided premium. In addition, in order to restrict the maximum gain or loss, 
weather derivatives contracts usually have a specified upper limit. 
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The risk that is covered by weather derivatives includes the potential adverse 
impact of the weather on expected costs, revenues and cash flows. In India, most 
importantly, crop produce could be hedged against weather through weather 
derivatives. 
Although initial weather derivative contracts in the US and Europe involved 
energy companies, slowly other businesses have started realizing the advantages 
of these contracts. As thought is being given to weather contingent risks, it is 
also being realized that cost of weather risk, if removed, can help in lowering 
prices and increasing sales. 
One such example was the strategy adopted by Bombardier, a snow mobile 
manufacturer in Canada (Ladbury, 2000 ) . In the winter of 1998, the company 
offered a huge rebate to its customers if a pre-decided amount of snow did not 
fall in the season. This guarantee was made by the company by buying weather 
derivates with a snowfall index. As it happened, the snowfall that year was above 
the strike level decided and so the company did not receive any payout from the 
weather derivative. However, it more than made up for the cost of the derivative 
through the increased sales it had on its snowmobiles. 
Some examples, which can easily be foreseen in India, would be: 
(i) Winter clothing manufacturers would have a lowered sales figure if a 
winter season is less cold than normal, 
(ii) Appu-Ghar, and similar theme parks would have a lower number of 
visitors and merry-makers on rainy days, or on winter days when the sun 
does not come out. 
(iii) Builders and construction companies might have over-runs of timelines 
in their projects when less labourers report for work because of rain or 
because of excessively low temperatures in winter, 
(iv) Agricultural produce in many crops, especially in un-irrigated areas, 
would be affected by lack of, or at times, excessive rainfall, 
(v) Revenues from a cricket match would be considerably affected if rain 
washes out play. 
The origin of weather derivatives lies in the contracts initiated by Enron in 1997, 
and were structured as protection against warmer or cooler than average 
weather. From the energy sector, this new market spread to other industrial 
sectors and to countries other than the US. 
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The market grew rapidly and soon spread from the energy industry to other 
industries and from the USA to Europe and Japan. The weather derivatives 
market has steadily grown and now there are many companies, which have 
groups dedicated purely to the business of trading in weather derivatives. The 
Weather Risk Management Association (WRMA) has reported that weather 
derivatives trade in 2006 accounted for a notional value of over $45 billion. 
Initially the trading was over-the-counter, but slowly it spread to the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), the London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange (LIFFE) and other exchanges. Today, noticeably increased 
volumes of trading are apparent, and these are helping in market liquidity and 
price discovery (Chockalingam, 2003). 
Besides energy companies, the entry of banks provided a fillip to the growing 
demand for weather derivative contracts. From 1997, when the first recorded 
contract was signed, to March 2002, the total national value of all written 
transactions reached US$ 11.8 billion (WRMA 2002). But these were mainly 
concentrated in the US energy industry. ENRON, in particular had set up a 
weather desk, and this was instrumental in starting a weather trading market 
and creating liquidity (Stoppa and Hess ,2003). At one time, more than 40% of 
the outstanding notional value was held by ENRON. Luckily for the weather 
market, the collapse of ENRON did not affect the liquidity in the market. Other 
market players picked up the ENRON deals and it was obvious then, that the 
weather market had reached a critical mass, where the exit of a dominant player 
did not matter. 
Slowly banks started entering the fray. Societe Generale, Credit Lyonnais, 
Deutsche Bank and ABN AMRO entered fairly early. Another fillip was given 
when reinsurers like Svnss RE entered the market. In time, the World Bank 
Group discovered the potential of the markets to absorb weather risks in 
emerging markets, and the first known emerging market transactions took place 
in South Africa and Mexico iStoppa and Hess ,2003). 
One of the first indexes developed was the Heating Degree Day (HDD) index 
which was used by energy producers. The HDD index could be used to hedge 
fluctuations in revenue based on the demand for heating. It basically is an 
indicator of how many days had temperatures below a baseline temperature, 
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and how many degrees below. In the US, the baseline temperature was taken as 
65°F since this was the generally accepted temperature below which most people 
would require heating and so there would be an accompanying increase in 
demand for energy. On a particular day, the number of degrees that the average 
temperature of the day is below the baseline temperature determines the 
number of HDDs on that day. 
1.2 The importance of agriculture in India 
Whilst there has been a decline in the percentage of Agricultural GDP in the 
total GDP of India over the last three decades (Figure 1.2) , there has been a 
substantial growth in the absolute GDP of agriculture (Figure 1.3). Agriculture is 
still the largest economic sector and plays a significant role in the socio-
economic development of the country. 
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(Data from www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Statistics.aspx) 
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India is, today, the third largest producer of food in the world. However, inspite 
of the 'green revolution', agriculture witnessed a very modest 2.1% average 
annual growth rate during the ninth five year plan while total GDP grew at an 
average of 5.4% per annum {Chandrashekhar, 2004). Indian agriculture was 
given a fiUip through the National Agricultural Policy, 2000. 
The process of planned economic development in India began with the 
launching of the first five year plan in April 1951 (Prasad, 2006). Successive five 
year plans have aimed at improving inputs used by farmers including seeds, 
fertilizers, machinery etc. As a result, there has been a considerable increase in 
yield, not only of major foodgrains (Figure 1.4), but also of horticultural crops. 
3000 
t -
m 
0 
lO 
o> 
m lO 
s 
o> 
05 
in 
00 
m 
o> 
CO 
<V CM 
(O 
O) 
t^  
"l> 
<£> 
(C 
a> 
—^ 
t^  
0 
1^ 
O) 
in 
t^  
• * 
t^ 
o> 
o> 
t^  
00 
t^ 
o> 
Years 
CO 
00 
CM 
00 
O) 
t^ 
00 
(O 
00 
CJ> 
—^ 
o> 
0 
O) 
en 
in 
o> 
'T 
O) 
o> 
C3> 
Oi 
00 
o> O) 
CO 
0 
CM 
0 
0 
CM 
Figure 1.4 Yield per hectare of wheat (all India) 
(Data from Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, Indian Agriculture Statistics, 
2006) 
The agricultural sector occupies a key position in the Indian economy. It 
provides employment to about 65 percent of the working population of India 
{Prasad, 2006). 
But of significant importance is the fact that the monsoons still play a critical 
role in determining whether a harvest will be good or bad - and this, in turn, 
determines the fate of a large number of Indian farmers whose livelihood 
depends on the income from their lands. Rain-fed agriculture continues to play a 
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major role in India even today. Even though the percentage of irrigated area vis-
a-vis total sown area has increased over the years, even today, almost 60% of 
sown area is not irrigated and relies on rain (Figure 1.5). 
Years 
Figure 1.5 Percentage of irrigated area vs sown area 
(Data from Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, Indian Agriculture Statistics, 2006) 
Coupled with this is the fact that the productivity in India is very low as 
compared to the average yield in the world. This could be attributed to: 
(i) Illiteracy and lack of awareness of modem techniques, 
(ii) Inadequate and inefficient finance for agricultural produce, 
(iii) Low level of land holdings, 
(iv) Inadequate irrigation facilities. 
In the last few decades, several farmers have committed suicide in various states 
of India. These have mostly been attributed to large debts run-up by the farmers 
in the face of repeated crop failures. 
Amongst states, there is a significant variation in not only yield, but also in the 
area which is irrigated. Punjab, for example, produces 60% of India's wheat and 
40% of India's rice. Haryana is the second largest producer of foodgrains in 
India. 
1.3 Weather risk mitigation measures in India 
Weather risk mitigation measures in India began quite some years back with the 
government of India offering crop insurance through the Comprehensive Crop 
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Insurance Scheme starting 1985. Subsequently, the CCIS was replaced by the 
National Agriculture Insurance Scheme which was implemented from the Rabi 
season of 1999-2000. However, both these schemes did not meet with much 
success. One of the main reasons was the primary need in the insurance to be 
able to prove a loss. A farmer taking an insurance had to be able to show that he 
had suffered a loss which could be directly attributed to the effect of weather. 
There was then, the accompanjdng paper-work and other formalities, which 
deterred people from going in for insurance policies. Again, such contracts 
cannot be used to hedge profits, which might be affected by weather-related 
aspects, since a 'loss of profit' cannot be construed as a 'loss' in insurance 
parlance. 
The CCIS was offered to farmers at arbitrarily set premiums of around 1-2% 
while claims made were approximately 9% of the sum insured This led to a loss 
of 184,446 lakhs, exclusive of administrative costs (IfftJ., 2001) . As we moved 
on to the NAIS, the premiums were raised to around 1.5 - 3.5%. 
Whilst the NAIS is an improvement in many ways over the CCIS, it was once 
again plagued with a plethora of problems. Losses continued to be high, with 
claim amounts vastly overshadowing the premium collected (Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6 Performance of NAIS (Datafromwww.indiastats.com) 
The main problems of the NAIS could be summarized as: 
(i) Target of achieving financial sustainability within five years of the 
commencement of the scheme was a daunting task, 
(ii) Arbitrary premiums were fixed, which did not equal the risk levels. 
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NAIS has not proved to be very popular. In 2005-06, the all-India figure of 
farmers opting for NAIS stood at 19 %, with statewise figures being as low as 1% 
for Uttaranchal and even lower for the North-Eastem states 
rwww.indiastat.com'). 
Some satisfaction can be drawn from the fact that government crop insurance 
has been a failure in almost all the countries where it has been tried. On the 
other hand, private programmes have had better success rates. Skees,(200o) 
points out that one of the main reasons for the slow growth of private crop 
insurance is the government subsidized schemes, which tend to stifle 
innovation. Examples of private crop insurance schemes can be seen in the 
United States and South Africa in particular. 
After lessons learnt from the NAIS, the Agricultural Insurance Corporation of 
India has, in 2004, introduced a rainfall index scheme called "Varsha Bima" - or 
Rainfall Insurance. In the year 2006 it was implemented across 16 states in 
India. 
1.4 Need for a study of the prospects and challenges for weather 
derivatives in India 
Weather derivatives are in a nascent stage the world over; no standardisation of 
contracts has been achieved and very few pricing mechanisms have been 
developed. Although some trades have been done and some thinking has gone 
into the rigours involved, volumes are nowhere near being comparable with 
other derivative products. 
There has been a prolonged debate and a few experiments with these in the 
Indian conditions. Weather derivatives could be an effective hedge against the 
vagaries of weather, which could result in a lower-than-expected agricultural 
output. And this would be true both, at an individual farmer level, or collectively 
at a larger level. Once again, the same argument would hold true for many other 
sectors where sales and revenues earned would be weather-dependant. 
An interesting and required area of research is the potential need for weather 
derivative products. In the initial stages, for the market to grow, there would be 
need for a large number of market players. Taking the agricultural sector in 
India as the one which could benefit the most, this could be a good starting point 
for research. Research into the demand for weather derivatives and willingness 
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to invest in such products would give an insight into the potential market and 
the manner in which they could be structured. Such a study has not been done in 
India, and this could possibly boost the market, while simultaneously be a feed 
into regulatory and policy issues which would have to be in place as the market 
takes off. 
The weather derivatives market will have to understand the complex 
relationships between various weather events e.g. high/low temperature, 
excess/deficient rainfall or a combination of these, with losses. This could give 
an insight into the appropriate time period of contracts while structuring 
weather derivative products. 
As the weather derivative market in India grows, there would be many players. 
There would thus be a need for clear regulatory and policy directives, so as to 
avoid a possible market crisis or illegal dealings, which might, in turn have 
negative fall-outs on investors in these derivatives. This is another interesting 
area of research. 
1.4.1 Need for an empirical study of willingness to pay 
India has experimented -with the crop insurance programme for many years. 
Whilst most of the schemes have been government programmes, a few private 
players have ventured into the field. However, the primary question has been of 
not just what an Indian farmer is able to pay, but also of what he is veiling to 
pay. Unfortunately, most debates start with an assumption that a farmer would 
not be able to pay for hedging his yield, and so the government would 
necessarily have to subsidise any scheme that is floated. 
An empirical study into farmers' vnllingness to pay for a weather derivative 
would give the required insight into the structuring of such products, whether 
such products can be introduced vdthout any government subsidy, as has been 
the case with all crop insurance thus-far, and the viability of private players 
coming up with innovative hedging products for farmers. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organised in ii chapters. After a study of existing literature in 
Chapter 2, the research methodology and the objectives of the study are brought 
out in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 brings out a theoretical analysis of farmers' 
willingness to pay based on his expected utility. The theoretical model is used 
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along with historical data, to derive a theoretical willingness to pay in the case of 
farmers growing soyabean in Jhalawar district of Rajasthan. This sets the pace 
for the survey which was carried out in two districts of Rajasthan - Jhalawar 
and Tonk. An important aspect of Ijasis risk' necessarily plays a role in hedging 
through weather derivatives. A clear understanding of the intensity of this factor 
is brought out in Chapter 5, through a study of rainfall data from two nearby 
weather stations. Chapter 6 elucidates the scope of the survey, which was carried 
out, and the methodology adopted for the study. An analysis of the data and the 
results obtained are given in Chapter 7 of this thesis. We move on to a study of 
the regulatory issues relevant to the introduction of weather derivatives in India, 
in Chapter 8. The valuation and pricing of weather derivatives warrants 
attention. The modalities for a naive pricing method are brought out in Chapter 
9. A summary of the findings and the recommendations of the research are 
given in Chapter 10. The final chapter lists the bibliography for the thesis. 
A detailed study of the relevant literature is given in the ensuing chapter. 
Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings out the in-depth study done on existing literature. The study 
has been done in two parts. The first is on the various crop insurance schemes 
which have been floated in India, and the lessons learnt from these. This will 
also discuss the commodity derivative exchanges and commodity derivatives 
trading in India, and the lessons learnt from these. Part two will bring out the 
history of weather derivatives and structures commonly used. The second part 
also brings out methods which could be used for pricing weather derivatives and 
techniques for determining willingness to pay for such products. This will set the 
pace for the study on the prospects and challenges of introducing weather 
derivatives in India. 
Parti 
2.2 Crop insurance in India 
2.2,1 Evolution and history 
Crop insurance in India has been on discussion agendas ever since 
independence in 1947 (AJC, 2007). A special study was commissioned in 1947-
48 to go into and recommend the approach that should be adopted. A major 
bone of contention, which emerged was whether we should use an Individual 
Approach or a Homogeneous Area Approach, where the area comprises villages, 
which are homogeneous in respect of production of a particular crop. The 
special study pointed out that the individual approach would be difficult to 
administer and implement. Administrative costs would be considerably higher 
since fixing of premiums on actuarially sound basis would require a large 
number of reliable data of crop yields of individual farmers. The issue of moral 
hazard would also arise and could have a large effect on premiums. 
The special study recommended the Homogeneous Area approach. However, 
this met with difficulties, as many states were not in favour of, and did not 
accept the Homogeneous Area approach. 
The generally agreed principles of crop insurance {Vyas and Singh, 2006) are: 
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(i) The risk and uncertainty faced by individual fanners is passed on to the 
insurer, in return for which, the farmer pays a premium. 
(ii) The premium is calculated based on the risk, which is taken on by the 
insurer. 
(iii) A pre-decided sum of money is to be paid by the insurer to the insured, 
when a loss is incurred by the insured, due to causes beyond his control. 
In 1965, the government introduced a crop insurance bill. The cover was to be 
provided by state governments, but the central government was to frame a re-
insurance scheme, which would cover the indemnity obligation of states. 
However, once again, many states were not in favour of this scheme (AIC, 2007). 
In 1972-73, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) come-up with a Crop 
Insurance Scheme for H-4 Cotton. It was implemented in some states. 
However, this scheme continued only upto 1978-79 and covered around 3000 
farmers. The premium collected was Rs 4.54 lakhs as against claims of Rs. 
37.88 lakhs {Lie, 2007). 
In 1979, the nationalized General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC), 
introduced a Pilot Crop Insurance Scheme (PCIS). This covered cereals, 
oilseeds, cotton, potato and gram. The scheme was based on the Area Approach 
and it was agreed that risk sharing would be in the ration of 2:1 between GIC 
and state governments. The premium would also be subsidized upto 50%, 
which would be shared equally by the Central and State governments. This 
scheme continued for 6 years until 1984-85 and covered 6.27 lakhs farmers. The 
premium collected was Rs. 196.95 lakhs, while claims disbursed were 157.05 
lakhs {MC, 2007). 
CCIS 
In 1985, the government floated the Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme 
(CCIS). This scheme, originally suggested by Prof. Dandekar in 1976, was 
administered by the Government of India with active participation by state 
governments. It was linked to crop credit and adopted the Homogeneous Area 
Approach. Twenty states and 2 union territories implemented this scheme till 
Kharif, 1999. Of these, 5 states which had joined the scheme initially, opted out 
after a few years. 
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The total premium collected was Rs. 403.56 crores, whilst the total claims 
disbursed were Rs 2303.45 crores, resulting in a claim to premium ratio of 572% 
{Ijft, 2001). The total number of farmers covered was 763 lakh {Vyas and 
Singh, 2006). 
An analysis of premium figures, show that claims made were approximately of 
the order of 9% of the sum insured. Administrative costs were about 6% of the 
sum insured. Thus, without subsidy, premiums would have been approximately 
15% of sum insured. In actuality, subsidized premiums were of the order of 1-
2% of the sum insured {Ifft, 2001). 
The CCIS was a result of the Prof. V M Dandekar committee, which was set up 
by the government in 1976 to look into the issues and modalities of crop 
insurance in India. The committee pointed out that any scheme based on the 
Individual Approach would be impracticable to implement, and so 
recommended the Area Approach. 
The main features of the CCIS were: 
(i) It was compulsory for farmers taking loans from financial institutions for 
growing food crops and oilseeds, 
(ii) Coverage was restricted to the entire amount of the crop loan subject to a 
maximum of Rs. 10000. 
(iii) The subsidized premium to be paid by the farmer was 2% for cereals and 
millets and 1% for pulses and oilseeds. Of this, 50% was subsidized by 
the Central and State Governments on a 50:50 basis, 
(iv) It was optional for state governments to join the scheme, 
(v) Premium and claim sharing between the central and state governments 
was in a 2:1 ratio, 
(vi) The scheme was promoted jointly by the Government of India, State 
Governments, GIC and participating banks. 
Of the total claims of Rs. 2303.45 crores, 47% were paid in the state of Gujarat 
and 21% in Andhra Pradesh {AIC, 2007). 
While the CCIS was still on, the government floated a new scheme called the 
Experimental Crop Insurance Scheme (ECIS) in 1997-98. This was very similar 
to the existing CCIS, but was meant only for small and marginal farmers in 
participating states. Hundred percent subsidy was provided in the premium. 
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which was shared by the Central and the State in a 4:1 ratio. However, this 
scheme was discontinued after just one season. 
NAIS 
From Rabi, 1999, the CCIS was replaced by the National Agricultural Insurance 
Scheme (NAIS), which was also called the Rashtriya Krishi Bima Yojna (RKBY). 
This was administered by the Ministry of Agriculture in the Government of 
India, and was implemented by the GIC. 
Three policy goals were laid down for the NAIS. 
(i) Social response - to provide support to farmers during crop failures 
(ii) Risk management - for financial institutions to be able to provide 
rural financial services more efficiently, so that farmers would have 
better access to finance 
(iii) Fiscal exposure - to control the government's fiscal exposure during 
disaster years. 
The objectives of the NAIS also included an encouragement to farmers to adopt 
progressive farming practices and the latest technology in agriculture. 
The main features of the NAIS were: 
(i) The crops covered included cereals, millets, pulses, oilseeds, sugarcane, 
cotton and potato, 
(ii) Loanee farmers, i.e. those availing loans for grovdng the notified crops 
would have to compulsorily opt for the scheme, whereas non-loanee 
farmers could join on a voluntary basis, 
(iii) The scheme was optional for states, but those opting had to continue for 
at least 3 years, 
(iv) Comprehensive risk insurance covered yield losses due to non-
preventable risks, 
(v) Sum insured could be upto the value of threshold yield, which was based 
on the Average Yield of the notified area, 
(vi) Premium rates varied from 1.5% of sum insured, for wheat, to 3.5% of 
sum insured, for oilseeds, 
(vii) A transition to the actuarial rate regime for cereals, millets, pulses and 
oilseeds was to be made in 5 years, 
(viii) A 50% subsidy in premium was allowed for small (land holding 5 acres 
or less) and marginal (land holding 2.5 acres or less) farmers, to be 
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shared equally between the central and state governments. This was to 
be phased out in 3-5 years, 
(ix) The scheme was operated on the basis of 'Area Approach'. The area was 
to be defined by the state and could be a Gram Panchayat, Mandal, 
Hobli, Circle, Phirka, Block, Taluka etc. 
(x) Estimation of crop yield was to be done by crop cutting experiments with 
a minimum of 16 at Taluka level, sliding to a minimum of 8 at the Gram 
Panchayat (comprising 4-5 villages) level, 
(xi) 3 levels of indemnity (90%, 80%, 60%) for low, medium and high risk 
areas were to be based on coefficient of variation in yield of last 10 years 
data. Threshold yield for the purpose of insurance, was the moving 
average (3 years yield), multiplied by the level of indemnity, 
(xii) Claims were to be settled based on yield data, and paid to nodal banks 
which, at grass-root level, were to credit the accounts of individual 
farmers, 
(xiii) Administrative and operating expenses were to be shared by Central and 
State Governments on a sunset basis, 
(xiv) Re-insurance cover was to be obtained by GIC in the international re-
insurance market. 
Varsha Bima, 2 0 0 5 
In December 2002, the Agriculture Insurance Company of India (AIC) was set 
up. This was promoted by the GIC, NABARD and 4 other public sector 
insurance companies. The AIC took over crop insurance activities from the GIC 
in April 2003. 
The Varsha Bima Scheme was introduced in Kharif 2004 as a pilot project in 20 
rain gauge stations of the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD). 
In 2005, the Varsha Bima Scheme was launched in 10 states, initially covering 
140 IMD rain gauge stations. The scheme is intended basically to cover financial 
losses incurred owing to crop losses, which result due to adverse rainfall iAIC, 
2007). 
Premium rates have been fixed between 4 to 7% of sum assured, varying based 
on a particular crop's sensitivity to rainfall and on the local rainfall distribution. 
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Along with the Varsha Bima, the AIC also launched a scheme called the Sookha 
Suraksha Kavach (SSK), which is basically a drought insurance scheme, 
exclusively for the state of Rajasthan. It covers 23 districts and major crops. 
Premiums are in the same range as the Varsha Bima and vary between 4-8%. 
The main advantages of these schemes are: 
(i) Quick settlement of claims 
(ii) Flexible premiums for insurance 
(iii) Lower administrative costs 
(iv) Option of group insurance, where a group of farmers can opt for Varsha 
Bima or SSK by submitting a single crop-wise proposal, along with 
details of each individual forming the group. 
However, one major disadvantage of the Varsha Bima, 2005, is that a farmer 
buying a policy under the scheme cannot cover the same crop in the same area 
through any other form of crop insurance {Raghuvanshi, 2005). So, in a sense, 
risk cover is limited only to adverse rainfall. 
2.2.2 Weather insurance schemes by private agencies 
Probably the earliest record of private forays into the weather risk market in 
India is the BASIX-ICICI Lombard venture in 2003 in Andhra Pradesh 
(Manuamorn, 2007). Whilst ICICI Lombard was the insurer, BASIX took on the 
role of selling the policies to the farmers. They were able to scale-up the venture 
more than 30 fold in a period of three years. 
BASIX is a new generation livelihood promotion institution established in 1996, 
working with over 190,000 poor households in 44 districts and eight states. 
With its wide reach and its policy of working in backward areas, BASIX was a 
good intermediary between the insurance company on one hand, and the 
farmers on the other. BASIX initially started by promoting life insurance policies 
of insurance companies and then later, moved on to livestock and health 
insurance products. Its tie-up venture, in 2003, with ICICI-Lombard, was 
undertaken along with technical assistance from the World Bank. 
What prompted the scheme was the plethora of problems which had plagued the 
CCIS and the NAIS schemes of the government. With the experience of these 
two schemes behind them, they went in for an index-based insurance rather 
than a yield-based insurance. ICICI-Lombard claims a higher level of 
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transparency, an easier to administer scheme and one which is scientifically 
developed and objective {ICICI, 2006). 
The process adopted by ICICI Lombard in structuring their product involves the 
following steps {JCICI, 2006). 
1. Peril Identification: An appreciation of the agronomic properties of the crop 
is done. This is followed by a detailed correlation analysis to see the way 
weather impacts crop yield/output of other economic activity. 
2. Index setting. An index is created by assigning weights to critical time 
periods of crop growth. Weather data of the past is analysed and mapped on 
to this index in order to determine a threshold index. 
3. Pricing. Pricing of the insurance is done based on expected loss, volatility of 
historical levels of the index, and management expenses. 
4. Monitoring. This includes collection of weather data on a continuous basis. 
5. Claims settlement. ICICI Lombard's claims of ease of administration are 
based on the fact that the beneficiary is not required to file a claim for loss, 
in order to receive a payment. 
The product was launched by the company in 2003 for a few crops. In Kharif 
2005, policies were designed and sold in close to 100 locations covering 1 lakh 
farmers. In 2006, ICICI Lombard also ventured into weather insurance for salt 
and brick kilns. The deals entered into included: 
1. Oranges in Jhalawar, Rajasthan - covering 782 farmers over 613 acres for a 
sum insured of Rs 18.3 million. 
2. Coriander in Jhalawar, Rajasthan - covering 1036 acres for a sum insured of 
Rs 12.75 milhon. 
3. Various crops in the states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. 
Some of the lessons learnt from the BASIX-ICICI scheme were: 
1. The scheme started with coverage for the entire season, but within a year 
moved on to smaller durations vrithin a season. 
2. The scheme started vdth premium being charged based on the land-holding 
of the farmer, but then went on to a charge per acre of cultivation. 
3. No government support was sought for the scheme. 
4. Whilst initially, payout was determined as a proportion of the percentage 
deviation of rainfall from the pre-decided threshold, it was later modified to 
absolute deviation. 
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5. ICICI-Lombard transferred the risk to international markets by reinsuring 
the risk with reinsurers. 
6. A lot of effort was put-in by BASIX in educating the farmers and making 
them understand the processes involved. 
7. Instead of crop-specific insurance, the emphasis was on area-specific 
insurance products. 
In 2004, the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) conducted a survey to assess the impact of the ICICI insurance 
product in the Anantpur and Mehboobnagar districts of Andhra Pradesh. A 
sample of 1052 farming households were interviewed, which included buyers as 
well as non-buyers of the insurance. Some of the salient findings were: 
1. Farmers who are aware about and understand insurance are the ones who 
are willing to pay for it. 
2. Farmers' perceptions of what the weather is likely to be (and so the impetus 
for them to buy the insurance) does not necessarily coincide with historical 
data. 
3. Other risk-coping methods eg. sale of animals, poultry etc. affects the 
farmers' interest in weather insurance products. 
4. Some of the farmers perceived the product as a gamble, rather than a risk-
hedging method. 
2.23 Comparison with crop insurance scliemes in other countries 
USA 
In the United States of America, crop insurance is subsidized by the 
governments, but is administered through private companies. Hail insurance, 
however, is not subsidized; and so is offered by insurers, along with the 
subsidized government policies. 
Premium rates are based on the history of crop losses. But here, 'Adverse 
Selection' is not a major issue, since rates are set higher for areas which have a 
higher risk {Raghuvanshi, 2005). 
South Africa 
Crop insurance in South Africa first started in 1929, when a group of farmers 
started a pool scheme. In the first few years, most of the crop insurance 
schemes were subsidized by the government. But now, for the last 20 years or 
so, no subsidy is given by the Government. 
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After the withdrawal of subsidies to crop insurance, several insurance players 
entered the market and there is an ever growing market in the area of crop 
insurance. The South African experience illustrates the benefits of crop 
insurance even after subsidies are withdrawn (Ravikumar, 2006). 
Canada 
Similar to India, Canada follows an Area Approach. However, Turvey and 
IslaTn,20o6 indicate that the Area approach has been inequitable and inefficient. 
Empirical research from 537 farms indicates that the Individual Approach to 
crop insurance is better. 
2.3 Lessons learnt from crop insurance in the Indian context 
Crop insurance schemes in India cannot really be viewed as success stories. 
However, consolation can be drawn from the fact that failures in public crop 
insurance schemes have happened not just in India, but also in the developed 
world (Ifft, 2001). Private players have had a better success rate {Raghuvanshi, 
2005). 
There are, however, many lessons to be learnt from the many crop insurance 
schemes that India has experimented with - and these could provide inputs to 
the design of newer financial risk management products like weather 
derivatives. Some issues we discuss are: 
1. Premiums will have to be based on true risk-levels. Crop insurance needs to 
be a facility available for risk management. A farmer, in any agricultural 
system, vrill avail of crop insurance if he feels that his risk management 
needs are met by the crop insurance scheme. 
Raghuvanshi, 2005 argues that if a farmer faces risk of such a 
magnitude that he cannot survive without subsidized insurance then this 
implies that the cropping system, itself, is not sustainable 
2. If the government stays in the crop insurance market, through provision of 
subsidies, it would not be possible for private players to enter the market. 
This would curb experimentation with innovative financial products for risk 
management. Skees, 2000, documents this as one of the reasons for the 
underdevelopment of private crop insurance. Subsidized crop insurance 
crowds out private players and stifles innovation. 
3. The problem of adverse selection arises when, as in government 
administered or government subsidized schemes, a common premium is 
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charged across the board for all. In this case, the worst farmers are the ones 
who are Hkely to avail of the insurance, thus making the number and amount 
of claims to be unreasonably high. This then, would lead to either an 
increase in premiums on a continuous basis, or a rising amount of subsidy. 
Thus for a scheme to become financially viable, premiums would have to rise 
continually. 
The case of adverse selection is evident in the NAIS, as we note that the 
states of Punjab and Haryana, which produce the most, did not participate in 
the scheme. 
4. The Area Approach is easier to administer, but this results in many 
problems. Often farmers with no loss end up being able to claim since the 
Area Yield was found, through crop cutting experiments, to be lower than 
threshold yield. On the other hand a farmer, who has suffered a loss, might 
not be able to claim because the Area yield was declared as being higher than 
the threshold yield. 
However, in the Individual Approach to crop insurance, the problem of 
moral hazard arises. This is when the insured is less vigilant or puts in less 
effort to avoid a loss, since he knows that he is insured and would stand to 
get a claim in the event of a loss. 
5. It is important to understand the situation and the needs of villagers. Their 
daily lives, how they structure their needs, and the occupations they engage 
in, would give insights while planning and designing financial risk 
management products for them. Very often, farmers in India have no source 
of income other than from farming - and so they become highly dependant 
on the monsoons, especially in areas which are not irrigated. 
6. A large part of Indian agriculture, being rain-fed, has a very heavy 
dependence on weather. Risk coping measures include the Minimum 
Support Price (MSP) given by the government for various crops, and forward 
trading which is available for farmers to lock-in the price for their crop. 
Nevertheless, crop insurance and/or products like weather derivatives are 
their means to cope vnth natural risks. 
7. Crop insurance in India has become a sort of loan-insurance. The benefit 
actually goes to the providers of the loan, whilst the premium is paid by the 
farmer. 
8. The government needs to be involved in the creation of, and if necessary, 
subsidy in, agricultural infrastructure and research. Private players would 
automatically move into the market and compete with innovative products, 
if the government moves out of the crop insurance market. 
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9. There is a major need for education and awareness. 
In spite of the government's goals of the scheme being able to be financially 
viable in 5 years, the NAIS had an average loss ratio of around 350% in the first 
4 years {firstinitiative.org, 2006) 
As a result, in June 2006, the Government of India decided to reform the NAIS 
and to place it on an actuarial footing. It was decided to base premiums, more 
practically, on actual costs. The AIC is to receive premiums in full. This would 
include upfront subsidies, which would be provided by the Government. AIC 
would be responsible for settling all claims. This now sets the path for 
premiums which are market-based. 
In 2006 also, a World Bank funded project offered technical assistance to the 
AIC in order that more effective crop insurance products could be developed. 
The emphasis is on pricing them on an actuarially sound basis and improving 
the scope for risk management. The project will be developing a series of pilot 
weather insurance schemes which is being implemented by AIC starting from 
the Rabi season of 2007-08. 
Once an effective actuarially sound pricing system is in place, this would help 
the AIC in being able to access global re-insurance markets. 
2.4 Commodity derivatives in India 
2.4.1 History 
It can be seen in most developed economies, that the derivative markets have 
usually been an integral part of the capital markets. Derivative markets have 
allowed the transfer of unwanted risk and so derivatives have been able to help 
in the allocation of capital across the economy in a more efficient manner. This, 
in turn, has contributed to increased productivity in the economy. 
The history of forward trading in exchange based derivatives in India is not very 
old. However, as a precursor to these, there did exist a kind of forward trading 
in the form of Teji (Call option), Mandi (Put option) and Fatak (Straddles) in the 
unorganized Indian markets (Saxena, 2003). 
When one goes though the global history of derivatives, it can be seen that the 
first derivatives contract was an agricultural contract which was entered into at 
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the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) about a hundred and fifty years ago-1859 to 
be precise. Soon thereafter, trading began in derivatives of various products. 
Trading in metals began in 1878 at the London Metal Exchange. 
These derivative contracts continued in pockets for about a century until 
technological changes led to the globalization of transactions. This, coupled 
with the volatility in currency exchange rates, led to the development of currency 
contracts in the late 1960s. At the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), 
currency derivatives were introduced in 1968 and then interest rate derivatives 
in 1971. Energy indexes for energy derivative trading were introduced in 1974. 
There are three basic users of derivatives: Hedgers, Speculators and 
Arbitrageurs. Each is a player in the market and each has a particular role in the 
market. Hedgers use derivatives to cover risk arising out of adverse movement. 
Price risk would be inherent to any open position and this is what a hedger is 
trying to protect himself against. The basic purpose of derivatives is to reduce 
the volatility of a portfolio by reducing the risk. 
Speculators use the volatility in prices to make a profit. If hedgers want to 
reduce their risk in a volatile market, it is the speculators who provide the role of 
a counter-party. They are ready to take the risk of price variation in order to 
profit ft-om price changes in the underlying. 
Arbitrageurs are those who use market imperfections to make a profit for 
themselves. They are the safest of the three classes of players and end up earning 
risk-free profits from price differences in two different markets. 
In India, the evolution of commodity derivatives trading has its genesis in the 
cotton and oilseeds markets, which started in Bombay, in 1875 and in 1900 
respectively. The raw jute and jute goods market started in Calcutta in 1912 and 
the wheat market started in Hapur in 1913. Trading in bullion was first done at 
Bombay in 1920. 
The Indian Commodity markets are far behind those in developed countries. 
This is mainly because of the long period of prohibition in forward trading in 
major commodities. In 1939, cotton options business was banned in order to 
restrict speculative activity. Just four years later, in 1943, the Defence of India 
Act was utilized to prohibit forward trading in many commodities, including 
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oilseeds, foodgrains, spices, sugar and cloth. In 1946, the Essential Supplies 
Temporary Powers Act was put in place- and this continued the ban on forward 
trading. 
After independence, in 1950, the constitution of India placed "Stock exchanges 
and future markets" in the Union List. In 1952, the Forward Contracts 
Regulations Act (FCRA) was passed by parliament. But the restrictions 
continued. In the aftermath of the war with China, futures trading in gold was 
prohibited. In the late 1960s, forward trading was banned in all commodities 
except for Pepper, Turmeric, Castorseed and Linseed. This was done at a time 
when domestic production of farm products was not enough to meet the local 
demand. In 1977 even Castorseed and Linseed were added to the list of banned 
commodities. 
However, things looked up in slow and agonizing steps in the 1980's. In 1980, 
forward trading was allwed in Potato and Gur. In 1985, it was allowed in 
Castorseed. 
In the 1990s, the process of liberalization of the economy started. 1993 saw the 
setting- up of the Prof. K.N. Kabra committee. This recommended allowing 
futures trading in 17 commodities. It also recommended amendments to the 
FCRA,1952 and the strengthening of the FMC, including registration of brokers 
with the FMC. The government accepted the report almost in-toto. Futures 
trading was permitted in all except Bullion and Basmati Rice. The FMC was 
strengthened with additional staff and the post of Chairman of the Commission 
was upgraded to Additional Secretary to the Government of India. 
In 1999, the National Agricultural Policy was announced by the government. It 
brought out an intention to increase the coverage of the futures market in order 
to minimise wide fluctuations in commodity prices as well as to allow a means of 
hedging risk. The government set up an expert committee on Agricultural 
Marketing headed by Shri Shankerlal Guru. This committee strongly 
recommended the linkage of spot and forward markets, inclusion of more 
commodities in which trading could be permitted and a system of warehouse 
receipts, which could be national in nature - rather than being local or even 
regional. 
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In 1999 itself, the government appointed a committee under Shri K C Misra, 
who was at that time the Chairman of the FMC, to prepare a road map for 
setting up a national wide multi-commodity exchange. However, the committee 
members themselves were unable to resolve their own differences especially on 
the location of the exchange. This led to a loss of more than three years in the 
setting up of the exchange. In fact, later it was felt that setting up only one 
exchange might create unwanted monopoly and that multiple exchanges might 
be better. It was also felt that these should be set up with a clear message that 
there would be no promises of a government bail-out in case of failure because 
of competition. 
In 2002, the Finance Minister, in his budget speech, announced the 
government's decision to allow futures and forward trading in all agricultural 
commodities. 
The Indian commodity markets have not developed as much as they should 
have. Even today there is the very obvious worry of a ban in some commodity or 
the other. Forward trading in wheat has been banned in February 2007 in order 
to stem the overall price rise in commodities, and there is a fear in the markets 
that more commodities might get added to the banned list if inflation is not 
reined in. 
In spite of apprehensions, the Indian markets have survived the many bans in 
the past, but this has been mainly because of a grey market which has carried on 
{Kolamkar, 2002). 
When the slow development of the Indian commodity derivative markets are 
discussed, what comes into prominence is the fact that the other markets in 
India have not had similar problems. Even the securities market in India grew 
rapidly and today has modem infrastructure, systems and regulations, which 
allow it to be comparable with securities markets in other countries. 
With a realization to this effect in the very recent past, there has been a need for 
leapfrogging to get over the lethargic growth of the commodities derivatives 
markets. The FMC has had to facilitate this, and has done so by studying and 
implementing some regulatory measures, which are in vogue in developed 
markets. Some of these are listed below: 
(i) Daily mark to market margining 
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(ii) Time stamping of trades 
(iii) On-line trading for new exchanges 
(iv) One-third representation of independent directors on the Boards of 
existing exchanges. 
These regulatory measures have, expectedly, met with a lot of resistance from 
traditional exchanges eg., the Bombay and Kanpur commodity exchanges. 
Kolamkar, 2002 argues that the perception that a futures market has a volatility 
aggravating impact in shortage situations might not be true. It has to be 
appreciated that even in the shortage situation, the futures market helps to 
smoothen the demand for the commodity and has a salutary impact of reducing 
intra-seasonal price spread. 
2.4.2 Comparison with financial derivatives in tiie USA 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) started trading currency futures in 
February 1972. In April 1973, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was 
set up to trade options on common stocks. This was the first time that an option 
was traded on an exchange (wwiv.geocities.com/kstability/content/derivatives, 
2007). In January 1976, Treasury Bill futures were traded in the CME. At the 
same exchange, in December 1981, the first cash settled contracts took place in 
the form of Eurodollar futures. This then led to the introduction of derivatives 
on stock index futures. In February 1982, the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT) listed futures on a composite stock exchange, followed by the CME 
listing of S&P 500 futures. In January 1983, the New York Futures Exchange 
(NYFE) listed options directly on stock index futures and in March the same 
year the CBOE listed options on stock indexes. 
Another noticeable feature in the US markets is the self-regulation aided by the 
National Futures Association (NFA), which was registered with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC )in 1982. This body, comprising of 
members from various industries, is a self-regulatory organisation which helps 
bring about ethics and integrity in the market. In the last 10 years, consumer 
complaints have decreased by 60%, while volumes of futures trading have 
doubled {Sahadevan, 2006). With a large amount of responsibility being taken 
on by the NFA, the CFTC has passed on its role of screening and registering 
people applying to conduct business in the futures industry. The NFA has made 
rules to help protect the interests of investors, to aid floor- trading practices etc. 
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In fact, the CFTC has even transferred the responsibihty of registration of 
brokers, to the NFA. 
2.5 Lessons learnt from the history of derivatives 
There are a lot of lessons to be learnt from the process of introduction of 
derivatives trading in securities which have been to quite an extent extrapolated 
to trading in commodity derivatives. Lessons from both these experiments need 
to be kept in mind when the introduction to weather derivative trading takes 
place in India. As such, a thorough review of the process of introduction of 
derivatives trading in securities in India would be apt. 
There were, expectedly, many hurdles faced prior to the introduction of trading. 
The first and foremost were the legal and regulatory issues, most of which were 
addressed by the J R Varma group which went into these aspects. There then 
was the resistance to allowing the introduction of derivatives mainly from people 
who were apprehensive about the processes involved and the issues of safety. 
There were the major challenges of building awareness and educating the 
community about derivatives. Finally there was the aspect of the need for active 
marketing of the products which were designed. 
The resistance to the introduction of derivatives and the subsequent protests 
were more emotional than objective (Narain, 2003). They were mostly aimed at 
the risk involved in derivatives trading, the issue of a lack of maturity of the 
Indian investors and the potential of large losses for individual investors who 
might plunge into the markets without sufficient knowledge and without 
sufficient research. Both, the L C Gupta committee and the J R Varma group, 
were of tremendous help since they publicly communicated the need for 
derivatives and their benefits as also the development of a sound regulatory 
framework. These, therefore, brought about a sense of confidence in the public 
when derivatives trading was actually introduced. 
The challenge of education and training was very well taken up by the National 
Stock Exchange. Initially this was at a low key, but the persistence of the team at 
the Exchange finally paid out. The early training programmes were planned 
once in a week and the focus was only in Mumbai. But slowly, the ft-equency was 
increased and these were then spread across the country. Initially the 
programmes were only in English, but very rapidly they were also done in Hindi, 
Gujarati and Tamil. 
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In fact, once trading started, the awareness campaign by the NSE really took off. 
Workshops were held, not only for analysts, but also for members of the press. 
Then, press reporting on prices and volumes and market analysis by experts, 
which were reported by the media - all helped in increasing awareness amongst 
potential traders. Institutional participation, however, took much longer to 
come by. This could be attributed to many reasons including the approval 
processes required before an institution could get involved in derivative trading, 
the usual resistance to change and the lack of clear accounting procedures. An 
absence of clear guidelines on the tax liabilities of institutions involved in 
derivative trading also delayed the entry of institutions into the arena. 
Another factor which helped in the spread of awareness stems from one of the 
recommendations of the L C Gupta committee, that broker-members and 
dealers in derivatives must pass a certificate programme considered adequate by 
SEBI. A web-based on-line objective type test was launched. The training 
programmes, coupled with the tests were highly successful. 
What also helped, were the efforts of NSE to have a close working with colleges 
and academic institutions. The result was that the student community was 
involved right from the beginning. 
The F & O business had a slow start. In the first year of trading, the average 
monthly traded value was in the region of Rs.240 crores. By June 2001, this 
figure touched Rs 800 crores. The first surge came in September 2001 when 
there was a surge in volumes in derivatives trading, the world over. The 
monthly traded volume in India touched Rs 5000 crores. The second big surge 
accompanied the introduction of stock futures for trading in November 2001 
when volumes touched Rs 1200 crores per day. 
2.6 The concept of derivatives exchanges 
Since the move to the floating rate system in 1973, exchange rates, across the 
world, have shown a fair amount of volatility. Volatility has been even more 
pronounced in the case of prices of commodities. As a corollary to this, there are 
financial risks which affect a firm's business profits and hence cannot be 
ignored. Avery large number of businesses across the spectrum, are affected by 
exchange rates and commodity prices. This could be either through a variation, 
from the planned, in input cost or through a variation in the earnings from sales. 
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It was to respond to these price volatilities that derivative investments were 
developed. Examples of derivatives include forwards, futures and option 
contracts. 
As derivative instruments developed, there was an obvious need for a central 
place where these could be traded; where one could find buyers/sellers for a 
certain commodity derivative; and where one could trade with some degree of 
surety with respect to the counterparty. 
A derivatives exchange can be defined as a trading forum or a system that links a 
central trading floor- where buyers and sellers meet, with a clearing house-
which intermediates and validates deals. As stated earlier, besides being a 
meeting ground for buyers and sellers, the primary function of a derivatives 
exchange is to facilitate the transfer of risk among economic agents by offering 
mechanisms for liquidity and price discovery (Tsetsekos and Varangis, 2000). 
As confidence spreads amongst the various players and the stakeholders, the 
exchange brings together a large number of participants in the risk transfer 
game. 
Commodity exchanges, like other exchanges, started with the traditional open 
outcry system. With the advent of modem technology, especially 
communications technology- a sea change has come about in the structure of 
derivative exchanges. Today, most commodity exchanges use electronic 
systems, which are considered much safer than the open outcry system. Just as 
an example, in an electronic system it is possible for the system itself to check 
for the availability of adequate margins before a trade is accepted. 
Today, most exchanges function as very professional organisations, in a 
demutualised form, where they have moved away from the system of being 
governed and run by their members. This has the advantage of not mixing the 
two aspects of trading and governing the exchange. 
Derivative exchanges grew rapidly with the realisation that the financial 
infrastructure of a country is strengthened through the links between 
speculators, hedgers and the cash markets. Derivative exchanges make more 
information publicly available- so that credit systems and capital markets are 
more responsive, transaction costs are lower and forward prices are more 
accurate (Tsetsekos and Varangis, 2000). In fact, improved price discovery is 
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considered one of the major results of setting up of derivative exchanges the 
world over. 
In any derivative exchange, specifications are written for standardised contracts, 
setting the contractual obligations between the parties. One of the main ways in 
which risks are managed is the setting of margins. This allows the clearing house 
to guarantee all transactions, in a sense acting like buyers to sellers and as 
sellers to buyers. 
The basic elements in the structure of a derivative exchange would be: 
1. regulatory mechanisms 
2. trading systems 
3. settling procedures 
4. a clearing house and clearing systems 
5. derivative products which can be traded 
Systems of derivatives trading including the regulatory environment, will vary 
across countries. Whilst low or no regulatory mechanisms could very easily lead 
to chaos, a high degree of regulation and strait-jacketing could lead to a stifling 
of the market. The ultimate aim is to increase the investors' confidence. 
Traditionally in India, trading in commodity derivatives was done in commodity 
exchanges which were product specific e.g., the Pepper exchange, the Wheat 
exchange etc. This was until 2003 when the Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX) 
and the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX) were set up. 
We now discuss some key issues with reference to commodity derivative 
exchanges in India. 
(i) The key to success in developing the markets for commodity derivatives 
lies in creating liquidity. Markets are driven by hedgers, arbitrageurs and 
speculators. A major role in creating liquidity is played by speculators. 
(ii) The lack of well-developed, organised spot markets and price discovery 
mechanism is a major impediment to arbitraging (Jagadharini and 
Putran, 2002). 
(iii) For hedging, there is a need to provide awareness through education. 
Along with this is the need for a distribution chain for training 
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/awareness programmes, which would encourage a wider body of 
participation. 
(iv) There would always be a need for some reference price (one method is 
through polling methodology), examples of which are the 
MIBID/MIBOR rates announced by the NSE, which are widely accepted. 
(v) The spot market and the price discovery process in the spot market play 
a major role in commodity prices. These are affected by forces like the 
Minimum Support Price announced by the government for essential 
items, procurement by the Food Corporation of India, etc. 
(vi) The structure of a commodity derivative exchange and its management 
would play a major role in its ultimate success. The trend today is 
towards having a demutualised, tax-paying, corporate structure. Under 
this kind of structure, the ownership of the exchange is separated from 
trading rights. This is a departure from the traditional structure where 
the members of the exchange had trading rights and at the same time, 
were also its owners. The demutualised structure, as has been adopted by 
the MCX and NCDEX, requires professional management of the 
exchange. 
(vii) A departure from the traditional open outcry system to the electronic 
system has been adopted by most exchanges. Even in commodity 
derivative exchanges, there is a need for a nation-wide, automated 
electronic exchange where price-dissemination is on a real time basis. 
(viii) Contracts are designed to take into account the characteristics of the 
underlying. These would include quality and grades, life of the 
underlying product, effects of seasonality, effect of international markets. 
All these and other factors would lead to the size of the contract etc. 
(ix) One of the major factors leading to the success of an exchange is the 
effectiveness of settlements. Efficient settlements include a daily mark to 
market settlement. Final settlement could either be through physical 
delivery or through cash settlement. In the case of commodities, the 
former course does result in problems of storage, inter-state movements 
etc. Of course, the option of'physical delivery' would not be available in 
the case of weather derivatives. 
In the case of commodities, when we take the course of physical 
delivery, issues of warehousing, a system of grading and quality of the 
product, the quality of the warehouse itself, warehouse regulations etc. 
arise. There is a move lately, towards warehouse receipts. These are 
taken to be equivalent to physical delivery. 
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(x) Another major factor in the success of an exchange is the risk 
management measures adopted. Counter-party risk is taken care of by 
having a clearing house. Upfront margins and then a system of daily 
mark-to market settlements are a common feature of commodity 
exchanges. Scenario analysis using software like SPAN ® to determine 
Value at Risk of the portfolio, are used by exchanges (Jagadharini and 
Putran, 2002). 
(xi) Portfolio limits are imposed for each of the players. 
(xii) A lesson learnt from earlier commodity exchanges vis-a-vis present day 
exchanges, is that liquidity is directly proportional to the amount of 
transparency in dealings. 
(xiii) The FCRA, 1952, does not permit options on commodities. A large 
number of investors, especially farmers, are hesitant to enter the 
commodities market because of the non-availability of options 
(Ravikumar, 2006). 
(xiv) Banks could provide a large amount of liquidity in the commodities 
markets. A regulatory amendment to allow banks to trade in 
commodities would help. 
(xv) Goods are still defined in the FCRA, 1952 as being limited to whatever 
can be delivered. For trading in weather derivatives to be possible, this 
would require an amendment. 
(xvi) Like banks. Mutual Funds and FIIs are not permitted to trade on 
commodity exchanges. Liquidity and volumes would increase 
substantially if they are allowed to participate. MFs and FIIs bring with 
them, experts who could play a vital role in tracking and bringing out 
global and other macro-factors, which play a role in commodities prices. 
This would be beneficial in price forecasting. 
(xvii) Dissemination of market-discovered prices would invite a greater market 
participation. This task becomes huge when we look at dissemination 
upto the farmer level and calls for investments as well as coordination 
with the ICT spread which is taking place in India at the rural level. 
2.6.1 The LC Gupta Committee: major recommendations 
The committee had conducted a wide market survey vrith brokers, mutual funds 
and financial institutions. It observed that there was an all round opinion that 
derivative products were required - mainly for hedging. The major 
recommendations of the committee were: -
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(i) There is a need for the development of a coordinated market for 
derivatives to cover market/systematic risk, interest rate risk and 
exchange rate risk, 
(ii) The committee favoured the introduction of financial derivatives to 
facilitate hedging in a cost-efficient way against market risk, 
(iii) SEBI and RBI should have coordination in respect of all financial 
derivatives markets, 
(iv) There is a need for improvements in the cash market, on which the 
derivatives market will be based, 
(v) Derivative trading should take place on a separate segment of the 
existing stock exchanges with an independent governing council, 
(vi) Trading should be an on-line screen trading -with a disaster recovery site, 
(vii) Settlement should be through an independent clearing corporation/ 
clearing house, 
(viii) Clearing corporation must have adequate risk containment measures 
and to collect margins, 
(ix) The derivatives exchange should disseminate trade and price 
information on a real time basis, 
(x) Arbitration and investor grievances cells to be set up in four regions, 
(xi) The regulatory framework should be on a two-level regulation -
exchange level and SEBI level with emphasis on self regulation under 
supervision and guidance of SEBI. 
(xii) SEBI to approve rules, bye-laws and regulations. New derivative 
products must be approved by SEBI. Exchange must provide: 
a) Economic purposes of the contract. 
b) Likely contribution to the markets' development 
c) Safeguards incorporated for investor protection and fair trading, 
(xiii) Exchanges to decide to trading days and hours, expiration date of 
contracts etc. 
(xiv) Membership criteria to be stringent. Clearing members to have a net 
worth of Rs 3 crores. 
(xv) The clearing corporation to be restructured. Initial and mark-to-market 
margins must be stipulated based on levels of volatility, 
(xvi) Cross margining was not favoured by the Committee, 
(xvii) Funds transfer for margins etc should be through EFT (Electronic Fund 
Transfer). Exchange to have power/facility to disable defaulting member 
from further trading. 
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(xviii) Clearing Corporation may prescribe maximum long/short positions by 
members or exposure limits, 
(xix) There should be a system of daily settlement of futures contracts. Final 
settlement price to be as per the closing price of underlying security, 
(xx) There should be a unique order identification number, a regular market 
lot size and tick size, price bands for each derivative contract and an 
indication of maximum permissible open position, 
(xxi) Brokerage to be prescribed by the exchange, 
(xxii) Creation of a derivative cell at SEBI. 
2.^.2 The JR Varma group: Major recommendations 
The group vy^ as set up in June 1998 by SEBI to recommend a roadmap for 
effective implementation of the LC Gupta Committee report. The major 
recommendations were as follows: 
(i) The exponential moving average method would be used to obtain the 
volatility estimate every day to calculate margin calls. The trading 
software could provide this information on a real time basis on the 
trading workstation screen, 
(ii) The clearing corporation must lay down operational guidelines on 
collection of margin and standard guidelines for back office accounting 
at the clearing member and trading member level, to facilitate the 
detection of non-compliance at each level, 
(iii) Clearing corporation must disclose details of margin collection failure at 
least on a quarterly basis, 
(iv) Liquid net worth of a clearing member must be at least Rs 50 lakhs i.e. 
total liquid assets deposited with the exchange-less initial margin 
applicable to total gross open positions of all trades cleared through 
clearing member, to be at least Rs 50 lakhs, 
(v) Clearing corporation to lay down exposure limits for a single bank which 
would include guarantees provided by the bank as well as debt/securities 
of the bank deposited by members as liquid assets for margin /net worth 
requirement, 
(vi) At least 50% of the total liquid assets to be in the form of cash 
equivalents, 
(vii) No position limits for individual clients - but if any person/ persons 
acting in concert together own 15% or more of the open interest, then 
this is to be reported to the exchange. Failure to do so will attract a 
penalty. 
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(viii) Position limits for trading member : 15% of open interest or Rs 100 
crore, whichever is higher, 
(ix) No limits on the total market-wide open interest. 
2.6.3 Comprehensive review of derivatives trading in India 
In 2002, SEBI's Advisory Group on Derivatives reviewed some of the issues 
relating to the derivative market. These included the use of sub-brokers, stocks 
on which derivatives trading was permitted, settlement of options and futures 
contracts and use of derivatives by mutual funds. The group was also asked to do 
a review of the recommendations of the LC Gupta Committee. 
The major recommendations of the group were: -
(i) Currency options and interest rate markets need to be more transparent. 
This should be done with the help of available technology, 
(ii) SEBI and RBI should encourage trading in a variety of underlyings eg. 
Rupee-Dollar rate, interest rate, Mumbai Inter-Bank Offer Rate 
(MIBOR), etc. 
(iii) Member wise position limits to be reviewed. Should be revised to 20% of 
the market-wise position limit in the stock, 
(iv) Differences in margin collection dates (margins in the derivatives market 
are collected up front) between the derivative and cash markets to be 
removed so that the margin levels are harmonised, 
(v) Only stocks which are in the top 500 in terms of market capitalisation 
and daily volumes, should be eligible for derivatives trading, 
(vi) Some changes were proposed in the risk containment systems in the 
derivatives market, 
(vii) For IPOs vrith a net public offer of or greater than Rs 5 billion, stock 
options and futures contracts should be offered from the time of listing 
in the cash market. This would help in efficient price discovery, 
(viii) A new index should be eligible for derivatives trading if 90% of the 
weightage in the index is from constituent stocks, which themselves, are 
eligible for derivatives trading, 
(ix) The minimum contract size of Rs 2 lakhs, should be done away with, 
(x) Cross margining should be allowed at client level across the cash and 
derivative market, with a desirability that the clearing member be the 
same for both markets. Various conditions for cross margining were 
suggested by committee, 
(xi) SEBI should not worry about physical separation of the cash and 
derivatives market, but should be concerned with separation of the legal 
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architecture of the derivatives segment through separate bye-laws, rules, 
regulations and Governing Council, 
(xii) Sub-brokers, if any, should be registered with SEBI as trading members, 
(xiii) Surveillance mechanisms in the derivatives market need to be different 
from those of the cash markets. There should be monitoring of open 
interest, cost of carry, impact cost and volatility. Timing of information 
disclosure by corporates should be monitored as this could affect 
contract prices at introduction and expiry, 
(xiv) But unified surveillance of the cash and derivatives markets must be 
done both at exchange and SEBI levels, 
(xv) Global surveillance practices should be studied, 
(xvi) The derivatives cell at SEBI should be strengthened. 
Part II 
2.7 Weather derivatives 
Weather Derivatives are a new, innovative and low-cost option for hedging risk. 
These could be used in many sectors, including agriculture, and would be 
especially relevant for developing countries {Hazell and Skees, 2005). 
A weather derivative is a financial contract whose payout depends in a certain 
way on weather [Mraoua and Bari, 2005). The starting point would be an 
agreement to have a contract on a certain index which is dependant on the 
weather. The index could be related to rainfall, snow, temperature, wind, 
humidity, etc. 
While various types of indices have been used to varying extents, the most 
common index used in the US and Europe is the temperature index. This is 
probably because one of the major factors for the growth of Weather Derivatives 
was the deregulation of the energy markets in the US (Alaton et al, 2002). The 
energy markets are highly temperature dependant as the American lifestyle calls 
for a large usage of energy in winters for heating and in summers for cooling. A 
small variation from the normal in the temperature leads to a large variation in 
the aggregate demand for energy. Consequently, this affects the planning for 
energy producers and distribution companies. Obviously then, they would look 
for a means to hedge their income risks and this led to the demand for Weather 
Derivatives. 
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Until a few years ago, 98-99% of Weather Derivatives traded were based on 
temperature (Carman et al,200o) The most common derivative structures are 
based on cumulative Heating-Degree-Days (HDDs) or Cooling-Degree-Days 
(CDDs) for either a month or a season. 
Degree-Day indices are mostly based on the number of HDDs, HDDi on a 
particular day i, or the number of CDDs, CDDi, where HDDi/CDDi is obtained 
from. 
HDDi = max ((To - TO, o) 
CDDi = max ((Ti - To), o) 
Ti = average temperature on day i and To = a baseline temperature. 
Average temperature for a day Ti is usually taken as Ti = (Ti""^ " + Ti™" ) / 2. 
The baseline temperature is taken as 65°F in the US, and i8°C in Europe. These 
are generally accepted as the temperature above which cooling would be 
required and below which heating would be required in order to achieve a 
comfortable ambiance. The way they are defined implies that HDDs and CDDs 
can never be negative. Also implied is the fact that on a particular day, both 
HDDs and CDDs may be zero, but at least one of the two wall be zero. 
The accepted baseline temperature of 65°F/i8°C is based on conditions in the 
US/Europe and need not necessarily be true for Indian conditions. We would 
need to think of a different baseline for two reasons. The first is that the 
ambient conditions in India are different. In general, the average temperature is 
higher and this could possibly lead to a higher baseline temperature. The 
second is that the tolerance levels of Indians is higher - and they do not 
generally switch from heating to cooling at a particular temperature - but would 
probably have a band of tolerance. This could possibly lead to a different 
baseline temperature for HDDs and a different one for CDDs. 
Besides normal structures, we could also have binary options. In this case the 
payout is either a fixed sum or zero. These kind of structures are generally 
confined to an event based index - e.g. the number of days it rained in the 
evenings in a month. This would be useful to event management companies, for 
example. 
Contracts are structured differently in different exchanges. For example, on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the CME degree day index is the cumulative sum 
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of HDDs/CDDs during a calendar month {Alaton et al, 2002). One contract is $ 
100 times the degree day index. In the CME, options and options on futures are 
European style. 
In general, the parameters for a weather option would be: 
(i) Contract type - (American Call/Put, European Call/Put) 
(ii) The period of the contract 
(iii) The underlying index (Degree-days, rainfall etc.) 
(iv) The weather station whose official readings would be used 
(v) The strike level 
(vi) The tick size 
(vii) A cap on the maximum payout. 
The last parameter, a cap on the max payout, is often used in Weather Derivative 
contracts to safeguard against extreme weather phenomenon. 
The payout on a HDD call can be written as: 
p = min {t. max ((To - T), o), h} 
Where t is the tick size and h is the maximum limit on the payout. 
r o ifTi>To 
Thusp(Ti)= J t(To-Ti) i fL<T<To 
^ h if T < L 
Where the equivalent limit on the temperature Ti, L = (To - h/t) 
The strike is typically set at between zero and one SD above the estimated 
expected index and the limit at around 2 SD - or the most extreme historical 
value for the index (Jewson et al, 2005). 
Morocco has been using a rainfall index derivative for its cereal producers for a 
few years now. Programme Secheresse is a drought relief programme, which 
has gained immense popularity. In 2002, subscription to the programme was 
80% of the 300,000 authorised hectares (Stoppa and Hess, 2003). But effects 
of moral hazard and adverse selection risk led to a World Bank sponsored 
project, which concluded that rainfall contracts would have better benefits. In 
Mexico, too, a pilot rainfall derivative scheme was developed for the region of 
Meknes, a wheat growing area in the north of Mexico. 
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The payout procedure followed is that a proportional payment is done when the 
indexed rainfall (Rt) in the crop year is below a threshold level (T). Specific 
weights are assigned to various growth phases of crop, since it has been 
established that some of the growing phases are critical with respect to water 
needs. The index Rt is calculated by summing the values of rainfall in each 
period 'i' by the specific weight assigned to the period. Thus: 
"Oif R , > T 
y _ R X Liability Indemnity -
-J-if R . < T 
The business structure in Morocco is that the rainfall index derivatives are sold 
in the form of a contract through MAMDA - a mutual insurance company, 
which is run by farmers' representatives. The rural credit institution, CNCA, 
builds weather index insurance into farmer crop loans. 
Martin et al.,(200i) suggest a more flexible European precipitation option, 
where 
Indemnity 
0 if X > strike 
u, (x - strike ) .„ ., ,. . 
—^^^ if strike > X > lim it 
strike 
l i f X < limit 
X Liability 
Where |a is defined such that limit = strike [i + 1/ |i] ; |j is thus an increasing 
payment factor. 
2.8 The weather derivative market for industry 
Since 2001, Price Waterhouse Coopers have been entrusted by the Weather Risk 
Management Association (WRMA), to carry out a survey to establish the size of 
the weather derivatives market. The survey results of 2006 indicate that the 
total value of trade was $ 45.2 billion, as compared to $ 9.7 billion the previous 
year. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) experienced significant increase 
in both, the number of trades, which increased by a factor of 4, and the value of 
those trades, which increased by a factor of 8. There was, however, a decline in 
the OTC market, which offset some of the increase, but relative to the size of the 
market, these declines were small. 
Literature review 43 
The PWC survey also concluded that HDD remains the most common type of 
trade. 
In India, one of the foreseeable major impediments to the growth of weather 
derivatives would be the lack of reliable weather stations in numbers which 
cover the vast geographical area of the country. 
Some agricultural produce would not only require specific weather conditions, 
but also specific timings for those conditions. Turvey et al, (2006) take up the 
case of weather insurance for ice-wine in the Niagara Peninsula of Southern 
Ontario. Ice vnne is a desert wdne which is made from grapes picked in their 
natural frozen state at air temperature between - 8°C and - 12°C. If specific 
weather conditions are not met, the grapes go waste because by then they 
become "late harvest" grapes and fetch very low prices. A model has been 
developed in which the key insurable event is not only total harvestable hours, 
but also when they occur. Whilst the authors use a random strike price, they 
continue to use the best-available historical data in conjunction with Monte 
Carlo methods to estimate premiums for an exotic derivative product. 
2.9 Valuation of weather derivatives 
Valuation of most financial contracts are done for three reasons: (i) for pricing 
(ii) after a trade, to know the current value of the holdings and (iii) for purposes 
of regulation. The same principles apply to the valuation of weather derivatives. 
In spite of the obvious need for universal pricing in the Weather Derivatives 
market, no standard pricing models are in place. Unlike other financial markets, 
there is no real common language in the weather market. Many market makers 
have developed their own models which they use only for their purposes and 
which they rarely share with others. 
As a backdrop, it can be noted that one reason for the take-off of the options 
markets in the 1980s was the universally accepted Black-Scholes model for 
pricing. Such a model has not as yet been developed for Weather Derivatives 
pricing, which has universal acceptance. 
Garman et al, (2000) bring out that the Black -Schoies model is inadequate for 
Weather Derivatives for the following reasons: 
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(i) Weather does not "walk" quite like the accepted "random walk" in asset 
prices. Instead, the phenomenon of mean-reversion comes into play. 
(ii) Weather is not "random" - that is to say that because of its inherent 
nature, weather is approximately predictable. 
(iii) Black-Scholes option payoffs are determined by the value of the 
underlying exactly at maturity. Weather derivatives usually provide for 
an averaging over time - more akin to "Asian" or average price options. 
In other words, they have a non-Black-Scholes payoff. 
(iv) Weather Derivatives are usually capped. 
(v) Underlying variables are not tradable prices and so pricing cannot be 
free of economy risk aversion factors - unlike the Black-Scholes model. 
Most research into pricing of weather derivatives focuses on temperature based 
contracts. Various types of methodologies have been used, varying from simple 
approaches to complicated ones using factors which would be difficult to 
measure. 
A large number of models proposed are Stochastic, using one factor models. 
Dischel (1999), Garman (2000), Meneu & Valor (2003) and A^aton, Djehiche & 
StiUberger (2002) have all used one factor stochastic models. Brody, Syroka & 
Zervos (2002) have extended the notion of Brownian notion to Fractorial 
Brownian notion in order to better capture long-term interdependencies in 
temperature time series. 
Martin, Barnett and Coble (2001) use a methodology for pricing based on the 
calculation of the expected loss in a contract by integrating over the probability 
distribution of the underlying. The authors recommended using the gamma 
distribution in the case of rainfall, as it could be fitted more accurately to 
precipitation observations than normal or lognormal distributions. 
Equilibrium models have been used by Cao & Wei (1999) and Davis (2001). But 
these are difficult to use practically, because of the hard-to-measure factors 
used. 
The CAPM brings out the proportionality of the excess return over risk free 
interest rate to the regression coefficient between performance of that 
investment and the performance of some wider market. So investments with 
low correlation are more desirable. Weather derivatives could therefore be a 
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desirable form of investment since they have a low correlation with financial 
markets (Jewson et al, 2005). However, for Weather Derivatives CAPM would 
not hold too well since they are not yet accepted widely as a form of investment, 
thus resulting in a lesser demand than what would be inferred from the CAPM. 
Also, a large number of contracts being OTC, prices do not follow market 
dynamics. 
Probably the simplest and most used models use the Bum analysis. Here payoff 
is calculated for a given contract over a set of historical outcomes for the 
underlying. The average payoff over a period of 20-30 years is taken as the fair 
price of the contract. 
Bjordal and Skogen(200i) bring out the fact that pricing of rainfall derivatives 
cannot be done by directly using available stochastic models which have been 
applied to temperature based Weather Derivatives for two reasons: 
(i) Precipitation cannot have a negative value, so differing from temperature 
(ii) Temperature is continuous, whereas precipitation is discrete in nature. 
This itself would affect the stochastic model. 
On the other hand. Bum analysis, where historical outcomes are used, can easily 
be adapted for rainfall derivatives. However, a major shortcoming is that it fails 
to distinguish weather patterns with high volatility. For example constant 
rainfall and highly volatile rainfall will be priced equally if the mean of both is 
the same. Another disadvantage is that Bum Analysis does not bring in 
probabilities of events more extreme than those in the historical period 
considered. 
Bum analysis can be, in short, described as the amount that would have been 
paid out to a shorted put option every year for the past, say, 50 years. Nelken 
(2000) lists outs six essential steps in Bum Analysis: 
(i) Collect historical weather data 
(ii) Convert to degree days 
(iii) Make corrections 
(iv) Determine what the option would have paid out every year in the past 
(v) Find an average of these amounts 
(vi) Discount back to the settlement date 
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We could, of course, use a weather model directly, in which case simulated 
possible weather patterns in the future could be used instead of historical data to 
calculate payouts of options. This kind of a weather derivatives model is first 
calibrated with observed past data. Weather sequences are then generated using 
a Monte Carlo process. The average payout of the option under various 
scenarios is then calculated and this is taken as the expected payout of the 
option. 
There would, in these processes, be a need for clean weather data. In fact, this 
would be crucial for the success of any Bum analysis. Dunis and Karalis 
(2003), bring out many interpolation techniques and filling methods for missing 
historical records of data. These include the Expectation Maximisation (EM) 
algorithm, the Data Augmentation (DA) algorithm, the Kalman Filter (KF) and 
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Of these, the authors find that PCA 
out-performs other methods and is easy to implement. It can be done in 
EXCEL. The advantages of using PCA for filling missing data are also brought 
out by Mraoua and Bari (2005). 
Most authors model temperature using a mean-reverting property in the 
stochastic process. Typically, (Alaton et al, 2002) give: 
( rl T "" 1 
- ^ + a (T.-^-T.) dt + a, dW, 
Whose solution is Tt" = mean temperature at time t 
= A+ Bt + C Sin (0, + (p) 
a (T," -T,) brings in the effect of mean reversion and 
CT, d W, brings in noise with a standard Weiner Process. 
The term, Tt"" incorporates seasonal dependence by bringing in a Sine function 
with CO = 2JT and a phase angle q).It also incorporates a trend effect - which could 
be attributed to global warming, urban heating effect etc. The trend is assumed 
to be linear. 
The parameters A, B, C, (p, a, and a are obtained from temperature data of at 
least the last 30 years. 
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Similar models can be used for precipitation modeling, albeit with minor 
aberrations. Emmerich, (2005), uses a similar model for rainfall in Germany. 
Bjordal and Skogen, (2001), have used a one factor model for precipitation. 
They have chosen to model weekly - accumulated precipitation in order to 
capture seasonal trend and to reduce the volatility of the data set. Since 
precipitation has a lower bound of zero, a log-transformed model of the time 
series was found to be convenient. 
2.10 Weather derivative pricing 
Markets in the US and in Europe trade weather derivatives in two forms: Swaps 
and Options. Weather Swaps are similar to forward contracts, usually with a 
maximum limit on payout. In essence, two parties are only exchanging risks 
where one party gets the payment if rainfall is above the strike and the other if 
rainfall is below the strike. 
So payoff from a long swap contract would be: 
c 
- LRS if X < LI 
p(x) = •{ t (x -K) i fLi<x<U 
^ LRsifx > U 
Where x is the index, t is the tick size, K is the strike and U and U are limits in 
units of the index. OTC contracts are usually traded with limits whilst CME 
contracts do not have limits and have daily settlements like futures (Jewson ,et 
al, 2005). 
A call option, on the other hand, would have payoff: 
o ifx<K 
t (x-K) ifK<x<L 
LRS if X > L 
P(x) = - < 
Just as with other options, we could have collars, straddles, strangles etc. We 
could also create baskets of options, which would be useful for 
companies/others who might have a weather risk at a number of locations. 
While pricing, it is understandable that if there is one hedger and one speculator 
in a contract, than the strike can be expected to shift away from the fair value 
towards the speculator since he is taking on the hedger's risk. Such a shift is 
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normally calculated as a percentage of the Standard Deviation of the index. Or, 
we could say, in the long run, with repeated contracts, the speculator would 
make money at the cost of the hedger (Jewson ,et al, 2005). 
However, it would have to be kept in mind that the risk for the seller of a 
contract is very high in the case of a single contract. He would then be forced to 
price it very high, in which case buyers would dwindle away. So this would be a 
market maker's dilemma in the beginning. 
Another issue in pricing is that of using forecasts. Two points emerge. The first 
is that accuracy of weather forecasting is highly dependant on the kind of 
equipment available. And so the success of weather forecasting would vary from 
country to country and region to region. On the other hand, forecasting in the 
case of financial markets is more dependant on human skills and experience. 
The second point is that forecasts in the financial markets play a large role in 
affecting the price of the financial instruments. On the other hand, weather 
forecasts play no role in affecting the weather. 
Zeng,(200o) talks of Prediction Based Pricing where, accepting that precise 
prediction of weather is infeasible, seasonal predictions of the probabilities that 
the temperature or rainfall will be above, near or below the climatic norm (PA, 
PN, and PB) during 3 months periods are provided. So for a city, rainfall 
probabilities could be PA=O.41, PN=O.33, PB=O.26. These are then used in a 
Monte-Carlo method, thus reflecting predictions into the pricing method. 
The role of weather derivatives in risk management for agriculture in developing 
countries has been brought out by many researches. The vulnerability of 
agriculture to weather is especially pronounced in developing countries. Also of 
importance is the fact that agriculture has a link to many other sectors, thus 
creating a link between GDP of a developing country and the weather. The poor 
have very little means of risk management and resort to short term strategies 
like selling their assets in times of crisis. The number of farmer suicides in India 
at times of crop failure is a pointer to this. 
Government interventions are there, but these have been to limited extents. The 
Minimum Support Price and government sponsored crop insurance schemes 
have absorbed a lot of public money, without being too sure of success rates. 
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Skees, (2002) brings out a Catch-22 situation as credit institutions realize that 
farmers' incomes are subject to large risks and so they charge higher rates of 
interest. These are not affordable by the farmers, so they delay the adoption of 
new technologies. 
Hess, et al.,(2003) have listed five key success factors of Weather Risk 
Management in emerging markets. 
(i) Availability of good weather data. The availability of comprehensive and 
accurate historical data for periods of at least 30 years, 
(ii) End-users. There is a lack of demand assessments in developing 
countries. This leads to a haphazard introduction of weather derivative 
products into the markets. Farmers could form the bulk of the demand 
for such products, 
(iii) Facilitators. The need for a large number of published pilot cases, in 
order to raise awareness levels, 
(iv) Regulatory framework. A robust regulatory framework within which 
weather derivatives are sold and traded, 
(v) Risk transfer mechanism into international weather markets. 
In developing countries, market makers would have high entry barriers, but also 
higher margins in the long run (Hess, et ai, 2003). In fact, global weather risk 
market makers would be willing to shoulder up-front costs in order to reap the 
benefits of a globally diversified weather market. 
Varangis, et al.,(2003) point out that when a probability distribution is drawn-
up for rainfall, weather derivatives risk protection can be sold in layers. 
Weather derivatives, which cover tail risk, (i.e. for extreme events with low 
probabilities) would be very expensive. The most efficient derivatives would be 
at layers closer to the mean of the probability distribution, whilst insurance 
would be better for tail risk. 
Many papers suggest a demand for rainfall insurance and that this demand 
would be enough to cover the cost of risk plus Administrative Costs (Turvey, 
2000). 
While in most models, exogenous events like weather are assumed constant, and 
output of agricultural products is a function of inputs like fertilizer, labour etc, 
Turvey (2000) models the marginal response of crop yields to weather events. 
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Here inputs are kept constant and yields are evaluated based on relationships 
with exogenous weather factors. 
A production function of the Cobb-Douglas type Is assumed : 
Y =ARP>HP2 
Where Y = Crop yield 
R = Cumulative daily rainfall 
H = Cumulative crop heat unit above 50°F 
Pi and P2 are production coefficients or elasticities 
So, marginal productivities of heat and rainfall are 
dR R 8H H 
BRdH ' RH 
So, for weather derivatives to be effective. 
— > 0 , — > 0 and > 0 
dR dH dRdH 
Obviously, if -—— > 0, both R and H jointly impact yields. If = 0, then 
either rainfall or heat events, or both - have no effect on yields. 
If either p, or P2 are not equal to zero, then specific-event weather insurance 
could be effective. 
Geyser and Van de Venter (2001), have done a study on hedging maize yield in 
South Africa. They point out that before the application of weather derivatives 
can be tested, the relationship between rainfall and yield must be determined. 
In the agricultural context, there are three types of risk: 
(i) Price risk 
(ii) Event risk 
(iii) Yield risk 
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Whilst price risk can be hedged through forward contracts and future, event risk 
and yield risk can be hedged through insurance and weather derivatives. 
Wynter and Cooper (2004), also state that it has been established that for grain 
fanners, the two most important variables are yield and price. While some of the 
risks associated with yield can be controlled eg. disease, weeds etc, risks due to 
weather are harder to manage. Kingwell (2000) suggests that farmers should 
focus on yield risk, an area they are often expert in, and leave price risk to 
others. Farmers, across the world, seem to go by this, as shown by the multitude 
of cooperative pools formed. 
Geyser and Van de Venter (2001) also bring out the fact that weather 
derivatives and weather insurance vfiW never entirely replace each other because 
of the many differences: 
(i) Weather insurance is for the high risk, low probability scenario while 
weather derivatives best suit the low risk high probability scenario, 
(ii) In weather derivatives, payouts are generally in proportion to the 
magnitude of the phenomenon. This is not usually so in weather 
insurance, 
(iii) Weather insurance normally requires a proof of loss, 
(iv) Weather derivatives are a traded security. So one can sell or buy back the 
contract, 
(v) Weather derivatives are, generally, cheaper then weather insurance. 
In India, the first experimentation vnth weather risk hedging was with the NAIS. 
This is a crop-yield based scheme, where farmers are compensated when the 
actual average yield of an area of a particular crop is less than the guaranteed 
yield (specified percentage of preceding 3 to 5 years average yield) in the area. 
This was not very successful (Ifft, 2001). 
The Agriculture Insurance Company introduced a rainfall insurance scheme 
called Varsha Bima' in 2004. This is aimed to be a mechanism for providing 
effective risk management aid to those individuals and institutions likely to be 
impacted by adverse rainfall incidence. AIC introduced Varsha Bima - 2004 
covering adverse deviations in rainfall during the Kharif 2004 season as a pilot 
project in 20 IMD rain gauge stations across 4 states. The expanded Varsha 
Bima 2005 was implemented in and around 130 districts/rain gauge station area 
across 10 states. The scheme was fine-tuned during Kharif 2006 for 
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implementation in about 140 IMD rain gauge station areas across 16 states, 
covering more crops and with more coverage options. 
2.11 Contingent valuation 
Arriving at a monetary value which should be placed on a service provided, is 
not an easy task. However, in order to aid in policy making and in order to act as 
a starting point for structuring weather derivatives, it is essential that we have 
some idea of the amount that people would be willing to pay for them. One of 
the methods, which has been used fairly extensively is the Contingent Valuation 
(CV) method. 
Contingent Valuation uses surveys to obtain responses to hypothetical situations 
and then determines preferences through respondents' willingness to pay for a 
service which is proposed to be introduced or for an improvement in an existing 
service. The method is named so because it determines 'willingness to pay' 
values which are contingent upon a hypothetical situation or market which is 
described to the respondent. 
The CV method was first proposed by Ciriacy and Wantrup (1947) in the 
Journal of Farm Economics, where they had proposed that individuals should be 
interviewed in a structured manner in order to determine their willingness to 
pay for a good or a service, as also to determine how the good or service could be 
improved to include the needs and desires of the individuals. Even at that time, 
they had, however, pointed out that the success or failure of a survey would 
significantly hinge on the method and quality of its design and execution. The 
first recorded use of the CV method is the use of questionnaires by economist 
Robert K Davis in 1963 to estimate the benefits of outdoor recreation in a Maine 
backwoods area. In 1967, Ronald Davis used the CV method in several studies of 
air pollution benefits. In 1970, Cicchetti and Smith used the method to estimate 
willingness to pay of hikers in a wilderness area, to reduce congestion caused by 
other hikers. In 1972, Darling used contingent valuation to value amenities in a 
California park. A year later, in 1973, Acton used the method to value exercise 
programmes which reduced the incidence of heart attacks. Other notable studies 
include valuations of aesthetic benefits from foregoing construction of a 
geothermal plant and benefits of government support to the arts. 
Later, Mitchell and Carson's (1989) book on contingent valuation brought 
together various aspects relevant to CV, like psychology, sociology, market 
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research, economics, etc. Thereafter, the CV method gained a lot of prominence, 
and is now used widely, for assessing a variety of investments {Hanemann, 
1994)-
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has played an important role in 
the development of the CV method, by providing funding for projects which 
focused on the use of CV for policy purposes. 
CV methods have been widely used for non-market as well as for potential 
market goods. They have been used by Mitchell and Carson (1985) and by Smith 
and Desvousges (1987) for valuation of non-traded services. Simulated markets 
were used, with hypothetical questions being asked. From these, values for the 
potential services were derived. 
McCarthy (2002) states that the value of an insurance will ideally be equivalent 
to the area under the appropriate demand curve, which is the change in welfare 
attributable to the use of insurance. In the case of weather derivatives, we would 
need to focus on trying to obtain data for estimating demand, in the absence of a 
market. Upfront, we have to accept that a CV method assumes that a 
hypothetical market would be comparable to an actual market. Since there is 
very little amount of actual data available, checking of the validity and reliability 
of a CV study becomes an important concern. Most of the methods of checking 
revolve around the approach of the study, the kind of questionnaire built up, the 
kinds of biases which might be present and the manner in which the survey is 
undertaken. Thus the specification of the scenario assumes importance. 
A CV survey is usually in three parts, (Mitchell and Carson, 1989): 
i) A detailed description of the service/good which is being valued and the 
hypothetical market in which it is made available. Detailed scenarios are 
read out and explained by the surveyor, 
ii) Questions about the characteristics of the respondent which might 
influence his responses to WTP, eg., age, education level, income etc. 
iii) Questions which elicit the respondent's willingness to pay for the service 
being valued. 
The main objective of the survey would be to determine the maximum amount 
that a respondent is willing to pay for a service, before he would prefer to go 
without it. One very simple and obvious way would be to ask, in a 
straightforward way, the maximum amount that he would pay. However, 
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researchers have found that respondents are usually unable to come-up with a 
value. Desvousges et al, 1983, found that open-ended questions tend to result in 
a very large number of non-responses or a zero response. As a result, most 
researchers tend to aid the respondent by helping him in the process of valuing 
the good/service. 
A number of elicitation methods have been developed by researchers and these 
have been tested in various situations. Some of these are enumerated below: 
i) Open-ended questions: This method would be more appropriate where 
education and awareness levels are high. These type of questions would 
be prone to large errors when the respondents are unable to associate the 
correct answer with the question being asked. Also, this method, as 
indicated above, results in a large number of non-responses. 
ii) Bidding Game: This is the oldest and most widely used method. It is 
close to an auction and gives the respondent a simple choice - either he 
accepts to pay or he declines to. It gives him the chance to mull the 
values in his mind and then take a decision. In this method, it is easy to 
get at the maximum amount that the respondent is willing to pay. The 
game can either be started with the highest value, which is subsequently 
lowered, or with the lowest value, which is subsequently raised. 
iii) Random Quotes: Instead of moving up or down an amount, as is done in 
the bidding game, here the surveyor randomly quotes a value or a range 
of values within which the respondent is asked to indicate his v/illingness 
to pay. 
iv) Take It or Leave I t : Here no ranges are offered. A pre-decided price of 
the service or good is determined and this is indicated to the respondent, 
with a simple choice of either accepting it or rejecting it. Some 
researchers have called this method the Yes/No elicitation method. 
v) Take It or Leave It with Follow-up: This method is a combination of 
methods. After the 'Take It of Leave It' question, if the respondent 
answers yes, then the surveyor quotes a higher amount, while if he has 
said no, then a lower amount is quoted. 
vi) Sealed Bid: Similar to the open ended questions method, here the 
respondent indicates the amount he is willing to pay, and this is not 
questioned or discussed further. 
vii) Cards: Various prices of the good/service are marked on cards which are 
displayed in front of the respondent. He is asked to choose the one which 
he feels indicates the most apt value for the service. 
I 1 > - i»o* ^ " ^ (A' 
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DeShazo (2002) found a problem with the open-ended question^jtyp6 ^f iu^ey. 
11 
In almost all cases where the respondent said Yes to a lower bouiui cdntract, 
when given the open ended question, his follow-up response was leiss t h ^ J h e 
value he had just said he would pay. The researcher explains this dowitward bias " 
as a 'loss averting behaviour', by now indicating that the respondent's initial Bid 
was the maximum amount that he would have paid, and he now indicates a 
lower amount hoping that it would influence actual contracts in the future. 
2.11.1 Disadvantages in the CV method 
Mitchell and Carson,( 1989 ) bring out some of the drawback in surveys 
conducted for a contingent valuation. The first is that respondents might engage 
in strategic behaviour by giving answers which they feel would influence the 
policy in the service/good being proposed. The second is that respondents might 
not be motivated enough to answer correctly or meaningfully. And the third is 
that answers sought in a hypothetical market might not accurately predict 
behaviour in an actual market. 
Sources of Bias 
Unless watched out for, certain elements of bias can creep into an analysis of 
willingness to pay through a contingent valuation method. Some of the principal 
sources of bias are: 
i) Strategic Bias: Respondents could tend to answer in a way which they 
feel might influence the outcome of the study in a manner which would 
be of benefit to them. For example, they might underbid in order to get a 
service at a lower cost. Alternatively, they might overbid in order to get 
the service activated quickly. 
ii) Compliance Bias: Respondents might shape their responses in order to 
please the interviewer. This could especially happen when respondents 
don't have a strong or well-considered view on the topic. 
iii) Implied Value Cues: Respondents could derive signals from the initial 
reference value suggested by the researcher. As an example, a Starting-
Point Bias could result when the willingness to pay, indicated by a 
respondent, is influenced by a value which is first quoted in the scenario. 
iv) Anchoring Bias: This could happen when, not knowing the service's 
actual value, the respondent regards the proposed amount as a value for 
the service and anchors his WTP on the proposed amount. 
v) Range Bias: The respondent might create an artificial upper or lower 
bound in his mind based on the maximum or minimum amount quoted. 
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vi) Relational Bias: The respondent might link the proposed service to some 
other service in a way in which the latter's value acts as a cue for the 
proposed service - something which the researcher would not have 
intended. 
vii) Scenario Misspecification: These may result either through erroneous 
descriptions in the survey or through errors in perception by the 
respondent. Of these, researchers find that errors caused by 
misperceptions in the minds of the respondents are the most 
problematic sources of errors in CV surveys. 
However, what is important is the conclusion reached hyArrow,(i986), that 
neither empirical evidence nor theoretical arguments assert that strategic bias is 
liable to be significant in CV studies. The most important challenge is in being 
able to convey in a technically correct sense, the meaning, the structure, the 
benefits and possibly, the policies behind the good or service being proposed; 
and doing this in a manner in which the respondent perceives it as intended. 
Errors in CY studies are predominantly discussed in literature as occurring due 
to respondents having to value a good or service vnth which they are either not 
familiar, or about which they do not have sufficient knowledge. McCarthy 
(2002), brings out three issues which are of particular concern in developing 
countries: 
i) Farmers not being familiar with the existence of formal institutions eg. 
Multi-commodity or other exchanges for trading weather derivatives, 
ii) Their feeling that it is the government's responsibility to offset effects of 
extreme weather eg. droughts, 
iii) The farmers' belief that if they under-represent, then the final pricing of 
an insurance or a derivative product would be lower. (Ofcourse, this is 
dichotomous with the first, and would be more predominant only if 
respondents have experience with formal financial instruments.) 
The above points do bring out the imperative requirement of first methodically 
training the surveyors and having them explain the service and the scenario with 
sufficient clarity to the respondents. This is especially so since scenario-
misspecification can easily lead to erroneous findings. 
Freeman (1993) has suggested that focus group discussions and pilot surveys 
could help in the use of comprehensible terminologies in the final questionnaire 
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and in the surveyors being on the level of the farmers when the survey is 
undertaken. 
Sampling issues 
The basic aim of a CV research is to be able to generalize the findings to a much 
larger group, than the sample surveyed. Biases can come about from faulty 
sampling design as well as from faulty execution. To start with, in a CV study, 
the researcher has to decide on the population which would be affected by the 
hypothetical market. From this sampling frame, the actual sample would be 
selected. It is from this sample that WTP responses are solicited. Some of the 
possible biases which might creep in, during sample design and execution are: 
i) Population Choice. Major errors come about in CV analyses when the 
population which uses a good or service is different from the one which 
pays for it. This problem is not envisaged in the case of weather 
derivatives, 
ii) Sampling Frame Bias. The sampling frame is defined after identifying 
the population of interest. If the population and the sampling frame 
diverge, then this could result in a sampling frame bias ^Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989). 
iii) Non-Response Bias. Because of some amount of non-response which 
usually results in a survey, the valid WTP responses will be less than the 
number originally chosen in the sample size. This could be in two forms 
- an individual non-response, where a person chosen to form the sample 
doesn't want to or is unable to participate in the survey, and a question 
non-response, where an individual doesn't or isn't able to respond to a 
particular question. 
Quality 
Very obviously, a CV study would be relevant only if its quality is good. However, 
Arrow,(i986) brings out the fact that even a flawed CV study can provide 
insights for policy making when the shortcomings are taken into account. 
A few criteria have been listed for CV studies by the Water Resources Council, 
1979 and by the Department of Interior, 1986. Two of the important criteria are 
- having a sample size of at least 200; and the use of the bidding game 
elicitation method. 
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The most important aspect of a CV survey is how the researcher is able to eUcit 
value. Hanemann, (1994), points out that the tvs^ o most important issues relate 
to being able to confront respondents with a specific and realistic situation; and 
the use of closed-ended questions. What can be inferred from this is that it 
would be too abstract to ask a question like " What would you pay for a weather 
derivative?'; and this would be unlikely to yield correct results, if any. On the 
other hand, asking "Would you be willing to pay Rs 30 for a weather derivative 
covering a return of Rs 1000?" would be more tangible. 
It has to be made clear that the respondents do not have to make a payment 
during the conduct of the interview - but are only expressing their willingness to 
pay. Unless respondents understand the service, the mode of payment, the 
benefits etc., their answers would not be correct. This leads us to the essentiality 
of proper training for the surveyors, before they embark on the survey. 
Using the data 
Different statistical methods can be used to determine willingness to pay, from 
the data collected from the survey. A simplistic mean could give a WTP; or a 
median. Hanemann, (1994), points out that a median is more robust, since the 
mean is highly sensitive to the right tail of the distribution, ie. to the responses 
of the highest bidders. 
A better method would be to use a model on the bid amounts in order to obtain 
the WTP. 
2.12 Willingness to pay 
With the grov«ng popularity of the CV method, more and more attention is 
being given to the statistical aspects of the analysis of data obtained from a 
survey. This has especially happened as there has been a pronounced shift from 
the use of open-ended questions, where respondents indicate an amount in 
rupees which they would be willing to pay, to the use of closed-ended questions, 
where respondents give a yes/no type of answer. In the latter case, the 
vdllingness to pay is then statistically obtained by introducing a model to the bid 
amounts which were put across to the respondents in the survey. 
Haab andMcConnel (2002) define v«llingness-to-pay as the maximum amount 
of income an individual will pay in exchange for an improvement in 
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circumstances, or the maximum amount a person will pay to avoid a decline in 
circumstances. 
Starting with an assumption that a farmer would be willing to pay in order to 
hedge his weather-related risks, and expressing his utility function as 
u[M,Y,V(y)] 
where M is his endowment, which we could take as land owned by him, Y is his 
income and V(y) is the variation in his income, we could say that by paying a 
certain amount (ie., with a marginal decrease in his wealth), the farmer would be 
able to stabilize his income. In other words, by maximizing his utility function, 
he is actually trading between wealth and stability of income. Their willingness 
to pay should also be related to their capacity to hedge their risk or stabilize their 
income through other means eg. owning livestock which can be sold when 
required, or their having sources of income other than from cultivation, eg. a 
small business or remittances from family members. 
Literature on measurement of preferences for risk reduction suggest that there 
is an insensitivity of willingness to pay for risk reduction to the magnitude of the 
risk reduction. But McCarthy (2002) suggests that this is because respondents 
see any improvement as being good - and take relatively little account of 
numerical information regarding risk reduction. McCarthy (2002) also brings 
out that while this problem is noticeable for cases where the size of risk is small, 
this is not so when the size of risk is much larger as is so in the case of rainfall 
risk hedging. Even Smith and Desvousges (1987) imply that baseline problems 
with consistency in estimating WTP for risk reduction are severe only when the 
baseline risk is small. In the case of rainfall risk, this is fairly large. 
In general, two approaches have been used for benefit estimation. 
(a) Stated preference - which is elicited through questions based on a 
contingent or hypothetical scenario 
(b) Behavioural preference - which is obtained through observation of 
responses to actual goods. 
Since weather derivatives have not yet been introduced in India, behavioural 
preferences cannot be observed, and it would be the stated preferences in 
response to a hypothetical situation, which we would need to look at. 
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One of the empirical tools used to determine willingness to pay from a 
questionnaire type of survey, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, is the 
Contingent Valuation (CV). But since the responses to the questions , in the 
nature of yes/no answers are essentially binary variables, we would need to 
create a model in order to estimate the dependant variable. Hanemann and 
Kanninen (1996) give the analogy from dose-response studies in biometrics, 
where the stimulus is the administered dose of some substance, and the 
outcome is a discrete measure of health status. 
In the case of weather derivatives, the aim would be to collect data on and to 
analyse covariate effects on responses e.g. the effect of education, income, 
savings, landholding etc. could be used to describe tendencies towards 
preferences. Carson and Mitchell (1992) have shovra the effect of 14 variables on 
the willingness to pay. The major advantage is that models with covariates can 
easily be used to expand the findings from a sample to a population, in a way 
which can be corrected by exogenous variables. The measures obtained by the 
CV method would be represented in terms of the difference between two 
expenditure functions, ie., in the CV survey, we would ask the respondent what 
he is willing to pay such that the reduction in his income along vrith the 
availability of weather risk hedging, leaves his utility level unchanged. 
Sarris (2002) brings out that the valuation of WTP for insurance would be 
different depending on how it is offered. If offered after the planting decision 
has been made, then the farmer can only reduce the variability of his returns. If 
offered before the planting decisions are taken, then he can reallocate the 
variable inputs ; and so the WTP for the second case is likely to be higher. 
Another feature could be the availability of insurance only for a year or a scheme 
in perpetuity. In the latter case a farmer would be able to adjust his cropping 
patterns and take a long term view; in this case, the WTP is likely to be the 
highest. In the case of weather derivatives, these would be offered prior to the 
planting decisions and, although no commitment will be made, it would be 
implied that this would be a scheme in perpetuity. 
The most important aspect of a WTP study is that of being able to generate in 
the minds of the respondents, a visualization of the service proposed, so that 
they are clear about what is in store. As an example, the respondents in the 
survey on WTP for weather derivatives, need to be explained clearly that by 
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paying, they can hedge only a limited amount of the risk. Also, in the case of 
rainfall insurance, there could very well be a variation in the rainfall received on 
his land and the rainfall measured by a weather station a few kilometers away. 
WTP may well be linked to where the weather station is placed, or the 
perception a farmer has on where the weather station would be vnth respect to 
his land. 
A major problem experienced by researchers in WTP studies is that WTP 
responses could be influenced by events in the recent past. Thus, it is likely that 
WTP would be higher if the study is being done just after a drought period - or 
could be lower if the study is being done after a few years of average or higher 
than average monsoons. 
2.12.1 Random utility model 
Hanemann (1984) devised the basic model for contingent valuation questions 
where there were two choices. A respondent answers 'yes' to a payment if he 
perceives that the benefits by paying that amount would be greater than the cost 
of paying for it. 
For a respondent j , his utility is: 
i = 1 for yes and = 0 for no (i.e. a preference for status quo) 
yj = income of j " " respondent 
Zj = vector of attributes and characteristics 
ey = Non observable (inherent to the respondent) component of preferences 
We can envisage an element of risk, such that if risk decreases from qo to qi then 
utility changes from Uoj to Uij i.e. the utility changes, for respondent j , from Uoj = 
u(yj, Zj,qo, €oj) to Uij = u(yj,Zj, q„ 6,j). 
Now, the respondent will say 'yes' to a payments only if 
U, > Uo 
The probability that the respondent j vnll say 'yes' is: 
Pr (yesj) = Pr [u. (y, - tj, Zj, e,j) > Uo (yj, zj, EOJ)] 
where tj is the payment required to reduce risk from qo to qi 
Literature review 62 
Or, separating the deterministic and stochastic preferences: 
Pr (yesj) = Pr [v, (yj - tj, Zj) + e,j > Vo (yj, Zj) + GOJ] 
If we consider the deterministic part to be hnear in the income and in the 
covariates, then: 
where Zj is an m-dimensional vector of variables related to individual j and a, is 
an m-dimensional vector of parameters, so that 
So the change in deterministic utility will be: 
V,j - Voj = [a, Zj + pi (yj - tj)] - [oo Zj + po yj] 
= {a,-ao)zj + P:(yj-tj)-p<,yj 
If we assume the marginal utility of income to be constant in the two CV states 
i.e. Pi = Po, then: 
V,j-Voj = azj-ptj 
where a = ai - Oo 
So the probability of a 'yes' response is: 
Pr (yeSj) = Pr [(a Zj - ptj + 6j) > o] 
where e j = e ij - € oj (a single random term) 
Assuming that the error term Sj is independently and identically distributed 
(iid), with mean zero, the normal and the logistic are two commonly used 
distributions. Both model estimations can be done using SAS or LIMDEP. 
Now for symmetric distributions, F(x) = i - F (-x) 
So we can write: 
Pr (yesj) = Pr [sj < azj - ptj] 
Now suppose that ej ~ N (o, a^) 
To use typical software packages we need to express 6j in terms of a standard 
normal (N (o, i)) variable. 
Let 0 = — , then 9 ~ N (o, i) 
<7 
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So Pr (yesj) = P"" e < a z, ft -^t, 
«--/ P^ 
Where ^ (x) is the cumulative standard normal i.e. probability that a unit normal 
variate is less than or equal to x. 
This is the Probit model, which can be used for dichotomous dependant 
variables 
When G is distributed logistic, it has mean zero and variance 
then — = 9 ~ logistic 
Tc' a 2 
3 
^^ 1 I ' J 
The standard logistic has a variance El_ times the standard normal and so will 
have parameters JL , i.e. 1.814 times the Probit parameters. 
Now, the probability that a variate distributed as a standard logit is less than or 
equal to x equals (1 + exp (-x))' 
So, Pr (yesj) = 1 + exp az, P^j 
I- J) 
-1 
This is the Logit model. 
Most of the times, there are only slight differences between the probit and the 
logit models. Both are symmetric, but the logit has thicker tails. 
Maximisation of the likelihood function yields unique estimates of the 
parameter function a -p 
a a 
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As brought out earlier, WTP is the amount of money which, when paid by the 
respondent, makes him indifferent between the proposed scenario and the 
present state. 
I.e. a^Zj+/3();j-WTPjyej^=a,Zj + fiyj+ •JO 
az So WTP,=^^+~^ IJ 
Where, a = (a, -a^) 
From the above, it can be seen that there could be 3 sources of variation in 
willingness to pay; 
(i) randomness of preferences 
(ii) randomness of parameters 
(iii) variations across individuals in the samples. 
We could say that the expectation of WTP with respect to preference 
uncertainty, e, is:-
and to get a consistent estimate of expected WTP, we can substitute the 
normalized parameter estimates into the above equation. 
So 
E,{WTPj\a,l3,Zj)-
Where the mean of Zj can be taken, to get the sample mean. 
We must note that an important assumption in the linear RUM is that the 
marginal utility of income is constant across scenarios posed by the questions in 
the questionnaire. 
Hanemann and Kanninen (1996) bring out two important aspects of models 
which are used to analyse responses to CV surveys. The first is that the models 
must make sense from the point of view of economic theory. Ofcourse, this does 
place some restrictions on the statistical models that can be used. The second is 
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that the models should be able to accommodate the heterogeneity of preferences 
and the heterogeneity of the response behaviour during the survey, in the 
population of interest. 
Research objectives and methodology 
3.1 Research objectives 
The crop insurance programme in India is not considered to be too successful 
{Parchure, 2002). One of the reasons could be lack of a study into the kind of 
product, which would appeal to those who would take the insurance, i.e. the 
farmers. 
Relative to traditional insurance products, weather derivatives have several 
advantages. However, these would be realised only if a detailed analysis is done 
of the needs of the potential buyers. One of the limitations, however, is the issue 
of basis risk, wherein the measure of the weather parameter at the location of 
the holder of the weather derivative may be different than the measure at the 
weather station specified for measuring it. The intensity of this problem needs to 
be studied. 
As the weather derivative market in India is at a nascent stage, a pilot study into 
the appeal of these products to the farmers, the kind of products they would look 
forward to, and the willingness to pay to invest in weather derivatives would 
yield a lot to the design of these products. 
Objective -1 
The major objective of this research is to, first theoretically estimate 
the amount that a typical farmer might be willing to pay for weather-
risk hedging and the magnitude of the basis risk, which is considered 
an important limitation for these products. We would then 
empirically evaluate the appeal of weather derivative products to 
farmers and their willingness to invest in these products in order to 
hedge weather related risks, through a survey. 
Besides depth and liquidity, one of the major contributors to the success or 
failure of a derivatives market is the regulatory framework (Hathaway, 1998). 
The emergence of a new market has to be accompanied by policy and legislative 
issues specifically protecting these markets from anti-gambling laws. 
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Notvsathstanding that, all these regulatory and policy frameworks have to be 
flexible enough to allow the emerging market to grow, rather than stifling it with 
stringent rules. 
In India, a lot of work was done on the regulatory frameworks for derivatives 
trading by a SEBI Committee set up in November 1996, under the chairmanship 
of Dr LC Gupta and by a group in 1998 under the chairmanship of Prof J R 
Varma. 
Objective - II 
The second objective of this research is to study the policy and 
regulatory framework for derivative trading in India and see how 
these could be adapted for weather derivatives trading in the Indian 
context. 
A limited amount of work has been done in the area of pricing of weather 
derivatives. The few existing models for weather derivatives are based on 
modelling the degree days. Although temperature would be an important factor 
in pricing of weather derivatives in India, rainfall is probably a more relevant 
index. The need of the hour is to have a simple, easily understood and 
transparent system of pricing of weather derivatives, so that subscribers get a 
sense of understanding and a sense of fairness in the product. 
Objective -III 
The third objective of the research is to study existing models for 
pricing weather derivatives and to study how they could be adapted 
for Indian conditions. 
This would go a long way in being able to price contracts which would have 
payouts depending on temperature / rainfall. 
3.2 Methodology 
The research into the prospects and challenges for weather derivatives in India, 
has been done in three parts. 
Research objectives and methodology 
Parti 
Since about one-fourth of India's GDP comes from the agricultural sector, this 
sector has been used for the study. Besides theoretical studies into the issues 
involved, an empirical study into farmers' opinions into the various issues 
involved as well as their willingness to pay for such a product like weather 
derivatives, has been done. 
The empirical framework of the study attempts to bring out farmers' preferences 
vis-a-vis various services related to hedging of crop yield through stated 
preference techniques. It then uses the contingent valuation technique to value 
their willingness to pay for such products. The steps followed are outlined in 
Figure 3.1. 
Choice of survey method and 
valuation techniques 
^ r 
Choice of target population and identify sampl 
frame population using probability sampling 
^ r 
Initial questionnaire design 
^ f 
Testing the questionnaire 
•^  f 
Conduct of survey 
1 r 
' 
Analysis of data gathered 
^ r 
Conclusion on preferences on types of weather 
derivative products and willingness to invest 
Figure 3.1 : Work plan for the survey 
The sample was chosen such that there would be representatives of farmers who 
had, earlier, opted for crop insurance schemes and those who had not, with-in 
the area chosen for the study. 
Research objectives and methodology 69 
The questionnaire finally designed covered questions that concern 
• Demographics of the sample (age, education, family size, income etc.) 
• Type of losses suffered, attributable to weather 
• Awareness of weather risk issues 
• Awareness of weather risk hedging methods 
• Willingness to invest in weather derivatives to hedge weather risks 
• Preferences for various types of weather derivative products 
A bidding game is used in the questionnaire to determine yes or no responses to 
various bids for weather derivative pricing. A Random Utility model is used, and 
logit and probit estimations are done using LIMDEP software. 
Part II 
This was an exploratory study of the policy and regulatory framework under 
which the existing trading in derivatives in India takes place. Extensions could 
then be drawn for trading in weather derivatives, with an emphasis on the 
aspects which would differentiate weather derivative trading from that in other 
derivatives. 
To cite an example, the FCRA Act (1952) defines goods as something which is 
deliverable. Due to this stringent definition, commodity exchanges are unable to 
deliver weather derivatives (Ravi Kumar, 2006). 
Since weather derivatives trading has been in vogue for the last few years in the 
international markets, the regulations and policy aspects which exist in those 
exchanges were studied in order to extend the lessons learnt, to the Indian 
context. 
The International Organization of securities commissions (IOSCO) has been 
providing international best practices and perspectives on derivatives markets. 
The IOSCO framework identifies the objectives of regulation in the securities 
and derivatives market - market efficiency and integrity, customer protection/ 
fairness and financial integrity (IOSCO, 1996). These three objectives were kept 
in mind while studying the existing policy and regulatory frameworks for 
derivatives trading in India, and while considering recommendations for 
weather derivatives trading. 
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Part III 
Traditionally, financial derivatives are priced using "no-arbitrage models" such 
as the Black-Scholes pricing model {Black and Scholes, 1973), which requires 
the underlying equity index to be traded. Since any weather index we discuss, 
will not be traded, no-arbitrage models cannot be directly applied to price 
weather derivatives. 
There are, however, many models put forth for weather derivatives. Most of 
these are pricing models with payouts depending on temperature. Usually, 
historical data is used to suggest that the evolution of temperature is based on a 
stochastic process. 
The Indian scenario would possibly warrant the use of an index based not on 
temperature, but on rainfall or, alternately, a composite index based on 
temperature and humidity or temperature and precipitation. 
The third part of the proposed research was a study of a few existing models for 
pricing of weather derivatives and to see if these could be adapted to use 
composite indexes. 
This assumes importance because, once properly constructed index contracts 
are in place, efficient pricing would be required. More importantly, at least in 
the initial stages of introduction of weather derivatives, a simple and easily 
understood method of pricing would be required. 
A theoretical analysis of willingness to pay 
4.1 Introduction 
In India, about 78% of the farmers are small and marginal and they are mostly 
poor (Agrawal,2000). Besides not being in a position to use the right inputs for 
the crop, they are largely dependant on rainfall. Most crops are highly 
dependant on the vagaries of the monsoons. If rainfall is less than normal, yield 
is very low because of lack of water; if it is very high, particularly during 
blossoming, there is poor grain setting and also, the matured grains germinate 
on the panicles. 
In this context, the development of financial instruments in the form of weather 
derivatives could help farmers in being able to hedge part of the volumetric risk 
in yield. Weather derivatives are a fairly new concept in India, which would be 
able to offer a means to manage the exposure to unpredictabilities in rainfall. 
Oilseed crops occupy about 10% of the total cultivated area and contribute 
approximately 10% to the production of food crops in India (Deosthali et al., 
2005). Noticeable efforts have been made towards increasing the yield of 
soyabean over the years, and it has increased by 490% from 1983 to 2004. The 
real increase in area under soyabean cultivation came about in 1989-90 with the 
use of a short duration (90 days), high yield variety. The average yield of Indian 
soyabean, however, at 1.074 tonnes/ha is very low as compared to the world 
average of 1.3 tonnes/ha (Deosthali et al, 2005). 
Soyabean is a legume crop, yet it is used widely as oilseed. It is now the second 
largest oilseed in India after groundnut. It grows well in warm temperatures and 
requires fair to heavy rainfall during its growth cycle. It is a highly nutritive crop 
and can supply much needed protein to the human diet, containing 
approximately 43% protein and 20 % oil. In fact, it contains essential amino 
acids particularly glycine, tryptophan and lysine, similar to cow's milk. 
Soyabean crop requires water especially during the germination, flowering and 
pod formation stages. A lack of water during the vegetative growth stage and 
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during seed development can reduce yield considerably. On the other hand, 
excessive rainfall could affect germination. 
The MSP (minimum support price) for soyabean, which is the government 
announced price aimed at ensuring remunerative prices to farmers for their 
produce, has varied from Rs 1002 per tonne in 1981-82 to Rs 933 in 1991-92 to 
Rs 930 in 2003-04 (at prices inflated to 2003-04), {CSO, 2006). More 
importantly, the yield per hectare, of soyabean in the district of Jhalawar in the 
state of Rajasthan has varied from 0.538 tonnes/hectare in 1981-82 to 1.387 
tonnes per hectare in 2003-04. Whilst a large portion of the variability in yield 
could be attributed to technological developments, a substantial variability 
comes in due to weather related effects. 
In the central, northern and western parts of India, where rainfall is high and 
winters are fairly cold, only one crop of soyabean is grown during the months 
from May to November. This is the Kharif crop. Typically, soyabean is sown in 
the month of June and is harvested in mid/end October. 
In Rajasthan, the total production of soyabean in the 2006 Kharif season was 
4.930 lakh tonnes with 5.803 lakh hectares being sown with the crop. 
The theoretical framework in the Soyabean yield scenario is based on the model 
used by Simmons and Rambaldi (1997). It builds in some simplifying 
assumptions and includes the cost of and the gain from a possible hedge on the 
portion of yield variability, which could be attributed to rainfall dependence. An 
empirical analysis based on the gross production of soyabean in the district of 
Jhalawar in the state of Rajasthan is done to give a rough estimate of what 
would be the aggregate willingness to pay in order to cover yield risk. 
Probably the only way to assess the inclination of soyabean growing farmers 
towards methods of hedging volumetric risk attributable to the vagaries of 
weather, is to physically carry out a survey. However, prior to this, a theoretical 
framework is attempted which would be able to give an estimate of the 
'willingness to pay' for hedging the weather risks. 
4.2 Theoretical model 
For a farmer growing a crop, his expected utility can be expressed as 
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E (U) = E (S) - C - R (1) 
Where E (U) is the expected utility, E(S) is the expected sale price, C is the cost 
of inputs and R is a risk premium. The risk premium can be defined using the 
Pratt Coefficient {Pratt, 1964) of absolute risk premium, k as 
R = - E [ ( S - E ( S ) ) ' ] (2) 
So, 
E(U) = E(S)-C - - E[(S - E(S))^) (3) 
In actuality, the risk premium, R, would be dependant on wealth of the farmer, 
but we assume it to be constant as has been done in other studies [Edwards & 
Simmons, 2004). 
We consider yield in a one-year cycle, so that utility in period t is maximised 
with respect to information of period t-i. Yield is expected to follow a naive 
model, which includes a trend component, attributed to technological 
advancements (T) and a multiplicative error term (i+e) which is attributable to 
variation in weather. 
So, Yt = (Y + aT)(l + e) ( 4 ) 
(where Y is the mean yield across 
the sample) 
and production qt=AYt ( 5 ) 
Selling price is taken as the MSP announced by the government - which is 
generally the price at which the farmer is able to sell his produce. It is assumed 
that selling price follows a naive model: 
St= So(l+f) ( 6 ) 
Where (l+f) is a multiplicative 
error term and So is the price at 
the start of the season 
So income from sales = St qt 
= So(i+f)A(Y+aT)(i+e) (7) 
Input costs can be taken as a total quantity decided upfront based on planned 
production qt and can be written as the sum of fixed costs and variable costs 
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which are dependant on amount of production qt. Variable costs would mainly 
include the cost of seed, fertiliser cost and cost of pesticides. Fixed costs would 
be dependant on area under cultivation and would include all other input costs. 
So C = CfA + aq t (8) 
Expected utility can be written as: 
{sS\ + f)A(Y + aT)i\ + e)-SJiY + aT)f\ 
= S,,q,-C,A-C^.q,-^SliY + aTyA'EXi^ + fX\ + e)-\y] 
Eo(U,) = S„q,-C,^-C„9,--^£„ 
= S„q, -C,A-C^.q, -^Sf,qJE,\{e + f + eff] 
For maximisation of utility with respect to planned production, 
^Wl = S„-C^.-kS!,q,EXe^f^efy]^0 
(9) 
(10) 
We now consider the case where the farmer has an option to hedge the weather 
risk through purchase of weather derivatives. 
We note that e and f are aberrations which can be hedged by the farmer. Whilst 
the farmer can hedge f by going in for forward contracts, weather insurance or 
weather derivatives would be the only ways to hedge e. We will, in this analysis, 
assume that the farmer is not too concerned with price risk and is more 
concerned with volumetric risks. Thus, he will go in for hedging of e to an extent 
within his means and his risk appetite. 
We take h as the proportion of e which the farmer wants to hedge. We take the 
cost of hedging as r, so that the amount paid by the farmer is rh. This amount 
will be included in the cost of inputs so that: 
C = CfA + Cvqt+rh (n) 
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and income from sales 
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= S„0 + f)A{Y + aT)(\ + i]-h)e) 
Utility at time t can be written as 
E,iU,) = E„iS,)-C, -^E,[{S, -E,{S,)y 
(12) 
(So(l + f)A(Y + aT)[l + (1 - h)e) - Soqt )^ . 
2" 
orEo(Ut)-Soqt - C f A - C y q t - r h - - E o 
= S o q t - C f A - C v q t - r h - | s 2 q 2 E o [ ( ( l + f)(l + ( l - h ) e ) - l ) 
= Soqt - C f A - C v q t - r h - ^ S ^ q ^ E o ^ + h \ - 2 h Y j 
(13) 
whereA = e^+f^+e^f^ 
andy^e^ +e^f^ 
First order condition are got by differentiating E(Ut) with respect to planned 
production qt and the amount of hedging h: 
^ ^ = S„-C,-kS',g,E,[A + h'y-2hy 
dq, 
and^^ = -r-kS',g^EAhr-r]=0 
oh 
0 
(14) 
(15) 
4.3 Empirical results 
We obtain the model parameters from a dataset of soyabean production, inputs 
etc for the 23 years 1982 to 2004 at Jhalawar district in the southern part of the 
state of Rajasthan. Data on the yield of soyabean was obtained from the 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 
Rainfall data at Jhalawar for the same period was purchased from the Indian 
Meteorological Department. 
In the first place, the yield of soyabean was regressed against time in order to 
obtain a value for a from the trend which we attribute to technology 
advancements and for the value of Y. We get 
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Y = 0.725 tonnes/ha 
a = 0.017 
Using eqn (4), and values of the error term for each of the 23 years of the 
dataset, we obtain the mean value for e 
e = -0.00087 
with a variance c, = 0.0681 
Similarly using equation (6) and values of the error term in the MSP for the 23 
years, we obtain the mean value for f 
f = -0.00291 
with a variance erf = 0.00104 
Minimum Support Price for soyabean for each year in the 23 year period 1981-
82 to 2003-04 (www.indiastat.com) was inflated (using WPI) to 2003-04 levels 
and a mean obtained: 
So = 9720 Rupees per tonne 
The mean yield per year from 1981-82 to 2003-04: 
Yt = 0.933 tonnes/ha 
4.3.1 Correlation of yield with rainfall 
Figures of yield of the soyabean crop in the district of Jhalawar were correlated 
with figures of rainfall in the 23 years in the period 16 June to 15 October. A 
positive correlation of 30% was noticed, indicating a fair degree of dependence 
on rainfall. Similarly, residuals of Yt indicated a positive correlation of 33.3% 
with rainfall in the same months. 
4.3.2 Willingness to pay 
In order to calculate the variable cost of inputs, Cv, the cost of seeds, fertilizer 
and pesticide used per ton of soyabean produced was arrived at. Data was 
available for the year 1996-97 for cost of fertiliser and seeds required per hectare 
of soyabean crop. Using the yield of soyabean in the same year, the cost per 
tonne of the produce was arrived at. This was then inflated to 2003-04 levels. 
Also, the total amount of N-P-K fertilizer consumed in the year 1996-97 was 
used in order to arrive at an approximation for that used for production of 
soyabean through a ratio of area sown for soyabean vis a vis gross sown area. A 
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similar calculation was done for pesticides, using the cost for Monocrotopk»s .-
pesticide. Both these input costs were inflated to 2003-04 prices.^}^>^ . '" - 'z^* V 
We obtained 
Cv = 3243 Rupees per tonne Vi ^ 
~ ^ — V 
The Pratt coefficient of absolute risk premium, k, is arrived at using th^jnethod . 
defined by Rambaldi and Simmons (2000). Risk premium in this study has 
been calculated as the difference between the expected selling price and the 
actual selling price. 
The coefficient of relative risk is arrived at from a study by Antle (1987) where he 
has done an econometric estimation of risk attitudes of farmers in Aurepalle 
village in Andhra Pradesh. The data is based on an experimental measurement 
of risk attitudes of the farmers in the same village {Biswanger, 1980). The 
relative risk premium arrived at was 0.144. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is a "unit free" measure of risk aversion 
that allows comparisons between groups and between results from different 
studies. It is measured in our study as S x k. This gives us: 
K = 2.9826 X 10 -5 
These coefficient and variable values are used to solve for planned production qt 
and the amount of hedge, h. From eqns. (14) and (15), we get: 
6477 - 0.019377 qt - 0.00159 qt h^ + 0.00318 qt h = o 
and 
r - 0.00159 qt^  h + 0.00159 qt'' = o 
On solving these two equations, we can see that as r approaches Rs o, farmers 
would be willing to hedge upto h=i ie. They would be willing to hedge 
completely. However, h approaches o as r tends to Rs 531.4 per tonne. 
Details of the data and the calculations are given at Appendix I to this thesis. 
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This translates to a theoretical willingness to pay of approximately 5.47% of the 
MSP. 
As such, we could infer that the demand for weather derivatives as a shield 
against volumetric risk in the case of soyabean in the district of Jhalawar in 
Rajasthan exists and would be of the order of around 5.47% of the sale price that 
a farmer would get from his produce. 
However, this is only an indicative figure for the soyabean cultivation in a 
selected area, and farmers in other areas, could possibly be vsalling to pay 
differently for weather derivatives. An ideal situation would be to ascertain 
actual willingness to pay through a survey. 
Thus these products may need to be introduced selectively in certain areas for 
certain crops after area based surveys. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Based on the fact that there is an element of rainfall dependency on the yield of 
soyabean, we see that there exists a demand for weather derivative products. 
This study is done for soyabean production in a selected district in the state of 
Rajasthan and only indicates a theoretical demand for weather derivative 
products. For reaching conclusions on demand in specific areas, a demand 
survey of that particular area would yield conclusive results. 
Basis risk in rainfall hedging 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the major challenges of weather derivatives is that climatic variability 
occurs on spatial and temporal scales. This is not too evident in the case of 
temperature, but could have significant effects on derivatives based on rainfall. 
Geographical climatic differences lead to situations where there could be 
correlations between many locations while at the same time, there could be low 
correlations between locations which are not geographically far apart. Basis risk 
can lead to imperfect hedging when the user vdshes to cover a weather risk at 
one location, but is actually covered by the weather recorded at a location some 
kilometers away. 
Most weather derivative contracts which have been traded world-wide have 
been based on temperature indices. However, in the case of farmers, especially 
in developing countries, their major interest is likely to be in rainfall index 
related weather derivative products. An impediment to the growth of a market in 
these products could be the apprehension of the acceptability of rainfall linked 
derivative products in the face of an associated basis risk. 
An understanding of the peculiarities of what basis risk entails, would be 
crucially important if weather derivatives are to be widely adopted {Woodard 
and Garcia, 2007). This would be especially relevant in the case of farmers 
where a lack of knowledge or very little information about weather derivatives is 
further clouded by the issue of basis risk. A study of basis risk in weather 
derivatives where precipitation is the underlying, can be done by considering 
past records of rainfall. 
Geographic basis risk in the case of weather derivatives can be defined as the 
risk that the payout does not correspond with the deviation in the underlying 
weather parameter at the location at which hedging is desired. This, typically 
comes in when the weather station , data from which is used for deriving the 
index, is located at a distance away from the location at which hedging is 
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desired. This would be a fairly common phenomenon, especially in a developing 
country, where the number of weather stations would be limited. Ofcourse, 
whilst an increase in the number of weather stations would bring down the 
geographical basis risk, it would also contribute to an increase in the 
administrative costs and hence an increase in the cost of the option. Jewson and 
Brix, 2005, have brought out that there is, generally, a trade-off between basis 
risk and the price of the weather hedge. 
Whilst geographic basis risk is the additional risk due to the use of a contract 
which is based on a non-local site, theoretically it is possible for location indices 
to be specified in terms of a set of locations which are weighted to capture the 
effect of offsetting the exposure risk using weather derivatives from multiple 
non-local markets (Woodard and Garcia, 2007). 
5.2 An empirical study of basis risl< 
In order to establish the intensity of the issue, it was decided to use two weather 
stations located close to each other and study the correlations in rainfall. In a 
sense, the aim was to see the basis risk if we were to take up a rainfall index 
linked weather derivative at one station, with recordings at the other station 
being used as a proxy. 
The locations chosen for this study were based on their proximity and the 
availability of reliable rainfall data for a period of 30 years. New Delhi has two 
airports - Palam and Safdaijung, both within the city and located less than ten 
kilometers aerial distance apart. While the former is in use, the latter is more or 
less defunct as an airport and sees only a few helicopter flights. However, both 
have weather stations of the Indian Meteorological Department which have been 
in existence for many decades. 
Daily rainfall data was purchased from the IMD for the 30 year period from 1975 
to 2005 and this was used for the study. A three stage comparison of the rainfall 
data was done. In the first instance, annual rainfall at the two locations was 
compared. Then the monthly rainfall in months of January, February, June, 
July and August were compared. In the other months the total rainfall was too 
little to give any significant results. Finally a comparison was made of the daily 
rainfall in the three- month period 01 June to 31 August each year for the 30 
years. 
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5.2.1 Yearly rainfall 
A comparison of the yearly rainfall at the two locations between 1975 and 2005 
is shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1. Comparison ofYeariy Rainfall 
The average rainfall in the 30 years was 762.03 mm at Safdarjimg and 714.48 
mm at Palam. While this itself is not significant, it was noted that the greatest 
absolute difference was in the year 2003, when it rained 1161 mm at Safdarjung, 
which was 280 mm more than at Palam. The greatest percentage difference was 
in the year 1989, when the rainfall was 47.9% more at Safdarjung. 
On the whole, it can be seen below that the correlation is fairly strong (fig 5.2): 
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Figure 5.2. Yeariy Rainfall 
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5.2.2 Monthly rainfall 
The farmer, however, is more interested in the rainfall during the monsoon 
months, especially in the months of June, July and August for the Kharif crop 
and in January and February for the Rabi crop. 
Rainfall in these five months at the two locations were compared. Correlations 
are indicated in table 5.1 below: 
SNo 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Month 
January 
Febaiary 
June 
July 
August 
Correlation 
94.2% 
86.2% 
64.6% 
87.6% 
89.2% 
Table 5.1. correlations between rainfall figures at two locations. 
The month of June gives us significant results with respect to basis risk. (See 
figure 5.3) 
The correlation is just 64.6%. The largest absolute difference in rainfall occurred 
in the year 1998 when it was 279.1 mm at Palam, which was 147.9 mm more 
than the rainfall at Safdarjung. The largest percentage difference, however, was 
in 2004 when the rainfall in the month of Jime was 331.55% more at Safdarjung. 
Of the 30 years rainfall data in the month of June, we notice that in 15 years the 
rainfall was more in Safdarjung, while in 14 years it was higher at Palam. 
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Figure 5.3. Comparison of monthly rainfall in June 
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So it is evident that the basis risk varies from month to month, and while using 
Palam as a pro)^ weather station for Safdaijung or vice-versa might be 
acceptable in the month of January, it could lead to a much higher basis risk in 
the month of June. 
5.2.3 Daily rainfall 
Next, an analysis was done of the rainfall on a daily basis for the months of June, 
July and August ie. for 92 days across the same 30 year period. (See figure 5.4) 
Rainfall Averages recorded Daily for the Months of 
June/July/August 
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Figure 5.4. Rainfall in June, July and August 
This is probably the most relevant to weather derivatives, because in rainfall-
index based derivatives, small periods of contracts are likely to be used. Here we 
get a R-squared of 0.688, which implies significant variations in the rainfall at 
the two stations which are located so close to each other. The largest difference 
occurred on 30 June, when the average rainfall over 30 years was 16.14 nrni at 
Palam, which was 5.17 mm greater than that at Safdarjung. The largest 
percentage difference was on 04 June when the rainfall at Safdarjung was 933% 
higher than the rainfall at Palam. On 53 of the 92 days studied in the 30 year 
period, rainfall was higher at Safdarjung, while on 39 days, it was higher at 
Palam. Infact, on 7 days, the difference in rainfall at the two locations was more 
than 100 percent. 
5.3 Conclusion 
We could conclude that the shorter the period in which the rainfall is looked at, 
the greater is the difference between the rainfall between the two locations. 
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The difference could be as high as 330 % when studied on a monthly basis and 
could be even higher (933% in this case) when seen on a daily basis. 
For short term rainfall-index based weather derivative contracts, the location of 
the weather station vis-a-vis the contract location assumes special significance. 
For longer term contracts, the use of proxy weather stations could be justified to 
a certain extent. 
A similar study was done on data ft-om two locations in London by Moreno 
(2005), with fairly similar conclusions. 
Survey preparation, questionnaire design 
and data coilection 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings out the study design and sampling framework for 
conducting the survey. The research instrument chosen is the personal 
questionnaire method to elicit both stated preferences and revealed preferences. 
6.2 Scope of the survey 
The survey was conducted with a broad objective of overall assessment of floated 
crop insurance schemes, appeal of weather derivative products and farmers' 
willingness to pay for such schemes. The survey had the follovdng specific 
objectives; 
i) To assess farmers' awareness levels on agricultural insurance schemes 
floated so far and the satisfaction levels with various insurance schemes 
ii) To assess the links between availability of irrigation and desire to insure 
against weather variability 
iii) To assess the acceptability of weather derivatives 
iv) To assess the weather factors which farmers would prefer to hedge through 
weather derivatives 
v) To assess the nature of hedging perceptions of the farmers and their 
willingness to pay for weather derivatives 
vi) To assess the preferences of and confidence levels associated with private/ 
government weather stations and weather derivative schemes. 
Weather derivatives could be offered by various institutions, which would be 
interested in offering risk cover. The attempt of the present research was to 
assess responses to scenarios of the derivatives being offered by the government, 
by private players or by both simultaneously. An attempt was also made to infer 
whether farmers would be willing to pay differently for different scenarios ie., 
would the choice of supplier of the derivative influence their WTP. 
The study was conducted in two districts viz., Jhalawar and Tonk of Rajasthan 
where the AIC has launched crop insurance schemes. These districts were 
chosen based on the district-wise number of policies sold in the Varsha Bima-
Survey preparation, quest, design & data collection 86 
2006 scheme and the Rabi Weather Insurance scheme 2006-07. Data on the 
number of pohcies sold and of the subscribers to the two schemes was obtained 
from the Agriculture Insurance Company of India. 
6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Research technique 
As the study was diagnostic in nature, quantitative and qualitative techniques 
were used for data collection, which included structured interviews with mostly 
coded and a few open ended questions. As part of the study, data was collected 
from primary sources (interviews) and Secondary sources (data from the 
Agriculture Insurance Company of India, India Meteorological Department, and 
the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Rajasthan). 
Freeman (1993), has pointed out that scenario misspecification can result in 
erroneous findings. He has suggested the use of a focus group discussion and a 
pilot survey, in order to be at the right level while interviewing the farmers. In 
our case, we had the advantage of other crop insurance schemes in the past, and 
the Varsha Bima Scheme, at present, providing the base, and some amount of 
awareness of terminologies. However, it was decided to precede the survey with 
a focus group discussion and a pilot survey so that a better understanding could 
be built into the final questionnaire. 
Various elicitation methods were studied, and the bidding-game method was 
considered the one with the maximum advantages in the scenario. In the 
bidding game designed, it was decided to start with the highest value . It was 
considered that if we start with the lowest bid, then farmers are likely to catch-
on that the value is being raised, and they would stop at the lowest or the next 
lowest. We start by asking if the respondent would be willing to pay Rs x for the 
proposed hypothetical weather derivative. If he answers in the affirmative, the 
game ends there. If he says No, then a lower price is quoted and the question 
repeated. The point at which he says Yes, is taken as his maximum WTP. 
Considering the level of the presently charged premiums for crop weather 
insurance, it was decided to start the bid at 10% of the value of the maximum 
payout of the weather derivative, ie., the farmer would be willing to pay Rs 100 
for a possible payout of Rs 1000 from the weather derivative. Subsequent steps 
of the bidding game were kept at 896,5%, 3% and finally at 2%. Thus there were 
five steps designed into the bidding game. 
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6.4 Questionnaire design 
A structured interview schedule was prepared for the survey. The content and 
format of the questionnaire used in the survey were decided on, based on the 
objectives of the survey. The questionnaire was then translated into local 
language (Hindi) and pre-tested among respondents from the sampling 
universe. 
6.4.1 Target group 
Although the target group is the entire farmer population in India, this study 
was restricted to the farmers in Rajasthan. 
6.4.2 Sampling design 
As brought out above, to factor-in the effect of prior knowledge of crop 
insurance products, it was decided to select the sample from two categories of 
farmers - one, who have, in the past, subscribed to the recent Varsha Bima and 
Rabi crop insurance schemes and the other who have not. 
Based on this, and from data obtained from the AIC, Jaipur office, three villages 
were chosen in each of the two districts - Jhalawar and Tonk, where the largest 
subscription had taken place in either of the two crop insurance schemes. For 
each of the six villages, hsts of names of farmers who had subscribed to the two 
schemes was taken from the AIC, Jaipur office. 
Of the 5839 farmers who took up policies in Rajasthan in the Varsha Bima -
2006 scheme, 1255 were from Jhalawar district. Similarly, of the 4400 farmers 
who took up the Rabi weather insurance- 2006-07 scheme, 489 were from Tonk 
district (Data from AIC). Further, three villages were chosen for the study in 
Tonk district (Deopara, Chandlai and Soothra) and three villages in Jhalawar 
district (Donda, Salawad and Khanpuriya). These villages, too, were chosen 
based on the number of policies sold in the two insurance schemes, and the 
number of respondents chosen were proportional to the number of farmers who 
had opted for the schemes. 
Amongst the two categories (subscribers of crop insurance, and non-
subscribers), random sampling was used for selection of the farmers who were 
finally interviewed. Help was provided in all the villages by the sanchalaks of the 
ITC e-chaupals and by the gram- panchayat members in locating the farmers 
from the lists of subscribers and non-subscribers. 
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Details of the study area chosen, and of the agriculture, in general, of the state of 
Rajasthan are given in Appendix II. 
6.4.3 Focus group discussion 
The concept of weather derivatives was discussed in a focus group discussion 
which was held in village Chandlai in Tonk district. The aim of this was to 
introduce the concept to the farmers and gauge their initial reactions as also to 
get familiarised with the terminologies commonly used by farmers. The group 
discussion included farmers who were presently subscribers of crop insurance 
schemes, as well as those who were not. Help was taken from an agricultural 
scientist from the Jaipur office of the Agriculture Insurance Company of India, 
who helped in providing the correct agricultural terminologies. The village 
Sarpanch also joined in the discussion and provided some valuable inputs. These 
were kept in mind when the final questionnaire was drawn-up. 
6.4.4 Pilot-testing 
The prepared questionnaire was then pre-tested, by, once again, randomly 
selecting farmers who had taken up crop insurance and those who had not. This 
was of immense help, not only in correcting a large number of questions asked 
in the survey, but also in cutting down on what was initially planned as the 
length of the questionnaire. The final questionnaire included a script which was 
used to describe the concept of the proposed weather derivatives. This script was 
tried out during the pre-testing, and was subsequently modified, taking into 
account the learnings from the responses. 
6.4.5 Final questionnaire 
The final questionnaire took an average of 20 minutes for a respondent to 
complete. It comprised a 'profile' section, which brought out the social and 
economic characteristics of the respondent, an 'opinions' section which covered 
perceptions on stress levels related to weather, awareness levels about crop 
insurance schemes, acceptability of weather derivatives, levels at which hedging 
would be desired, preferred lengths of contracts, preferences towards hedging in 
groups etc. and a 'valuation' section. 
The valuation section of the survey comprised a bidding game, where 
respondents were asked to indicate, with a YES or NO answer, whether they 
would be willing to pay a certain amount for a weather derivative which would 
provide a maximum payout of Rs looo (about $25). 
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The bidding game was started with a question on whether they would be willing 
to pay a price of 10% of the expected payout amount. The game was brought to 
an end if a respondent answered in the affirmative. If the response was negative 
the next bid of 8% was offered and the game continued in the same fashion with 
subsequent bids being successively lowered to 5%, 3% and finally 2%. 
The final questionnaire used is attached to this thesis as Annexure I. 
6.5 Data collection 
The entire survey and the attempt to determine the willingness to pay, was based 
on the stated preference method for determining benefit estimation. 
Closed ended questions were asked and the specific question asked in the WTP 
section of the questionnaire was: 
"If you were to insure your crop or purchase weather derivatives for an 
amount ofRs 1000, a premium or charge would have to he paid for this. We 
will now read out some premiums to you. Please tell us if you will be willing to 
pay this amount. (Note: You can insure/ purchase weather derivatives for 
more than Rs woo - the premium would be for each Rs 1000 insured)". 
The bidding game was commenced with Rs 100 and was subsequently lowered 
to Rs 80, Rs 50, Rs 30 and finally Rs 20. These amounts were chosen based on 
premiums of existing crop insurance schemes, and the outcomes of the focus 
group discussion and the pre-testing. 
The respondents were asked to respond with a simple Yes or No. If they 
answered Yes at the first bid, the game was stopped there itself. Otherwise, the 
next lower bid was offered and their response was elicited. 
6.5.1 Sample size 
The formula for sample size selection is given by Cochran (1977): 
^ ^ _ 2 ^ ( p ) x ( l - p ) 
where, 
n = sample size 
z = z value associated with desired confidence level 
p = percentage picking a choice, expressed as a decimal 
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d = confidence interval 
We take a confidence level of 95% , ie. a z value of 1.96 and a confidence interval 
of4%., ie. d=0.04 
The value of p is decided based on the percentage of the sample that picks a 
choice. Since we are not sure of this, we take p as 0.5. Put simply, if 99% of a 
sample gave the same answer to a question and only 1% differed, then the 
chance of an error is very small. On the other hand, if the percentages are 51% 
and 49% then the chances of an error are much larger. Therefore in determining 
the sample size needed for a given level of accuracy, the worst-case percentage 
(50%) is generally assumed. 
This gives us a required total sample size of 600 respondents. 
Finally, however, based on economic constraints, it was decided to go in for a 
sample size of 500. This, when included with the respondents of the pilot survey 
done for the purpose of pre-testing the questionnaire, gave us a final sample size 
of 536 - of which, 283 were subscribers and 253 were non-subscribers. 
Working backwards on the formula given above, this gives us a confidence 
interval of 0.042 ie. 4.2% v«th a confidence level of 95%. 
The sample per village was decided on, proportionately from the total number of 
farmers who had taken crop insurance schemes in each selected village. An 
attempt was made to contact an equal number of respondents for both the 
categories. However, in two villages, where a large number of farmers had taken 
up the insurance scheme, a slight mismatch occurred since there were only a 
limited number of farmers available, who had not taken up the scheme. Table 6.1 
provides details of samples covered in the two districts. 
Table 6.1 Coverage details in villages during survey 
District 
Jhalawar 
Tonk 
Village 
Donda 
Salawad 
Khanpuriya 
Deopura 
Chandlai 
Subscriber 
Targetted 
35 
65 
35 
25 
25 
Achieved 
35 
75 
39 
26 
25 
Non Subscriber 
Targetted 
35 
65 
35 
25 
25 
Achieved 
35 
55* 
31* 
26 
25 
Total 
Targetted 
70 
130 
70 
50 
50 
Achieved 
70 
130 
70 
52 
50 
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District Village 
Soothra 
Total Sample 
Subscriber 
Targetted Achieved 
80 83 
265 283 
Non Subscriber 
Targetted Achieved 
80 81 
265 253 
Total 
Targetted Achieved 
160 164 
530 536 
* In Salawad and Khanpuria villages an exactly equal number of respondents in 
both the categories were not covered due to non-availability of eligible 
respondents (farmers who had not taken crop insurance). 
Data analysis 
Parti 
7.1 Profile of the respondents 
7.1.1 Social characteristics 
Of the 536 respondents, 283 were subscribers of either of the crop insurance 
schemes (Varsha Bima and Rabi crop insurance) and the remaining 253 
respondents were non-subscribers of the schemes. Further, looking at the 
district wise coverage of the respondents, 270 respondents were from district 
Jhalawar and the remaining 266 respondents from Tonk. 
As is evident from the following table (Table 7.1), most of the respondents (61% 
subscribers and 58% non subscribers) belonged to the age group of 21-40 years. 
Approximately half of the respondents either had no formal education, or had 
attended school only upto primary level. 30% had school education till 
secondary level, and just about 18% had undergone education at the higher 
secondary or levels beyond that. (Table 7.1). 
Cultivation was reported as the primary occupation amongst the respondents, 
with a few indicating other professions. (Table 7.2). 
75% of the respondents have 5 or less dependent members (less than 16 years of 
age) in their household, whilst 2% have 10 or more dependent members. 
(Table 7.2). 
Table 7.1 Table showing social characteristics of the respondents 
Parameters 
Age distributior) (1 
<21 
21-40 
41-60 
>60 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
N % 
n years) 
4 2.7 
89 59.7 
50 33.6 
6 4.0 
Non 
N 
2 
68 
40 
11 
Subscriber 
% 
1.7 
56.2 
33.1 
9.1 
District Tonl< 
Subscriber 
N % 
2 
84 
43 
5 
1.5 
62.7 
32.1 
3.7 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
2 
78 
45 
7 
1.5 
59.1 
34.1 
5.3 
Subscriber 
N % 
6 
173 
93 
11 
2.1 
61.1 
32,9 
3.9 
Total 
NonS 
N 
4 
146 
85 
18 
ubscriber 
% 
1.6 
57.7 
33.6 
7.1 
Data analysis 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
Parameters N 
Educational qualification 
Non Literate 13 
Primary 38 
Secondary 65 
Higiier Secondary 17 
Graduate 12 
Post Graduate 4 
% 
8.7 
25.5 
43.6 
11.4 
8.1 
2.7 
Non Subscriber 
N 
13 
45 
40 
8 
14 
1 
% 
10.7 
37.2 
33.1 
6.6 
11.6 
0.8 
U 3J 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N 
39 
28 
45 
15 
4 
3 
% 
29.1 
20.9 
33.6 
11.2 
3.0 
2.2 
Non Subscriber 
N 
32 
41 
35 
14 
8 
2 
% 
24.2 
31.1 
26.5 
10.6 
6.1 
1.5 
Subscriber 
N 
52 
66 
110 
32 
16 
7 
% 
18.4 
23.3 
38.9 
11.3 
5.7 
2.5 
Total 
Non Subscriber 
N 
45 
86 
75 
22 
22 
3 
% 
17.8 
34.0 
29.6 
8.7 
8.7 
1.2 
Table 7.2 Table showing social characteiistics of the respondents 
Parameters 
Primary Occupation 
Cultivation 
Agri-labour 
Siiop 
Cattle Rearing 
Others 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N 
148 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Number of dependants of' 
1-5 members 
6-10 members 
>10 members 
Base 
110 
31 
8 
149 
% N 
99.3 118 
0.0 0 
0.0 0 
0.7 1 
0.0 0 
0.0 1 
<16 years 
73.8 93 
20.8 26 
5.4 2 
100.0 121 
% 
97.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
76.9 
21.5 
1.7 
100.0 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N 
117 
0 
4 
2 
5 
5 
90 
42 
2 
134 
% 
87.3 
0.0 
3.0 
1.5 
3.7 
3.7 
67.2 
31.4 
1.5 
100,0 
Non Subscriber 
N 
127 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
105 
25 
2 
132 
% 
96.2 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.8 
1.6 
79.6 
19.0 
1.5 
100.0 
Su 
N 
265 
0 
4 
3 
5 
5 
200 
73 
10 
283 
bscriber 
% 
93.6 
0.0 
1.4 
1.1 
1.8 
1.8 
70.7 
25.8 
3.5 
100.0 
Total 
NonS 
N 
245 
1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
198 
51 
4 
253 
iubscriber 
% 
96.8 
0.4 
0.0 
0,4 
0.8 
1,2 
78,3 
20,2 
1,6 
100,0 
7.1.2 Economic characteristics 
The economic characteristics of the respondents were assessed in terms of their 
sources of income, average monthly income, average monthly savings, land 
holding etc. 
As indicated in table 7.3 , most of the respondents had income from cultivation. 
At the same time, a fair number had income from other sources like small 
businesses, cattle rearing, driving etc. 
SHghtly more than two-fifths of the respondents had a monthly income between 
Rs. 2500-RS.5000. Only 8% had an income of more than Rs. 8000 per month. 
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While assessing for average monthly savings, it is found that slightly more 
one-fourth of the respondents are able to save betv^ e^en Rs.300-Rs.500 per 
month at an average (Table 7.3). 
than 
Table 7.3 Table showing economic characteristics of the respondents 
Parameters 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
N % 
Non Subscriber 
N 
Source of Income (Multiple response) 
Only Cultivation 104 
Other sources also 45 
69.8 
30.2 
Average Monthly Income (in Rs.) 
<1000 
1000-2500 
2500-5000 
5000-8000 
8000-12000 
12000-15000 
>15000 
No Response 
4 
30 
76 
24 
7 
1 
5 
2 
Average Monthly Saving ( 
Nil 
50-100 
100-300 
300-500 
500-1000 
1000-3000 
>3000 
No Response 
1 
7 
45 
33 
39 
14 
7 
3 
2.7 
20.1 
51.0 
16.1 
4.7 
0.7 
3.4 
1.3 
;in Rs.) 
0.7 
4.7 
30.2 
22.2 
26.2 
9.4 
4.7 
2.0 
Information on land holding 
Rain fed 
<2.5 Acres 
2.5-4 Acres 
4 - 7 Acres 
> 7 Acres 
Not Specified 
Irrigated 
<2.5 Acres 
2.5-4 Acres 
4 - 7 Acres 
> 7 Acres 
37 
30 
13 
40 
29 
39 
25 
14 
17 
24.8 
20.1 
8.7 
26.9 
19.5 
26.2 
16.8 
9.4 
11.4 
85 
36 
5 
27 
64 
17 
6 
0 
2 
0 
3 
9 
27 
39 
25 
16 
2 
0 
23 
19 
12 
26 
41 
34 
26 
19 
12 
% 
70.2 
29.8 
4.1 
22.3 
52.9 
14.1 
5.0 
0.0 
1.7 
0.0 
2.5 
7.4 
22.3 
32.2 
20.7 
13.2 
1.7 
0.0 
19.0 
15.7 
9.9 
21.5 
33.9 
28.1 
21.5 
15.7 
9.9 
DistrictTonk 
Subscriber 
N 
36 
98 
17 
51 
45 
16 
2 
2 
1 
0 
7 
8 
21 
38 
38 
20 
2 
0 
15 
6 
3 
3 
107 
41 
42 
21 
20 
% 
26.9 
73.1 
12.7 
38.1 
33.6 
11.9 
1.5 
1.5 
0.8 
0.0 
5.2 
6.0 
15.7 
28.4 
28.4 
14.9 
1.5 
0.0 
11.2 
4.5 
2.2 
2.2 
79.9 
30.6 
31.3 
15.7 
14.9 
Non Subscriber 
N 
52 
80 
22 
53 
34 
10 
7 
3 
3 
0 
16 
14 
28 
31 
18 
19 
6 
0 
13 
9 
5 
3 
102 
25 
60 
25 
14 
% 
39.4 
60.6 
16.7 
40.2 
25.8 
7.6 
5.3 
2.3 
2.3 
0.0 
12.1 
10.6 
21.2 
23.5 
13.6 
14.4 
4.6 
0.0 
9.9 
6.8 
3.8 
2.3 
77.3 
18.9 
45.5 
18.9 
10.6 
Subscriber 
N 
140 
143 
21 
81 
121 
40 
9 
3 
6 
2 
8 
15 
66 
71 
77 
34 
9 
3 
52 
36 
16 
43 
136 
80 
67 
35 
37 
% 
49.5 
50.5 
7.4 
28.6 
42.8 
14.1 
3.2 
1.1 
2.1 
0.7 
2.8 
5.3 
23.3 
25.1 
27.2 
12.0 
3.2 
1.1 
18.4 
12.7 
5.7 
15.2 
48.1 
28.3 
23.7 
12.4 
13.1 
Total 
NonS 
N 
137 
116 
27 
80 
98 
27 
13 
3 
5 
0 
19 
23 
55 
70 
43 
35 
8 
0 
36 
28 
17 
29 
143 
59 
86 
44 
26 
ubscriber 
% 
54.2 
45.8 
10.7 
31.6 
38.7 
10.7 
5.1 
1.2 
2.0 
0,0 
7.5 
9.1 
21.7 
27.7 
17.0 
13.8 
3.2 
0.0 
14.2 
11.1 
6.7 
11.5 
56.5 
23.3 
34.0 
17.4 
10.3 
Data analysi! 
Parameters 
Not Specified 
Base 
DisWctJhalawar 
Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N 
54 36.2 30 
149 100.0 121 
% 
24.8 
100.0 
1 95 1 
District Tonk 
Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N 
10 
134 
% N % 
7.5 8 6.1 
100,0 132 100.0 
Subscriber 
N % 
64 22.6 
283 100.0 
Total 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
38 15.0 
253 100.0 
A large number of respondents were not willing to divulge information on their 
land holding. As evident from the table (Table 9a), about 25 percent of the 
respondents own less than 2.5 acres of rain-fed land, while 13% have more than 
7 acres of rain-fed land. 
Most of the respondents grow soyabean, wheat and mustard, with soyabean 
being the predominant crop in District Jhalawar, and wheat being predominant 
in Tonk (Table 7.3a). 
Table 7.3a Table showing economic ciiaracteiistics of the respondents Cont.. 
Parameters 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
Main Crops Grown (more 
Wlieat 
Mustard 
Moong 
Bajra 
Jowar 
Maize 
Soyabean 
Spices (Dhania) 
Ground nut 
Base 
73 
3 
0 
1 
0 
13 
148 
44 
8 
149 
Non Subscriber 
N % N 
than one also noted) 
49.0 
2.0 
0.0 
0.7 
0.0 
8.7 
99.3 
29.5 
5.4 
61 
1 
0 
0 
0 
21 
121 
26 
1 
121 
50.4 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
17.4 
100.0 
21.5 
0.8 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
% 
124 
106 
27 
16 
6 
2 
0 
0 
0 
134 
N 
92.5 
79.1 
20.2 
11.9 
4.5 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Non Subscriber 
% 
120 
112 
9 
21 
10 
1 
0 
0 
0 
132 
N 
90.9 
84.9 
6.8 
15.9 
7.6 
0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Subscriber 
% 
197 
109 
27 
17 
6 
15 
148 
44 
8 
283 
N 
69.6 
38.5 
9.5 
6.0 
2.1 
5.3 
52.3 
15.6 
2.8 
Total 
No 
% 
181 
113 
9 
21 
10 
22 
121 
26 
1 
253 
n Subscriber 
N % 
71.5 
44.7 
3.6 
8.3 
4.0 
8.7 
47.8 
10.3 
0.4 
Part II 
7.2 Survey findings-opinion section 
7.2.1 Stress levels related to weather 
Expectedly, 98% of the respondents indicated that they go through mental 
Stress, worrying about abnormal rainfall and how it would affect their crops. 
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While 6896 said that worries about abnormal rainfall stresses them to a very 
large extent, 31% said that it stresses them somewhat. (Table 7.4, Figure 7.1). 
Somewhat 
stresses 
Not thought about 
it 
Highly stresses 
Figure 7.1 Mental stress - rainfall uncertainty 
Abnormal temperatures also seem to cause a lot of stress to the farmers in the 
two districts surveyed. 59% indicated that worries about abnormal temperatures 
stresses them to a very large extent, 36% of them said that it stresses them 
somewhat. (Table 7.4, Figure 7.2). 
Somew hat 
stresses 
^^^^^^S9 
Does not 
stress 
Highly 
stresses 
Figure 7.2 Mental stress - abnonnal temperatures 
Efforts were made to assess the factors, which can influence a farmer's decision 
of taking-up some method of hedging weather risk, or not. In this connection it 
was first attempted to assess respondents' surety level regarding the quantity of 
their produce. It is evident from Table 7.4 that slightly less than one-third of the 
respondents (subscribers & non subscribers) were somewhat sure whilst almost 
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40% were unsure of the quantity of their crop produce. The same pattern was 
ob\ious in both the districts. 
The respondents were asked about what worries them more, variabiht} in price 
or variabiht)' in yield and it was found that while most of them were equally 
worried about both, a large number (36%) were more concerned about the 
variability in >aeld (Table 7.4). 
Table 7,4 Table showing respondents' stress level related to weather related risks 
Parameters 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
N 
Respondents surety level re 
Very sure 
Sure 
Somewhat sure 
Somewhat unsure 
Unsure 
Very Unsure 
Mental stress in case 
Yes 
No 
34 
23 
44 
23 
24 
1 
% 
gardingq 
22,8 
15.4 
29.5 
15.4 
16.1 
0.7 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N 
jantity of their produce 
31 
20 
25 
17 
25 
3 
of abnormal rainfall 
147 
2 
98.7 
1.3 
117 
4 
25.6 
16.5 
20.7 
14.1 
20.7 
2.5 
96.7 
3.3 
7 
23 
46 
12 
44 
2 
134 
0 
% 
5.2 
17.2 
34.3 
9.0 
32.8 
1.5 
100.0 
0.0 
Non Subscriber 
N 
4 
24 
43 
15 
41 
5 
127 
5 
% 
30 
18.2 
32.6 
11.4 
31.1 
38 
96.2 
3.8 
Subscriber 
N 
41 
46 
90 
35 
68 
3 
281 
2 
% 
145 
16.3 
31,8 
12,4 
24,0 
1,1 
99,3 
07 
Total 
Non 
N 
35 
44 
68 
32 
66 
8 
244 
9 
Subscriber 
• ' • 
13 8 
1 / ,1 
26 9 
12 ' 
26 1 
3,2 
96,1 
3,6 
0 
Level of Mental stress in case of abnomial rainfall 
stresses to a very 
large extent 98 
Stresses somewhat ^g 
Haven't given a 
thought to this 
Mental stress in case of ab 
Yes 137 
No j 2 
Level of Mental stress in case of abnormal temperature 
stresses to a very 
large extent 62 45.3 68 
stresses somewhat y j 52 6 42 
Haven't given a 
thoughttothis 3 2.2 4 
Which of the following is more worrisome 
Variability in yield 13 8.7 19 
Variability in price 25 16.8 24 
Both equally m 74,5 78 
Base 149 100.0 121 
66.7 87 
33.3 29 
0.0 1 
nal temperature 
92.0 114 
8.1 7 
74.4 
24,8 
0.9 
94.2 
5.8 
86 
48 
0 
132 
2 
64.2 
35.8 
0.0 
98.5 
1.5 
88 
38 
1 
127 
5 
69.3 
29.9 
0 8 
96.2 
3.8 
184 
97 
0 
269 
14 
65 5 
34 5 
GO 
95.1 
5,0 
175 
61 
7 
241 
12 
/I ' 
) i ^ 
0 8 
95,3 
4,7 
59.7 
36.8 
86 
41 
65.2 
31.1 
92 
31 
72.4 
24.4 
148 
113 
55,0 
420 
160 
73 
66 
30 
3,5 32 3,0 i,3 
15,7 
19,8 
64.5 
100.0 
83 
2 
49 
134 
61,9 
1.5 
36.6 
100.0 
77 
5 
50 
132 
58,3 
3,8 
37,9 
100.0 
96 
27 
160 
283 
33 9 
9.5 
56,5 
1000 
96 
29 
128 
253 
!/' '' 
11 '. 
50,(1 
100 U 
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An attempt was made towards assessing the respondents' attitude towards 
hedging weather related risks by asking them to indicate the amount of risk they 
would want to hedge by paying a price for it. A majority of both subscribers and 
non-subscribers indicated a desire to hedge 50% of weather related risks. (Table: 
7.5 and Figure 7.3). 
i 
<10 % 
100% 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 
n Subscriber • Non Subscriber 
Figure 7.3 Respondents' desire towards hedging of weather risk 
Table 7.5 Table showing respondent's desire towards hedging of weather risk by paying some 
amount 
Parameters 
Ttie entire 
weather risk 
75% of it 
50 % of it 
25 % of it 
<10% 
Base 
Su 
22 
9 
88 
22 
8 
149 
District Jhalawar 
bscrlber 
N '?' 
14.8 
6.0 
59.1 
14.8 
5.4 
100.0 
Non Subscriber 
27 
25 
47 
15 
7 
121 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N % 
22.3 
20.7 
38.8 
12.4 
5,8 
100.0 
8 
14 
50 
51 
11 
134 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
6.0 
10.5 
37.3 
38.1 
8,2 
100.0 
5 
23 
44 
51 
9 
132 
N 
3.8 
17.4 
33.3 
38.6 
6.8 
100.0 
Su 
% 
30 
23 
138 
73 
19 
283 
bscriber 
N 
10,6 
8,1 
48,8 
25,8 
6,7 
100,0 
Total 
Non Subscriber 
% 
32 
48 
91 
66 
16 
253 
N % 
12,7 
19,0 
36,0 
26,1 
6,3 
100,0 
\2.2 /Iwareness /eve/s about previous insurance schemes 
People's awareness on the older government crop insurance schemes like the 
Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) and the National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NATS) was assessed and it was found that slightly more than 
half of the subscribers were aware of these old schemes. However about 90 
percent of the non subscribers were not even aware of the older schemes. 
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The respondents who were aware of the schemes were also asked about their 
experience with the older schemes. About one fourth of those who had 
subscribed to the older schemes were unsatisfied with their experience, while 
about 50% were somewhat satisfied with their exposure to those schemes. 
(Table 7.6). 
Further, the respondents who were not satisfied with the scheme were asked to 
cite the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Most of them attributed the area 
approach adopted in the older schemes as being the main reason for their not 
having had a satisfying experience (Table 7.7) 
With respect to the more recent crop insurance schemes, while assessing 
farmers' awareness about the Varsha Bima / Sookha Suraksha Kavach / Rabi 
Wheat Insurance Schemes launched in 2005/2006, it was found that about 
four-fifths of the non subscribers were found not at all aware (Table 7.8), 
indicating the need for wider publicity to the schemes and a need for an 
intensification of education on the benefits of weather risk hedging schemes for 
farmers. 
The major mode of dissemination of information about crop insurance schemes 
seems to be through word-of-mouth from other farmers. Expectedly, agents of 
these schemes have been another large source of information about these 
schemes. While television and newspapers have had a fair deal of success in 
awareness generation, internet kiosks and choupals have been more successful 
in attracting farmers to go in for crop insurance schemes. (Table 7.8). 
Table 7.6 Table showing respondent's awareness and experience with old crop insurance 
schemes 
District Jhalawar DIstrictTonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Awareness about Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme or the National Agricultural Insurance Schemes 
Yes 
No 
'"'^ ^ 89 59.7 21 17.4 56 41.8 
60 40.3 100 82.6 78 58.2 
Experience of those who had answered Yes' above 
Did not take the 
scheme 1 1.1 5 23.8 2 3.6 
Highly satisfied 5 5 5 2 9.5 21 37.5 
9 
123 
7 
1 
6.8 
93.2 
77.8 
11.1 
145 
138 
3 
26 
51.2 
48.8 
2.1 
17.9 
30 
223 
12 
3 
11.9 
88.1 
40.0 
10.0 
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Parameters 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
Highly 
unsatisfied 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N % 
51 
17 
15 
57.3 11 
19.1 3 
16.9 0 
52.4 
14.3 
0.0 
100 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N % 
30 
3 
0 
Non Subscriber 
N 
53.6 0 
5,4 1 
0.0 0 
% 
0.0 
11.1 
0.0 
Subscriber 
N % 
81 
20 
15 
55.9 
13,8 
10.3 
Total 
NonS 
N 
11 
4 
0 
ijbscriber 
% 
36.7 
13.3 
0.0 
Table 7.7 Reasons for dissatisfaction with old crop insurance schemes 
Parameters 
Reason for dissatisfaction 
Because of time taken in 
claim settlement 
Because 1 felt that the 'Area 
Approach' was 
disadvantageous to me. 
Got less amount 
Base 
Distr 
Subs 
N 
3 
28 
1 
32 
ct Jhalawar 
criber 
% 
9.4 
87.5 
3,1 
100.0 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
100,0 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N % 
1 
2 
0 
3 
33,3 
66,7 
0,0 
100,0 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
1 
0 
0 
1 
100.0 
0.0 
0,0 
100,0 
Total 
Subscriber 
N % 
4 11.4 
30 85,7 
1 2,9 
35 100,0 
Non Subscriber 
N 
1 
0 
0 
1 
% 
25,0 
0,0 
0,0 
100,0 
Table 7.8 Table showing non-subscribers' awareness about and all respondents' source of 
information about new crop insurance schemes 
Parameters 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N % 
District Tonk 
Subscriber Non Sut 
N % N 
scriber 
% 
Total 
Subscriber 
N % 
Non Subscriber 
N 
Awareness about Varsha Bima / Sookha Suraksha Kavach / Rabi Wheat Insurance Scheme launched in 2005/2006 
Yes 
No 
Source of information 
TV 
Newspaper 
From other farmers 
Internet kiosks 
Choupals 
Agents 
Can't say 
n/a 
7 
7 
26 
1 
0 
66 
0 
6,7 
6.7 
24,8 
1,0 
0,0 
62,9 
0,0 
37 
84 
3 
1 
18 
0 
0 
14 
0 
30,6 
69,4 
8.1 
2.7 
48,7 
0.0 
0,0 
37,8 
0,0 
n/a 
17 
17 
76 
29 
11 
3 
4 
13.9 
13.9 
62.3 
23.8 
9.0 
2.5 
3.3 
12 
120 
1 
0 
6 
1 
1 
0 
1 
9,1 
90,9 
8,3 
0,0 
50,0 
8,3 
8,3 
0.0 
8,3 
n/a 
24 
24 
102 
30 
11 
69 
4 
10,6 
10,6 
44,9 
13,2 
4.9 
30.4 
1.8 
49 
204 
4 
1 
24 
1 
1 
14 
1 
% 
19.4 
80.6 
8.2 
2.0 
49.0 
2.0 
2.0 
28,6 
2,0 
7.2.3 Experience and satisfaction witii new crop insurance sctiemes 
Satisfaction levels were found to be fairly high (85%) with the two schemes 
launched by AIC in the recent past - Varsha Bima and Rabi Crop insurance. 
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Between the two districts, satisfaction levels were much higher in Tonk. In 
Jhalawar, most of those who had reservations about their satisfaction with the 
schemes, attributed these to time taken in and difficulties related to the receipt 
of the claim amount. (Table 7.9 and Figure 7.4). 
• Highly salisted 
nUnsalislied 
• Somewhat satsfed 
nHighly unsatlslied 
Figure 7.4 Respondents' experience with new crop insurance schemes 
Farmers' opinions on the procedural issues related to the new schemes were 
solicited. Surprisingly, only 36% felt that the procedures were very clear and 
transparent. This could very well indicate that a large number of farmers are 
going in for the schemes only because others are opting for it, without being 
fully aware of the nuances. This might not be a sustainable situation in the long-
run and indicates a need for more branding, awareness building of procedures 
and larger inputs for training the villagers about the schemes. Once again, 
Jhalawar district had an obviously very large number of farmers who felt that 
the modalities adopted for claim entitlement were not clear to them. (Table 7.10 
and Figure 7.5). 
Figure 7.5 Opinions on modalities for claim entitlement 
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Farmers of Jhalawar district, once again, had a difference with those in Tonk 
district in the process of getting the entitled amount of a claim. Over 50% of the 
farmers in Jhalawar indicated that they had to pursue the matter themselves for 
getting the claim amount. 
Table 7.9 Table showing respondents' experience with new crop insurance schemes 
District Jhalawar DistrictTonI* Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % 
What Was Your Experience With Varsha Bima / Sookha Suraksha Kavach Scheme 
Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Highly satisfied 
Somewhat satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
Highly unsatisfied 
Reason for dissatisfaction 
Because of time taken in claim 
settlement 
Because 1 could not 
understand the procedures 
Got less amount 
Not getting payment 
Not Specified 
Base 
7 
54 
10 
16 
6 
1 
2 
13 
4 
87 
8,1 
62.1 
11,5 
18.4 
23.1 
3.9 
7,8 
50,0 
15,4 
100.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
74 
41 
3 
3 
1 
4 
0 
0 
1 
121 
61,2 
33,9 
2,5 
2,5 
16.7 
66.7 
0.0 
0.0 
16.7 
100.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
81 
95 
13 
19 
7 
5 
2 
13 
5 
208 
38.9 
45.7 
6,3 
9,1 
21.9 
15.6 
6.2 
40.6 
15,6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100,0 0 
0.0 
00 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
00 
0.0 
00 
100,0 
Table 7.10 Table showing respondents' opinions on procedural issues 
District Jhalawar DistrictTonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % 
What is your opinion of the modalities adopted for claim entitlement 
Very clear and transparent 5 5.8 0 0.0 70 57.9 0 
Somewhatclear i s 20.7 0 0.0 43 35.5 0 
Not clear 46 52.9 0 0.0 3 2.5 0 
Feel that the process is 
18 20.7 0 0.0 5 
grossly unfair 
If you are entitled to a claim then which of the following is correct? 
N N % N % 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
75 
61 
49 
36.1 
29.3 
23.6 
0 
0 
0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
4.1 0 0.0 23 11.1 0 00 
amount easily 
The process took too long 
Had to pursue the matter 
myself 
Claim still not paid for over 
two months 
For rainfall insurance, ate you 
8 
11 
46 
22 
9.2 
12.6 
52.9 
25.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
111 
5 
4 
1 
91.7 
4.1 
3.3 
0,8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
in agreement with the figure of rainfall on the basis of which claims 
119 
16 
50 
23 
were 
57,2 
7,7 
24,0 
11.1 
paid 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
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Parameters 
In agreement 
Felt it was slightly less 
Felt it was much less 
Felt it was more 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N % 
60 69.0 
9 10,3 
10 11.5 
6 6.9 
Have not even given a thought 
to this 
For rainfall Insurance, what is your opinion of the amount of premium 
Feel that it is too high 
Feel that it is alright 
Feel that it can be raised 
Base 
N % N % N % 
2.3 0 0.0 3.3 0.0 2.9 
N % 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
84 
31 
1 
1 
69.4 
25.6 
0.8 
0.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
144 
40 
11 
7 
69.2 
19.2 
5,3 
34 
0 
0 
0 
0 
00 
0,0 
00 
0.0 
00 
17 
70 
0 
87 
19.5 
80.5 
0.0 
100.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
27 
90 
4 
121 
22.3 
74.4 
3.3 
100.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
44 
160 
4 
208 
21.2 
76.9 
1.9 
100.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
100,0 
There was little dispute in the minds of the farmers on the figure of rainfall on 
the basis of which, claim entitlement was determined. 69% of the subscribers 
were in agreement with the figures, indicating a high level of faith in the weather 
data used by AIC in determining claims. This was almost the same in both the 
districts. (Table 7.10) 
77% of the subscribers felt that the premiums being charged for crop insurance 
were alright (Table 7.10). 
Further, non-subscribers of the Varsha Bima / Rabi crop insurance Schemes 
were asked to cite the reason for not insuring. The major reason indicated, 
behind not insuring, was the lack of awareness about the schemes. Lack of 
money for paying the premium and lack of faith in such schemes were other 
reasons for not insuring (Table 7.11). 
Table 7,11 Table showing respondents' reasons for not insuring 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N % N % 
Reasons for not insuring in Varsha 
Unaware of schemes 
Hassles of insuring 
Lack of faith in such schemes 
Lack of money for premium 
Consider the premium too high 
BIma/ Rabi Insu 
15 
13 
59 
31 
4 
ranee Schemes 
12,8 
11,1 
50.4 
26,5 
3.4 
100 
3 
4 
25 
0 
75.8 
2.3 
3.0 
18.9 
0.0 
115 
16 
63 
56 
4 
46.2 
6.4 
25.8 
22.5 
1.6 
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1.2.4 Acceptability of weatiier derivatives 
Before going on to the section on weather derivatives in the questionnaire, each 
respondent v^ a^s individually explained the concept behind the derivative 
products. They were explained that the intention is to be able to move a step 
ahead of crop insurance schemes and to offer to them new and innovative 
weather risk hedging products which, on one hand provide more flexibility to 
the farmers and on the other, lower the administrative costs, so that the 
premiums could be kept at reasonable levels. They were told that Weather 
Derivatives will be in the form of trade-able options which would allow a farmer 
to hedge his risk in the manner that he wishes to - thus giving him flexibility 
and a more proactive approach to manage his weather risks. The option 
purchased by him could be traded at a price announced by a derivative exchange 
just like a commodity derivative - and would be based on the change in the 
weather index, the forecast etc. So he could sell or buy the option at any time at 
the prevailing price. 
They were explained this through a hypothetical contract, so that they could 
understand the concept better. Respondents were also explained the difference 
between insurance and weather derivatives and the advantages that these 
derivative products would have. These included: 
(i) transparency in transactions - prices would be quoted by the exchange on a 
daily basis and would be available on the e-choupals 
(ii) can be bought or sold at any time - regardless of whether one is actually 
growing a crop or not 
(iii) lower administrative costs - so lesser upfront payment by farmers 
(iv) wall have automated rainfall / temperature measurement instruments 
installed at each village 
(v) weather derivatives will be bought and sold all across the country, at the 
exchange, by other industries also - so, for example, a soft drink company would 
invest in derivatives for low rainfall so that they have more sales; this will 
compensate farmers who want more rainfall. Thus costs of weather derivatives 
would be lower. 
The proposed weather derivative schemes were received fairly enthusiastically 
by the respondents. 92% of them felt that the schemes could help them either to 
a very large extent or to a fair extent. This figure was almost the same for 
subscribers and non-subscribers, although non-subscribers were a shade more 
enthusiastic about weather derivatives, probably because of an acceptability of 
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the existing crop insurance schemes amongst the subscribers. (Table 7.12 and 
Figure 7.6). 
Table 7.12 Table showing people's perception to weather derivative schemes as an aid to 
relieving financial stress 
Parameters District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber NonSubscriber Subscriber NonSubscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
N % N % N % N % N % N 
Sure wil not helpl 
Mightmtlielpl 
WouJd help maiginally 
WoJd help to ^ r extent I 
WoM hefp b a veiy large extent j 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
I Subscriber I Non Subscriber 
Figure 7.6 Respondents' reactions to weather derivatives 
% 
Perception regarding relieving financial stress by weather derivative scheme 
Would help to a very 
large extent 
Would help to a fair 
extent 
Would help marginally 
Might not help 
Sure will not help 
Base 
37 
93 
17 
2 
0 
149 
24.8 
62.4 
11.4 
1.3 
0.0 
100.0 
37 
67 
16 
1 
0 
121 
30.6 
55.4 
13.2 
0.8 
0.0 
100.0 
74 
54 
4 
1 
1 
134 
55.2 
40.3 
3.0 
0.8 
0.8 
100.0 
74 
55 
3 
0 
0 
132 
56.1 
41.7 
2.3 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
111 
147 
21 
3 
1 
283 
39.2 
51.9 
7.4 
1.1 
0.4 
100.0 
111 
122 
19 
1 
0 
253 
43.9 
48.2 
7.5 
0.4 
0.0 
100.0 
7.2.5 Weather related worries arid preference of factors to hedge 
Respondents were asked about the weather factor, which worries them most as 
being detrimental to their crop yield. It was, expectedly, found that about two 
third of the respondents indicated that prospects of low rainfall worried them 
the most. This trend was common across subscribers and non-subscribers in 
both the districts. (Table 7.13 and Figure 7.7). 
Data analysis 106 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Higher than nonnal Lower than nornial Higher than nomial Lower than normal 
Rainfall Rainfall Temperature Temperature 
Figure 7.7 Mostwoirisome weather factor for crop yield 
Most of the respondents, when going in for weather derivatives would prefer to 
hedge against a mix of temperature and rainfall (46% subscribers & 51% non 
subscribers) followed by rainfall variations (48% subscribers and 46% non 
subscribers) (Table 7.13 and Figure 7.8). There is a difference in the opinions of 
farmers in the two districts, indicating the need for the availability of a variety of 
weather derivative products, giving a choice to farmers. 
A nix oftemperatjre 
and ralnfeill 
^ Rainiall variatons 
Temperature 
variaions 
10 20 30 40 50 
Percentage of Respondents 
60 70 
I Jhalawar iTonk 
Figure 7.8 Preference for hedge against 
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Table 7.13 Table showing weather factors which worry as being detrimental to crop yield 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Totai 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Weather factor worries you the most as being detrimental to your crop yield 
Higher than normal 
Rainfall 33 22.2 37 30.6 20 14.9 21 15.9 53 18.7 58 22.9 
Lower than normal 
Rainfall 97 65.1 65 53.7 94 70.2 96 72.7 191 67.5 161 63.6 
Higher than normal 
Temperature 19 12.8 19 15.7 20 14.9 14 10.6 39 13.8 33 13.0 
Lower than normal 
Temperature 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.8 0 0.0 1 0,4 
Would prefer to opt for a hedge against 
Temperature variations g 5 4 4 3 3 5 3 7 4 3 0 13 4,6 8 3.2 
Rainfall variations 92 gl .? 58 47.9 43 32.1 59 44.7 135 47.7 117 46.3 
A mix of temperature 
and rainfall 46 30.9 59 48.8 85 63.4 69 52.3 131 46.3 128 50.6 
No Response 3 2.0 0 - 1 0.8 0 - 4 1.4 0 -
Base 149 100.0 121 100.0 134 100.0 132 100.0 283 100.0 253 100.0 
7.2.6 Levels at which hedging would be desired 
Respondents were further asked about the levels of rainfall/temperature 
variations at which they would they would want to hedge their risks. It was 
found that about two fifth of the respondents (37% subscribers and 44% non 
subscribers) would prefer to hedge when rainfall will be below 20 percent from 
the normal. Slightly more than one fifth of the respondents wouldn't mind 
risking a 30% variation in rainfall before hedging. (Table 7.14). A mean of these 
responses indicates that the respondents are wilHng to take a chance with 
rainfall being 24.9% below normal before they would want to hedge their risk. 
Similarly, farmers would want to go in for a hedge against high temperatures 
only when the temperature levels go to between 5 to 10% above normal. 
(Table 7.14). A mean of these responses indicates that farmers are willing to take 
a chance with temperature being 7.1% above normal before they would want to 
hedge their risk. 
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Table 7.14 Table showing weather variation levels atwhich hedging would besought 
DistrictJhalawar DistrictTonk Total i trictj  
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
% N % N "' " •" " " Parameters N % N •»
You would want to hedge against low rainfall only if it is? 
10% below normal 33 22.2 14 11.6 35 
20% below normal 45 39.2 51 
30% below normal 41 27.5 30 
50% or less below 
normal 30 20.1 26 
j id want to hedge against high tempers 
8.3 9 
42.2 59 
24.8 27 
21.5 13 
 
You woul ature only if it is 
2% above normal 21 14.1 10 .   
5% above normal 45 30.9 35 28.9 77 
10% above nomial 73 52.4 73 60.3 41 
15% or more above 
normal 0 0.0 0 
No response 4 2.7 3 
 
26.1 31 
44.0 59 
20.2 
9.7 
6.7 
57.5 
30.6 
26 
16 
8 
78 
42 
% 
23.5 
44.7 
19.7 
68 
104 
68 
% 
24.0 
36.8 
24.0 
45 
110 
56 
% 
17.8 
43.5 
22.1 
12.1 43 15.2 42 16.6 
6.1 
59.1 
31.8 
30 
123 
119 
10.6 
43.5 
42.1 
18 
113 
115 
7.1 
44.7 
45.5 
Base 149 100.0 121 
0.0 7 5.2 2 1.5 7 2.5 2 0.8 
2.5 0 0.0 2 1.5 4 1.4 5 2.0 
100.0 134 100.0 132 100.0 283 100.0 253 100.0 
1.2.7 Length of weather derivative contracts 
It is evident from Table 7.15 that most of the respondents would prefer to buy 
season based weather derivatives (65% subscribers and 62% non subscribers). 
Further, the most preferred time for expiration of the contracts would be at least 
60 days (close to 70% of respondents). (Tables 7.15, 7.16 and Figure 7.9). 
Would be indilferent 
Very much prefer season Based derivatives 
Prefer season Based derivatives 
Prefer specific period denvatives 
Very much prefer specific period derivatives 
I Subscriber 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
I Non Subscriber 
Figure 7.9 Respondents' preference to buy weather derivative cover for specific periods 
Data analysis 109 
Table 7.15 Table showing preference for period of weather derivatives 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Non 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Would you prefer to buy weather derivative cover for specific periods, or would tfiat be too much of a hassle to keep track o f 
Would very much prefer ^ ^ j 2 1.7 40 29.9 37 28.0 44 15,6 39 15,4 
specific period derivatives 
Would prefer specific period ^ ^.7 4 3.3 47 35.1 49 37.1 51 18,0 53 21,0 
derivatives 
Would prefer season Based ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^ g 3^ 27,6 39 29,6 121 42,8 98 3 8 / 
derivatives 
Would very much prefer season ^^ 36,2 53 43,8 9 6,7 7 5,3 63 22.3 60 23,/ 
Based derivatives 
Would be indifferent 3 2.O 3 2.5 1 0.8 0 0.0 4 1,4 3 1,2 
Base 149 100.0 121 100.0 134 100.0 132 100,0 283 100,0 253 100,0 
Table 7.16 Table showing preference for time-to-expiry of weather derivatives 
Parameters 
District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
N % 
Non 
N 
Subscriber 
% 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N % 
Choice of periods (start to expiry) of weather derivatives? 
' 1 week 
'15 days 
'30 days 
'45 days 
'60 days 
'90 days 
Base 
2 
0 
7 
12 
63 
65 
149 
1,3 
0.0 
4,7 
8,1 
42.3 
43.6 
100,0 
1 
0 
2 
6 
55 
57 
121 
0.8 
0,0 
1,7 
5,0 
45.5 
47.1 
100.0 
2 
8 
29 
30 
14 
51 
134 
1.5 
6.0 
21,6 
22,4 
10,5 
38,1 
100.0 
Non 
Subscriber 
N 
1 
6 
34 
20 
25 
46 
132 
% 
0,8 
4.6 
25.8 
15.2 
18.9 
34.9 
100,0 
Subscriber 
N 
4 
8 
36 
42 
77 
116 
283 
% 
1.4 
2.8 
12,7 
14,8 
27.2 
41.0 
100.0 
Total 
Nor 
N 
2 
6 
36 
26 
80 
103 
253 
Subscriber 
% 
0,8 
2,4 
14,2 
10.3 
31,6 
40,7 
100.0 
7.2.8 Hedging related to arrival date of monsoons 
Respondents were universally found interested in hedging the weather risk 
related to date of arrival of the monsoons. (Table 7.17) 
Table 7.17 Table showing interest in hedging date of monsoon arrival 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Would you be interested in hedging risks related to tfie date of arrival of the monsoon? 
Would be interested 140 940 101 83.5 132 98.5 127 96,2 272 96.1 228 90,1 
Would not be 
interested 9 6.0 20 16,5 2 1.5 5 3.8 11 3.9 25 9,9 
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1.2.d Preferred mode of payout 
Respondents were asked about whether they would prefer weather derivative 
payouts "Triggered by a pre-fixed level of the index with a yes/no type of 
payment" or "Triggered by a pre-fixed level of the index, but paid proportional 
to the amount of rainfall / parameter". About two-third (64%) of the 
respondents opted for the payment terms triggered by a pre-fixed level of the 
index, but paid proportional to the amount of rainfall / parameter (Table 71B). 
Table 7.18 Table showing preference to payout for weather derivative 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber NonSubscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Preferred pay out 
Triggered by a pre-fixed 
level of the index with a 
yes/no type of payment 
Triggered by a pre-fixed 
level of the index, but paid 
proportional to the amount 
of rainfall/ parameter 
Base 
53 
96 
35.6 51 42.2 47 35.1 42 
64.4 69 57.0 88 65.7 90 
31.8 100 35.3 93 
68.2 184 65.0 159 
36.! 
62.9 
149 100.0 121 100.0 134 100.0 132 100.0 283 100.0 253 100,0 
7.2.10 Basis risk 
One of the major challenges of weather derivatives is that climatic variability 
occurs on spatial and temporal scales. This is not too evident in the case of 
temperature, but could have significant effects on derivatives based on rainfall. 
Geographical climatic differences lead to situations where there could be 
correlations between many locations while at the same time, there could be low 
correlations between locations which are not geographically far apart. Basis risk 
can lead to imperfect hedging when the user wishes to cover a weather risk at 
one location, but is actually covered by the weather recorded at a location some 
kilometers away. 
Most weather derivative contracts which have been traded world-wide have 
been based on temperature indices. However, in the case of farmers, especially 
in developing countries, their major interest is likely to be in rainfall index 
related weather derivative products. An impediment to the growth of a market in 
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these products could be the apprehension of the acceptabihty of rainfall linked 
derivative products in the face of an associated basis risk. 
Surprisingly, inspite of the fact that most farmers were in agreement with the 
rainfall figures used by the AIC in determining claims for the crop insurance 
schemes, they seemed to be aware of the existence of basis risk in rainfall-index 
related products. They were asked to indicate a preferred distance from their 
village of the weather station in case it is not possible to locate it in the village 
itself. A very large number of farmers indicated a preference for a weather 
station to be located within 2 km of the village, and definitely within 5 km. 
(Table 7.19). 
7.2.11 Mannini and control of weather recording stations 
close to 90% of the respondents expressed that they would have a better sense 
of comfort with government controlled and manned weather recording stations 
than with privately manned stations. (Table 7.19). 
Table 7.19 Table showing preferences related to weather recording 
Parameters District Jhalawar 
Subscriber 
N % 
Non Subscriber 
N % 
Preferred Distance From Village if the weather station is 
Less than 2 Km. 
'2-5 l<m. 
'5-lOkm. 
Does not make a 
difference 
42 
76 
31 
0 
28.2 
51.0 
20.8 
0.0 
28 
65 
28 
0 
23.1 
53.7 
23.1 
0.0 
District Tonk 
Subscriber 
N % 
; not within the V 
73 
51 
10 
0 
54.5 
38.1 
7.5 
0.0 
Non Subscriber 
N 
illage 
80 
42 
9 
1 
% 
60.6 
31.8 
6,8 
0.8 
115 
127 
41 
0 
Total 
Subscriber 
N % 
40.6 
44.9 
14.5 
0,0 
1 
Non Subscriber 
N 
108 
107 
37 
1 
% 
42J 
42,3 
14,6 
0,4 
Most comfortable/preferred weather recording stations 
Government weather 
recording stations 131 87,9 110 90.9 108 80.6 116 87.9 239 
Private weather 
recording stations 13 8.7 8 6.6 19 14.2 10 7.6 32 
Would not make a 
difference 5 3.4 3 2.5 7 5.2 6 4.6 12 
7.2.12 Cooperative weather derivative schemes 
Some developing countries have experimented with group schemes, either with 
individually formed groups or with village level schemes, in order to instil more 
84.5 
11.3 
4,2 
226 
18 
9 
89,3 
7,1 
3,6 
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confidence in the farmers and in order to keep premiums a bit lower by 
increasing volumes. 
In our survey, about a quarter of the respondents indicated a preference for 
going in for village level schemes; however, most either preferred to go it alone 
or to go in for schemes which would permit small, self-formed groups. (Table 
7.20 and figure 7.10). 
Table 7.20 Table showing preferences related to group schemes 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N N % N % N % N % 
Preference to buying alone or in group 
as an individual 
Buying weather derivatives 
in small, self-fomned group 
Buying weather derivatives 
as cooperatives at the 
village level 
Buying weather derivatives 
33 
54 
58 
as cooperatives at the block 0 
level 
Not Specified 
Base 
4 
149 
22.2 
36.2 
38.9 
0.0 
2.7 
100.0 
41 
48 
30 
0 
2 
121 
33.9 
39.7 
24.8 
0.0 
1.7 
100.0 
62 
47 
24 
1 
0 
134 
46.3 
35.1 
17.9 
0.8 
0.0 
100,0 
52 
52 
28 
0 
0 
132 
39.4 
39.4 
21.2 
0.0 
0.0 
100,0 
95 
101 
82 
1 
4 
283 
33.6 
35.7 
29.0 
0.4 
1.4 
100.0 
93 
100 
58 
0 
2 
253 
36.8 
39.5 
22.9 
0.0 
0.8 
100.0 
As cooperatives 
at block level 
As cooperatives 
at village level 
As individuals 
Small self-
formed groups 
Figure 7.10 Respondents' preference to buy weather derivatives as individuals or in groups 
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7.2.13 Government versus private schemes 
An extremely large number of respondents preferred to go in for weather 
derivative schemes offered by the government, as against those offered by 
private agencies. (Table 7-2i). 
Table 7.21 Table showing preference to the agencies offering the schemes. 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Most comfortable/preferred agency 
Only government 
insurance schemes/ ^^^ ^^.e 113 93.4 90 67.2 116 87.9 228 80.6 229 90.5 
weather derivatives 
offered by the government 
Both government and 
private agencies'offered ^ ^ 3 ^ j ^ 27 20.2 8 6.1 29 10.3 10 4.0 
Insurance schemes/ 
weather derivatives 
Only private agencies' 
offered insurance ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^.7 8 6.1 26 9.2 14 5.5 
schemes/weather 
derivatives 
Base 149 100.0 121 100.0 134 100.0 132 100.0 283 100.0 253 1000 
Most respondents attributed this to their having more faith in government 
schemes. (Table 7.22). 
Table 7.22 Reasons for selecting government schemes 
District Jhalawar District Tonk Total 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber NonSubscnber 
Parameters N % N % N % N % N % N % 
You have mote faith in , „ 
137 99.3 110 97.4 87 96.7 113 97.4 224 98.3 223 97 4 
government schemes 
Private players may look for too 
, . , , 0 0.0 1 0.9 2 2.2 1 0.9 2 0.9 2 09 
much gams for themselves 
Private agencies may not be 
^, . . . . ' , . 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1 . 1 1 0.9 1 0.4 1 0,4 
able to survive in the market 
DK/CS 1 0.7 2 1.8 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.4 3 1,3 
Base 138 92.6 113 93.4 90 67,2 116 87.9 228 80.6 229 90.5 
7.2.14 Farmers' opinion on weather relationship with crop growth 
Weather factors, mostly rainfall and temperature, play a very significant role in 
crop growth as most of the seasonal crops need a range of temperature and 
rainfall for proper growth which, in turn, significantly affects the crop yield. 
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Besides the water required for growth of the crop, many pathogens also become 
active in adverse conditions (low or high) of rainfall or temperature. These infect 
the crop and result in low yield. For example, Soyabean can be infected by 
defoliators like green semilooper and Tobacco caterpillar due to continuous 
drizzling during pre flowering stage and if the condition remains the same then 
after 1-2 weeks, this population can get infected by entomopathoganic fungi 
Beauveria bassiana/Nomuraea rileyi and may result in a substantially reduced 
yield. Before infection the larvae may feed on flowers/developing pods and could 
also lead to no-podding situation. In the same crop, due to erratic rainfall and 
low soil moisture availability during flowering period and onwards, incidence of 
charcoal rot (a plant disease) may increase. Conversely, with high rainfall, with 
more soil moisture availability, there may be more incidence of crop diseases 
like Rhizoctonia aerial blight, Anthracnose and Collar rot. High humidity and 
temperature are also favourable for many foliar diseases. 
For the purpose of this study, five stages were identified, where weather effects 
could play a role in the yield of the crop: (i) Sowing, (ii) germination stage (iii) 
vegetative growth stage, (iv) grain formation stage, (v) harvesting. 
The farmers were asked to indicate impacts that they have experienced in the 
past few years to the crop yield, which they could attribute to weather factors at 
various stages in the growth of the crop. 
Excessive rainfall as well as deficient rainfall were considered by farmers to be 
have a detrimental effect on the yield of the crop at the sowing stage. An almost 
similar response emerged for the germination stage with respect to excessive 
rainfall; however, deficient rainfall was not considered so detrimental in 
Jhalawar, but was indicated as being detrimental in Tonk district. High 
temperatures, too, were considered detrimental in the germination stage, albeit 
with a higher emphasis in Tonk district. 
In the vegetative growth stage, excess rainfall and higher temperature were both 
considered detrimental in both the districts. Once again, excessive rainfall and 
high temperatures were considered more detrimental to crop >'ield in the grain 
formation stage. Finally, a verj' pronounced detrimental effect of excessive 
rainfall was indicated by the farmers, whilst the importance to temperature 
variations reduced considerably. 
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Although farmers had indicated that lower than normal rainfall caused them the 
highest mental worries, when asked about weather effects at various stages of 
crop growth, more farmers indicated excessive rainfall as being detrimental to 
crop yield at all the stages, than deficient rainfall. 
At first glance, this appears dichotomous, but is probably explained by the fact 
that while excessive rainfall is perceived to be more harmful for crop in the 
regions surveyed, farmers perceive the probability of less rainfall to be higher 
than the probability of excessive rainfall. Hence they worry more about deficient 
rainfall, but wall be inclined to a fair amount of hedging against excessive rainfall 
too. 
This then leads us on to the fact that weather derivatives need to be tailored in 
such a way that a farmer has the flexibility of hedging against low rainfall in one 
period, high rainfall in another, and possibly high temperatures in yet another. 
To aid in structuring such products, the farmers' perceptions on how each of the 
weather factors affect a crop at various stages of its growth need to be known in 
advance. Of course, these would vary from crop to crop and from region to 
region. 
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7.3 Survey findings - valuation section 
7.3.1 The bidding game 
The valuation section of the survey comprised a bidding game, where 
respondents were asked to indicate with a YES or NO answer whether they 
would be willing to pay a certain amount for a weather derivative which would 
provide a maximum payout of Rs looo. 
The bidding game was started with a question on whether they would be willing 
to pay a price of io% of the expected payout amount. The game was brought to 
an end if a respondent answered in the affirmative. If the response was negati\e 
the next bid of 8% was offered and the game continued in the same fashion w ith 
subsequent bids being successively lowered to 5%, 3% and finally 2%. 
With the largest number of farmers, the game stopped at a bid of 5%, with a \er\ 
small number taking the game to a bid below that (Table 7.23). In fact the 
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number of respondents who indicated a Yes at a bid value less than Rs 50 was 
only 8.7%. 
Table 7.23 Distribution of responses to Bids for a WD witii a payout of Rs. 1000 
District Jhalawar District Tonk 
Subscriber Non Subscriber Subscriber Non Subscriber 
Total 
Parameters 
Yes at bid value of Rs 100 
for Rs 1000 covered 
Yes at Rs 80 
Yes at Rs 50 
Yes at Rs 30 
Yes at Rs 20 
Base 
N 
62 
13 
65 
6 
3 
149 
% 
41.6 
8.7 
43.6 
4.0 
2.0 
100 
N 
30 
14 
61 
13 
2 
120 
% 
25.0 
11.7 
50.8 
10.8 
1.7 
100 
N 
63 
15 
43 
7 
5 
% 
47.4 
11.3 
32.3 
5.3 
3.8 
133 100 
N 
59 
16 
46 
8 
2 
131 
% 
45.0 
12.2 
35.1 
6.1 
1.5 
100 
N 
214 
58 
215 
34 
12 
533 
% 
40.2 
10.9 
40.3 
6.4 
2.3 
100 
Rgure 7.11 Responses at each bid value 
7.3.2 Responses to bid values, related to savings 
Expectedly, it was seen that those who indicated a higher amount that they were 
able to save in a month out of their total income, also indicated a Yes at a higher 
bid value. (Table 7.24 and Figure 7.12). 
Table 7.24 Responses related to monthly savings 
Yes at Rs. 
100 
80 
SO 
30 
20 
Total 
Mean of highest bid values 
Nil 
7 
6 
8 
6 
0 
27 
65.2 
50-100 
12 
3 
17 
3 
2 
37 
65.4 
100-300 
46 
14 
47 
8 
4 
119 
70.50 
300-500 
58 
16 
53 
11 
3 
141 
71.8 
500-1000 
49 
12 
55 
2 
2 
120 
72.58 
1000-3000 
32 
5 
28 
4 
0 
69 
74.2 
>3000 
8 
2 
6 
0 
1 
17 
75.3 
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Figure 7.12 Mean of Highest Bid Value - Related to monthly savings 
7.3.3 Responses related to perception of surety of yield 
Expectedly, farmers who felt that they were unsure of the yield that they would 
get from their farms at the end of the season, responded with a Tes' at higher 
bid values than farmers who felt that they could be sure of the yield from their 
farms (Table 7.25). 
Table 7.25 Responses related to surety of yield 
'Yes' at c 
100 
80 
50 
30 
20 
Total 
bid value of: 
Mean of highest bid value 
Very 
21 
10 
41 
4 
0 
76 
66.7 
sure Unsure 
64 
10 
43 
13 
4 
134 
73.3 
Also, expectedly, farmers who were more worried about variability of crop yield 
said "Yes' at higher bid values than those who had indicated that a variability in 
price was more important a factor to them. (Table 7.26). This indicates a risk 
averseness amongst the farmers since variability in price would be taken care of 
to a fair extent by the Minimum Support Price, announced by the government, 
while variability in yield especially at an individual level, would result in a 
definite variation in income for the farmer. 
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Table 7.26 Responses related to worry about variability in yield of crop 
•Yes' at a bid value of: 
100 
80 
50 
30 
20 
Total 
Mean of highest bid value 
Farmers who 
more about 
Variability in 
82 
18 
70 
15 
7 
192 
71.5 
worry 
yield 
Farmers who worry more 
about 
Variability in price 
3 
9 
41 
3 
0 
56 
56.4 
7.3.4 Responses related to preference of weather factors to hedge against 
There was a marked difference in the responses related to preferences of farmers 
for weather derivatives with contracts linked to various weather factors. While 
farmers who had indicated a preference for temperature related products 
indicated a "Yes" at much lower bid value than those who preferred rainfall 
related weather derivatives, an important finding was that the highest bid values 
were from those who had indicated a preference for products which would be 
related to hybrid indexes of rainfall as well as temperature. (Table 7.27). 
Table 7.27 Responses related to choice of weather derivative contract indexes 
'Yes' at a bid value of: 
100 
80 
50 
30 
20 
Total 
Mean of highest bid value 
Weather factors which respondents would like 
Temperature Rainfall Temperature & rainfall 
10 
2 
9 
16 
7 
44 
50.7 
94 
29 
105 
18 
5 
251 
70.2 
108 
27 
99 
0 
0 
234 
76.5 
• to hedge against 
Total 
212 
58 
213 
34 
12 
529 
7.3.5 Responses related to preference of contract t/me period. 
It has already been mentioned that a larger number of respondents had 
indicated a preference to go in for season based weather derivatives, rather than 
for specific- period based contracts. However, when comparing their preference 
in this respect with their responses to the bid values, not much difference is 
noted in the mean of the highest bid value. (Table 7.28). 
Data analysis 119 
Table 7.28 Responses related to contract time period. 
•Yes' at a bid value of: 
100 
80 
50 
30 
20 
Total 
Mean of highest bid value 
Specific period derivatives Season based derivatives 
Very much prefer Prefer 
32 
9 
34 
5 
2 
82 
70.9 
48 
9 
39 
4 
3 
103 
74.3 
87 
25 
82 
18 
7 
219 
70.7 
Prefer Very much prefer Be Indifferent 
45 
15 
55 
7 
0 
122 
71.0 
2 
5 
0 
0 
7 
64.3 
However, when we look at willingness to pay related to the choice of time period 
of the weather derivative contracts (start to expiry), which respondents had 
opted for, the highest WTPs are either for periods of 15 days to 30 days, or then 
for 90 days. (Table 7.29). There is a positive disinclination, not only in the 
number of respondents who indicated a preference for periods less than 15 days, 
but also in the willingness to pay for such short duration contracts. 
Table 7.29 Responses related to contract time period in number of days 
Durati 
'Yes' at a bid value of: 1 wee 
100 1 
80 1 
50 1 
30 3 
20 1 
Total 7 
Mean of highest bid value 48.6 
on of weatlier derivativ 
k 15 days 30 days 
8 
0 
3 
2 
0 
13 
78.3 
39 
5 
26 
0 
2 
72 
78.4 
e scheme p 
45 days 
17 
9 
32 
7 
2 
67 
65.8 
referred 
60 days 
35 
19 
87 
11 
3 
155 
63.5 
90 days 
114 
24 
66 
11 
4 
219 
78.1 
Total 
214 
58 
215 
34 
12 
17 
71.4 
7.3.6 Amount that respondents are willing to set aside monthly - for hedging 
At the end of the bidding game, the respondents were also asked the amount 
that they would be willing to set aside in a month solely for the purpose of 
hedging their weather related risks through purchasing weather derivatives or 
insurance. 
A mean value of Rs 184.98 was obtained as the amount amongst those who had 
subscribed to existing schemes, while, expectedly, non-subscribers were willing 
to set aside a lower amount, Rs 157.29 every month. 
What is important, however, is that even those who have not subscribed to any 
crop insurance scheme so far are positively inclined towards hedging their 
weather related risks by setting aside a fair amount from their savings on a 
monthly basis. 
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PART IV 
7.4Willingnesstopay 
7.4.1 The model 
The entire survey and the attempt to determine the wilHngness to pay, is based 
on the stated preference method for determining benefit estimation. 
Closed ended questions were asked and the specific question asked in the WTP 
section of the questionnaire was: 
"If you were to insure your crop or purchase weather derivatives for an amount 
of Rs 1000, a premium or charge would have to be paid for this. We v«ll now 
read out some premiums to you. Please tell us if you will be willing to pay this 
amount. {Note: You can insure/ purchase weather derivatives for more than Rs 
looo - the premium would be for each Rs looo insured)". 
The bidding game was commenced with Rs loo and was subsequently lowered 
to Rs 8o, Rs 50, Rs 30 and finally Rs 20. These amounts were chosen based on 
premiums of existing crop insurance schemes, and the outcomes of the focus 
group discussion and the pre-testing. 
The respondents were asked to respond with a simple Yes or No. If they 
answered Yes at the first bid, the game was stopped there itself. Otherwise, the 
next lower bid was offered and their response was elicited. 
Since the CV responses were either Yes or No, the response could be taken as a 
binary variable and a statistical model appropriate for a discrete dependant 
variable could be used. The intention was to be able to analyse covariate effects 
on responses eg. the effect of education, age, awareness of insurance schemes etc 
on the willingness to pay. Carson and Mitchell (1992), for example, have shown 
the effect of 14 variables on the willingness to pay. The major advantage of 
coming up vnth a model with covariates is that it could easily be used to expand 
the findings from this research, in a way which can be corrected by exogenous 
variables. 
The basic concept used is that of the Random Utility Model (RUM) devised by 
Hanemann (1984), where a respondent answers 'Yes' to a payment if he 
perceives that the benefits which would accrue by paying that amount are 
greater than the cost of paying for it. Preferences for Willingness to Pay would 
differ across individuals based on their social-demographic characteristics, and 
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their preferences on the type of structuring that the weather derivatives should 
have. 
In our model, we envisage an element of weather-related risk to the yield that a 
farmer expects from his cultivation. If this risk qo were to reduce to q, through 
the purchase of weather derivatives by paying an amount t, then, as explained in 
the review of literature, the probability of a respondent, j , answering "Yes' to a 
bid amount is: 
PrCyesj) = Pr [(azj- ptj + Cj) > o] 
where: z\ is a vector of attributes and characteristics, and 
Ej is the non-observable (inherent to the respondent) component of 
preferences 
Assuming that the error term Cj is independently and identically distributed, 
with mean zero, the normal and logistic are two commonly used distributions. 
In order to understand the determinants of respondents' willingness to pay for 
weather derivatives which would be consistent vnth intuition and with economic 
demand theory, a series of multivariate regression analyses were performed with 
the survey data. Those variables having little effect on the dependant variable 
were left out from the final model. These included source of income, 
landholding, type of crop grown, total produce, source of worry in terms of 
yield/price risk, satisfaction levels with previous schemes, whether the farmer 
had taken loans in the past, and whether he had any outstanding loans. 
In our final model, 9 variables viz., education, age, monthly savings, livestock 
holding, perceptions on surety of yield, awareness of crop insurance schemes, 
preference of weather factor to hedge, preference for time period of contract and 
preference for individual vs group schemes were taken as independent 
variables. Income is not taken as a determinant in the model, since, as in the 
Random Utility Model with linear utility function, marginal utility of income is 
assumed constant across scenarios posed by Contingent Valuation questions 
(Haab and McConnel, 2002). 
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Table 7.30 describes the independent variables and gives an idea of the means. 
Some of the variables have been categorised for convenience. Details of the 
categories in each of the nine variables considered are given below: 
i) Level of education: 
l-Non-Literate 
2-Studied upto Primary level 
3 - Studied upto Sec'dary level 
4 - Studied upto Hr Sec level 
5-Graduate 
6-Post-Graduate 
ii) Age: 
l -<20 years old 
2-20-30 years 
3-31-40 years 
4-41-50 years 
5->50 years old 
iii) Monthly Savings: 
l -N i l 5 -Rs 501-1000 
2 - Rs 50-100 6 - Rs 1001-3000 
3-Rs 101-300 7 ->Rs3000 
4- Rs 301-500 
iv) Livestock holding: 
l-Nil 
2-1-10 
3 - 10-20 
4->20 
v) Perception of surety of yield from farms: 
1-Very Sure 
2 - Sure 
3-Somev\(hatsure 
4 - Somewhat Unsure 
5-Unsure 
6-Very Unsure 
vi)Awareness of crop insurance schemes: 
l=Not aware 
2-Aware 
vii) Preference of weather factors to hedge against: 
1-Temp variations 
2-Rainfall variations 
3-Mixofboth 
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viii) Preference for contract time period: 
1-one week 
2=15 days 
3-30 days 
4-45 days 
5=60 days 
6-90 days 
ix) Preference for going-in for weather derivatives as an individual or in groups: 
1 - Prefer to buy as an individual 
2 - Prefer to buy in small groups 
3 - Prefer to buy in village level groups 
4 - Prefer to buy in blocl< level groups 
Table 7.30 Means of variables used in the model 
Variable 
BID 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
GPREF 
Description 
Highest bid value at which respondent said Tes" 
Level of education 
Age 
Monthly savings 
Livestoci< holding 
Surety of Yield 
Insurance Awareness 
Preference of weather factors to hedge against 
Preference for contract time period 
Preference for opting for groups 
Mean (n-536) 
2.65 
3.26 
4.04 
1.90 
3.24 
1.51 
2.43 
4.89 
1.89 
1A2 Binomial logit and probit model for dichotomous choice CV responses using 
bid levels at which a 7es'response was obtained 
Table 7.31 gives the parameter estimates when the linear random utility probit 
and logit models are fitted with the model: 
Pr(Yes) = Pr [ 6 < (ai edu+ a2age+ as mon_sav+ 04 live+ as ysrty+ a6 iawar+ 
ay hpref+ a8 ctim+ a9 gpref - P t ) /o) ] 
Table 7.31 Results from the estimation of WTP through probit and logit model 
Parameter (Normal) 
BID* 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
Coefficient 
-.03303749 
.12759987 
.06008382 
.05459551 
.24678438 
.05449482 
.28734585 
.11615068 
Standard error 
.00126555 
.02877158 
.03038476 
.02347285 
.05525198 
.02239473 
.06257357 
.04936535 
t-ratio 
-26.105 
4.435 
1.977 
2.326 
4.467 
2.433 
4.592 
2.353 
p-values 
.0000 
.0000 
.0480 
.0200 
.0000 
.0150 
.0000 
.0186 
Data analysis 124 
Parameter (Normal) 
CTIM 
GPREF 
Parameter (Logistic) 
BID* 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
GPREF 
Coefficient 
.12674040 
,08980771 
Coefficient 
-.05803970 
.22851164 
.11178711 
.08453996 
.45177621 
.10992892 
.51694625 
.19487908 
.21667046 
.14008889 
Standard en'or 
.02354120 
.04011426 
Standard error 
.00242206 
.05046530 
.05273736 
.04095523 
.09852313 
.03932746 
.10998470 
.08602834 
.04202372 
.07076081 
t-ratio 
5.384 
2.239 
t-ratio 
-23.963 
4.528 
2.120 
2.064 
4.585 
2.795 
4.700 
2.265 
5.156 
1.980 
p-values 
.0000 
.0252 
p-values 
.0000 
.0000 
.0340 
.0390 
.0000 
.0052 
.0000 
,0235 
.0000 
.0477 
' Note that this is the parameter on -t 
Table 7.32 Calculation of mean WTP with normal utility function 
Parameter 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
GPREF 
Coefficient 
0.1276 
0.060084 
0.054596 
0.246784 
0.054495 
0.287346 
0.116151 
0.12674 
0.089808 
Mean 
2.652985 
3.264925 
4.035448 
1.899254 
3.235075 
1.514925 
2.429104 
4.889925 
1.891791 
Coefl*Mean(azj) 
0.33852055 
0.196169188 
0.220317329 
0.468706154 
0.17629481 
0.435307518 
0.282142137 
0.619751097 
0.169897421 
2.907106204 
Mean WTP (ozj/p) 
87.99416 
Table 7.33 Calculation of mean WTP with logarithmic utility function 
Parameter 
EDU 
AGE 
MON_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTf 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
Coefficient 
0.228512 
0.111787 
0.08454 
0.451776 
0.109929 
0.516946 
0.194879 
0.21667 
Mean 
2.652985 
3.264925 
4.035448 
1.899254 
3,235075 
1.514925 
2.429104 
4.889925 
Coeff*Mean(azJ) 
0.606237969 
0.364976571 
0.341156592 
0,858037652 
0.35562826 
0.783134989 
0.473381646 
1.059502379 
Mean WTP 
(ozj/P) 
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1.891791 0.265018907 
5.107074967 87.99279 
Table 7.34 Comparison of ratio of parameter estimates for logit and probit model 
Variables Coefficient (logistic) 
BID 
EDU 
AGE 
M0N_SAV 
LIVE 
YSRTY 
lAWAR 
HPREF 
CTIM 
GPREF 
-0.05804 
0.228512 
0.111787 
0.08454 
0.451776 
0.109929 
0.516946 
0.194879 
0.21667 
0.140089 
Coefficient (nomial) 
-0.03303749 
0.12759987 
0.06008382 
0.05459551 
0.24678438 
0.05449482 
0.28734585 
0.11615068 
0.1267404 
0.08980771 
Table 7.35 Other statistics for probit and logit model 
Log likelihood function (LogL) 
Restricted log likelihood (LogLO) 
Estrellall-(L/L0)'^(-2L0/r\)i 
Chi squared 
Prob(ChiSqd> value] 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared 
P-value 
McFadden 
MeanWTP{Rs) 
Normal 
-980.9552 
-1481.260 
.36457 
1000,609 
.0000000 
22.41138 
.00421 
.33776 
87.99416 
Ratio of coefficients 
1.756783 
1.790845 
1.860519 
1.548478 
1.830652 
2.017236 
1.799039 
1.677813 
1.709561 
1.559876 
Logistic 
-985.0499 
-1481.260 
.36298 
992.4194 
.0000000 
31.72700 
.00010 
.33499 
87.99279 
7.4.3 Interpretation of results 
Both Probit and Logit model estimations were done using LIMDEP 8.0. 
The null hypothesis is that the parameters ai ag and P are equal to zero. 
Under the null hypothesis, the Chi squared for the number of restrictions which 
is 9 (degrees of freedom) is 1000.6. So the hypothesis is rejected. 
If we interpret the signs on the coefficients, they all make intuitive sense. The 
probability of a Tes' increases as the bid amount decreases. The probability 
increases as the farmer is more educated, when his monthly saving is more or 
when he is more aware of crop insurance schemes. It increases with a preference 
for hedging against rainfall variability and more so for a preference for hedging 
against a hybrid index of rainfall and temperature. It increases as the farmer 
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opts for longer contract time periods and when they opt for group schemes 
rather than going in for weather derivatives as individuals. 
An unexpected result was that the probability of a 'Yes' increases as the livestock 
holding of a farmer increases. Intuitively, one would expect a farmer to opt less 
for a weather derivative when he has more livestock, since he could use these to 
tide over an economic crisis in a drought period. However, some researchers do 
mention that this might not really work, since the income from livestock also 
goes dovra in a drought period. In our case, an increasing probability of a 'Yes' 
with increasing number of livestock might also be an indicator of the number of 
livestock being a proxy for wealth, and so of a wealthier farmer being in a better 
position to pay more for a weather hedge. 
Table 7.34 gives a summary of the logit and probit parameter estimates and the 
ratio of the two. The ratios are close to 1.8, which is what we would expect, since 
the ratio of each of the parameter estimates should roughly be equal to the ratio 
of the standard logistic and standard normal distribution scales (71 / V3 = 
1.814). 
Calculation of Willingness to Pay. 
Haab and McConnel, 2002 explain WTP in a random utility model as : 
a ,Zj +P(yj - WTPj) + Cji = OoZj + Pyj +ejo 
where yj = income of jth respondent 
So, WTPj=azi/p + ej /P 
Uncertainty from randomness of preferences ej / P has mean zero; so the 
expectation of willingness to pay with respect to preference uncertainty (e) is: 
Ee(WTPj|a,p,zj)= azj/p 
Both, the Probit and Logit models give close to identical results of willingness to 
pay, as can be seen from tables 7.32 and 7.33. These values are Rs 87.994 and 
Rs 87.993 respectively. 
7.4.4 Probability Of a "Yes'response 
Given that in our questionnaire, when posed with a certain bid amount, the 
farmers were asked to respond with a simple 'Yes' or 'No' response, the 
probability that they would say 'Yes' at a particular bid amount is given by: 
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Probability CYes) = i - { i + exp [a Zj - P (bid amount)]} • 
The probabilities of getting a "Yes' response at various bid levels are indicated in 
table 7.36 and are shown in the graph in figure 7.13. 
The results make intuitive sense - the probability of a Tes' response increases as 
the bid amount decreases. 
Table 7.36 Probability of a 'Yes' response at various bid levels. 
Bid Amount (Rs.) 
100 
80 
50 
30 
20 
Probability of a Yes' response 
0.327834 
0.608735 
0.898621 
0.965842 
0.980583 
1.2 
0) 
>-
0.8 
0.6 
t 0.4 
0.2 
100 80 50 
Bid Amount (Rs.) 
30 20 
Figure 7.13 Probability of a 'Yes' response at various bid levels 
Regulatory issues relevant to introduction of 
weather derivatives in India 
8.1 Existing regulations in India 
8.1.1 Defining financial instruments 
The Committee of European Security Regulators (CESR) had in 2004, issued an 
advice note on the definition of financial instruments. This advice has been 
debated and a collated opinion of thirteen associations was brought out in the 
form of comments on the CESR advice {CESR, 2005). While welcoming the 
flexible and detailed approach adopted by the CESR, the concerns were centred 
around the definition of financial instruments and the worry that the advice 
would lead to a narrow interpretation of when a contract could come under the 
ambit of a derivative, and so leading to exclusion of some contracts and swaps. 
The association brought out clearly that there was a need for "definitional 
flexibility" so as to cover a diversity of products as well as future innovations. 
One important point of difference, was that the CESR advice would exclude 
those contracts where the payment was fixed. While CESR advised that 
"derivatives" are forwards, options or contracts for differences, it limits the last 
only to contracts where the payment has a variable value, which is based on the 
difference between two values, of which at least one is not determined at that 
time (CESR, 2005). 
The organisations argue that taking as granted that the need for derivatives 
stems from a need to hedge volatility in prices and/or in earnings, regardless of 
the form of the derivative, the object of the parties is the same i.e. to make a 
profit or avoid a loss. This is done by reference to fluctuation in the particular 
index or factor, even if the quantum of the profit made, or loss avoided, is fixed. 
8.1.2 The evolution of the regulatory processes 
Saxena, 2003, brings out that the major contributing factors for success or 
failure of a derivatives market include: 
(i) the market culture 
(ii) the underlying market including its depth and liquidity 
(iii) the financial infrastructure, including the regulatory framework 
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Simultaneously the purpose of regulation is to promote efficiency and 
transparency and to build up investor confidence and not to impede competition 
and efficiency. 
8.1.3 Regulatory objectives in tlie derivatives markets 
The LC Gupta Committee Report (para 3-i) lays down the goals of regulations 
as: 
(i) Investor Protection. This includes fair & transparent trading, 
safeguards for clients' money, competent and honest service and 
market integrity, 
(ii) Quality of Markets. The need to enhance market qualities such as cost 
efficiency, price-continuity and price-discovery, 
(iii) Innovation. The regulatory framework should not stifle innovation. 
8.1.4 Existing regulators in Indian financial markets 
Regulation in the Indian financial markets comes under the purview of the 
Ministry of Finance and under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs in the 
Government of India. 
A graphical representation of the regulators for various sectors in the Indian 
financial markets is shown below in figure 8.i: 
Indian Financial Markets and 
Regulators 
Minittiy of Fmince 
National 
Housing Bank 
louaing Finance 
Compania* 
Insurance Rsgulatory 
Development Authority 
(IRDA) 
A. 
Insurance 
x Pension 
Funds 
SIOBI RBI 
Company 
Law Board 
Corpo rates 
SEBI 
Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs 
FMC 
Commodity 
Mar1(ets 
State Financial 
Institutions 
Banldns I 
NBFCs 
Capital 
Markets 
1 
NABARO 
' ' 
Co-operative Banks S 
Regional Rural Banks 
Figure 8.1 Indian financial marl<ets and regulators 
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8.1.5 Regulatory conditions specified by SEBI for derivatives trading 
In India, a strict vigil is kept on derivatives trading by the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Some of the important regulatory conditions 
specified by SEBI are given below: 
(i) Trading to take place through an on-line screen based system with on-
line surveillance capability to monitor positions, prices, and volumes on 
a real-time basis, 
(ii) Exchange segment should disseminate information on a real-time basis, 
(iii) The exchange segment should have a grievance redressal system 
operative from all areas of the country, 
(iv) The clearing corporation shall perform full novation 
(v) The level of initial margin should be based on Value at Risk (VaR). It 
should be large enough to cover a one-day loss that could be encountered 
on the position on 99% of the days, 
(vi) There should be swift movement of margin payments through electronic 
funds transfer, 
(vii) Clients' margin money is to be held in trust by the clearing corporations 
for client purposes only and not be diverted for any other purpose. The 
money is to be used only against liability of the investor and not for any 
other purpose whatsoever, 
(viii) Risks associated vdth derivatives trading should be made known to an 
investor, 
(ix) An Investor Protection Fund is to be created - to cover investors from 
default by a member. 
8.1.6 FCRA,1952 
The Forward Contract (Regulation) Act (FCRA) was passed by the Indian 
parHament and came into being in 1952. Although 56 years old, this act still 
governs futures trading in commodities in India. 
The constitution of India places all stock and commodity exchanges dealing 
with trading in forwards and futures in the Union List, which implies that 
they come under the regulatory domain of the central government. 
The main features of the FCRA are as follows:-
(i) the Act applies to all goods. And "goods" are defined in the Act as 
movable property other than security and currency, 
(ii) section 19 of the Act prohibited options in goods 
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(iii) contracts have been classified as essentially of two t>'pes: ready 
delivery and forward delivery. Ready delivery are those contracts 
where physical delivery is done within a period of ii days. (This was 
recently amended to 30 days.) All other contracts are called forward 
contracts. 
(iv) forward contracts themselves are classified into two categories-
Specific delivery contracts and Non specific delivery contracts. 
(v) in the arena of regulation, the Act envisages it in a three tiered 
fashion. Firstly the exchange itself formulates its own rules, articles 
of association and bye- laws. The exchange regulates trading on a 
day to day basis. Second, the Forward Markets Commission (FMC) 
approves these rules and bye-laws and provides regulatory oversight. 
Third, the central government, through the Department of Consumer 
Affairs, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, 
is the ultimate regulatory authority. 
(vi) until 2008, whilst the government delegated most of its powers to the 
FMC, it retained full control over the commission. In fact the FCRA 
envisaged the FMC as having a recommendatory role. 
(vii) the Act lays down that only associations notified commodity wise, by 
the government, can organize forward trading. 
(viii) the Act lays down penalties for illegal trading. However, over the 
years, it has been noticed that these are too nominal to ha\'e any 
deterrent effect. Also, there is no provision to relate the penalty to 
the amount involved in the offence. 
The FCRA, 1952, has been at the centre of many debates; and many authors 
have brought out problems in the Act. The major problem is that the FCRA is 
archaic and that there is a need for a strong regulatory body to guide the 
markets {Sahadevan, 2006). The existing FMC has not been able too meet the 
emerging needs of the fast-growing markets {Sahadevan, 2004). 
The Forward Markets Commission was set up in 1953 as a body envisaged by the 
FCRA, 1952. It is a small body consisting of a Chairman and a maximum of 3 
members (of the rank of Joint Secretary). Section 4 of the FCRA lays down the 
functions of the FMC as follows:-
(i) advise the government on recognition of exchanges 
(ii) act as an observer in forward markets 
(iii) collect and disseminate information on trading conditions 
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(iv) recommend improvements in the oganisation and working of forward 
markets 
(v) inspect the accounts of exchanges. 
As can be seen, the FMC, therefore, is primarily an advisory body under the 
Department of Consumer Affairs, which retains most of the regulatory authority'. 
As against this, if we were to compare the regulatory capacity of the FMC with 
that of the capital markets, we note that SEBI is a statutory body- set up by the 
SEBl Act, 1992. On the other hand, the FMC is a part of the Ministry- of 
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. We could also take a 
comparison from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the 
regulatory authority in the USA. Established in 1974, it has been highly 
successful because of the wide powers and the authority given to it. Infact, the 
CFTC was strengthened even more through the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act, 2000. 
Another noticeable feature in the US markets is the self-regulation aided by the 
National Futures Association (NFA), which was registered with the CFTC in 
1982. This body, comprising of members from various industries, is a self-
regulatory organisation which helps bring about ethics and integrity in the 
market. In the last 10 years, consumer complaints have decreased by 60%, 
while volumes of futures trading have doubled {Sahadevan, 2006). With a large 
amount of responsibility being taken on by the NFA the CFTC has passed on its 
role of screening and registering people applying to conduct business in the 
futures industry. The NFA has made rules to help protect the interests of 
investors, to aid floor-trading practices etc. In fact, the CFTC has even 
transferred the responsibility of registration of brokers, to the NFA. 
A step towards correcting the lack of powers with the Indian Forward Markets 
Commission was taken in January 2008, when the government put forth an 
ordinance to make the FMC an autonomous agency, much like the SEBI. 
8.1.7 SCRA,1956 
The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act (SCRA), was passed by the parliament 
in 1956. It contained a large number of prohibitory features, and under this act, 
all forward trading in securities was prohibited by the government in 1969. 
Initially, this act excluded trading in derivatives, since they were not included in 
the definition of securities. 
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It was much later, in 1995, that the government reahzed the benefits of 
derivatives trading. On 25 January 1995, Section 20 of the SCRA, 1956 and its 
preamble, were amended so as to allow trading in derivatives. The L C Gupta 
Committee was set up in November 1996 and its report, submitted in March 
1998 recommended permitting trading in derivatives. To aid this, a task force -
the J R Varma group was set up in June 1998 to look into the regulatory aspects 
of trading in derivatives and to recommend risk containment measures. 
The report of the group, submitted in October 1998, suggested a margining 
system and a methodology for charging initial margins. It also recommended a 
system of assessing broker network, deposit requirements and real-time 
monitoring requirements. 
The SCRA, 1956 was again amended in December 1999 to include derivatives as 
"Securities". However, OTC derivatives were not included in this, possibly to 
preclude their interpretation as wagers. 
8.1.8 Introduction of derivatives trading in India 
Finally, in March 2000, the prohibition on forward trading in securities was 
removed and in June 2000, derivatives trading commenced in India on the 
National Stock Exchange (NSE) and on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in 
approved derivative contacts. 
In June 2001, trading commenced in index options. In July 2001, the exchanges 
commenced trading in options on individual securities, and, a few months later, 
in November 2001, trading commenced in futures contracts on individual 
stocks. 
There are a lot of lessons to be learnt from the process of introduction of 
derivatives trading in securities which have been, to quite an extent, 
extrapolated to trading in commodity derivatives. Lessons from both these 
experiments need to be kept in mind when the introduction to weather 
derivative trading takes place in India. As such, a thorough review of the 
process of introduction of derivatives trading in securities in India would be apt. 
There were, expectedly, many hurdles faced prior to the introduction of trading. 
The first and foremost were the legal and regulatory issues, most of which were 
addressed by the J R Varma group which went into these aspects. There then 
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was the resistance to allowing the introduction of derivatives mainly from people 
who were apprehensive about the processes involved and the issues of safety. 
There were the major challenges of building awareness and educating the 
community about derivatives. Finally there was the aspect of the need for active 
marketing of the products which were designed. 
The resistance to the introduction of derivatives and the subsequent protests 
were more emotional than objective {Narain.soos). They were mostly aimed at 
the risks involved in derivatives trading, the issue of a lack of maturity of the 
Indian investors and the potential of large losses for individual investors who 
might plunge into the markets without sufficient knowledge and without 
sufficient research. Both, the L C Gupta committee and the J R Varma group, 
were of tremendous help since they publicly communicated the need for 
derivatives and their benefits as also the development of a sound regulatory 
framework. These, therefore, brought about a sense of confidence in the public 
when derivatives trading was actually introduced. 
The challenge of education and training was very well taken up by the National 
Stock Exchange. Initially this was at a low key, but the persistence of the team at 
the Exchange finally paid out. The early training programmes were planned 
once in a week and the focus was only in Mumbai. But slowly, the frequency was 
increased and these were then spread across the country. Initially the 
programmes were only in English, but very rapidly they were also done in Hindi, 
Gujarati and Tamil. 
In fact, once trading started, the awareness campaign by the NSE really took off. 
Workshops were held, not only for analysts, but also for members of the press. 
Then, press reporting on prices and volumes and market analysis by experts, 
which were reported by the media - all helped in increasing awareness amongst 
potential traders. Institutional participation, however, took much longer to 
come by. This could be attributed to many reasons including the approval 
processes required before an institution could get involved in derivative trading, 
the usual resistance to change and the lack of clear accounting procedures. An 
absence of clear guidelines on the tax liabilities of institutions involved in 
derivative trading also delayed the entry of institutions into the arena. 
Another factor which helped in the spread of awareness stems from one of the 
recommendations of the L C Gupta committee, that broker-members and 
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dealers in derivatives must pass a certificate programme considered adequate by 
SEBI. 
A web-based on-line objective type test v^ a^s launched. The training programmes, 
coupled with the tests were highly successful. 
What also helped, were the efforts of NSE to have a close working with colleges 
and academic institutions. The result was that the student community was 
involved right from the beginning. 
Simultaneously the NSE put its efforts to strengthen the underlying market. In 
the first stage, from the traditional norm of 2 weeks, the NSE was able to bring 
the settlement period dovm to i week. This was considered remarkable at that 
time since the volumes were rising rapidly. A further push to this effort was 
provided by SEBI which decreed that all securities were to be brought under 
compulsory rolling format on all exchanges by the end of the year 2001. In the 
next step, the rolling settlement regime moved to T+3 basis from April 2002. 
Contract specifications 
The prevailing contract specifications for derivatives trading are now discussed, 
in order to assess their extrapolation to weather derivative trading. 
Index derivatives on the stock exchanges are European style, whereas stock 
options are American style. There are a minimum of 5 strike prices for which 
contracts are floated. Of these, 2 should be in-the-money, 1 at-the-money and 2 
out-of-the-money. At any point of time, only three contracts are to be specified 
- 1 month, 2 months and 3 months to expiry. These are called near month 
contract, next month contract and far month contract respectively. The 
contracts expire on the last Thursday of the expiry month, and a new contract is 
introduced on the next trading day following the expiry of the near month 
contract - so that at any time, there are always 3 contract periods available for 
trade. 
8.1.9 Volumes of trading 
The F & O business had a slow start. In the first year of trading, the average 
monthly traded value was in the region of Rs.240 crores. By June 2001, this 
figure touched Rs 800 crores. The first surge came in September 2001 when 
there was a surge in volumes in derivatives trading, the worid over. The 
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monthly traded volume in India touched Rs 5000 crores. The second big surge 
accompanied the introduction of stock futures for trading in November 2001 
when volumes touched Rs 1200 crores per day (Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.2 Business growth on the F&O segment 
Source: Narain,2003 
An analysis of the trading figures done by Narain, 2003 indicate that near 
month contracts are the most popular. Futures contracts have more volumes 
than options in most cases. In general, contract on securities are more popular 
than those on indices and call options are more popular than put options. 
8.1.10 Risk management 
The recommendations of the LC Gupta committee and the JR Varma group were 
of great help for drawing up risk management strategies at the exchanges when 
derivatives were introduced. Some of the strategies adopted are described 
below: 
1. The concept of clearing members was introduced. These were to be 
distinctly different from trading members. By segregating trading interests 
from clearing interests, relatively weak trading members now got a chance to 
participate in the market by being able to pass on some of the risk of their 
positions to the stronger clearing members. 
2. A lot of thought was given to margins. It was described that in the 
derivatives trading market, margins would be portfolio-based on a 99% VaR 
approach. Margins are collected up front. 
3. Sudden and unwanted growth of open positions was something which 
needed to be taken care of, since it could endanger the safety of the market. 
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As such, it was decided to introduce position limits at various levels. 
Position limits were specified at client level, member level and market wide. 
4. It was decided that all derivative products would be cash-settled. 
5. In the interest of small investors and to prevent them from entering the 
derivatives market without being aware of the issues involved, the minimum 
contract size for derivatives was fixed at Rs. 2 lakhs. 
6. The LC Gupta committee had recommend that cross-margining (allowing a 
member's margin with an exchange for one market to be used against the 
margin requirements of another market) should eventually be allowed 
between even spot and derivative markets. This is permitted, so far, only to 
a limited extent at exchanges. 
A few other issues, which could be relevant, include those of a lack of clarity on 
taxability of income and institutional participation. Infact both are linked to an 
extent. In view of a lack of a clarity on tax and accounting treatment, 
institutional participation in derivatives trading has not been too large. 
Especially in the case of weather derivatives, they should not be considered as 
speculative transactions and should be taxed as normal business income. In fact 
a thought needs to be given to a way of having a nil/very low tax for small 
transactions in weather derivatives for farmers. 
8.1.11 Success at NSE 
The bulk of the derivatives trading is on the NSE. Some of the reasons for this 
are as follows: 
1. the deep involvement of the NSE in creating training programmes and 
spreading awareness, their association with students and academic 
institutions and the efforts put in by the team at NSE in the years preceding 
and just after introduction of derivatives trading, led to a sort of creation of 
a brand name. 
2. the F & O screen of the NSE is more user friendly and is easier to trade on. 
3. the NIFTY is a more tradeable index. 
8.1.12 Legal frame work 
The emergence of a derivatives market will normally require legislation, which 
addresses issues regarding legality of the derivative instruments, protection of 
these contracts against anti-gambling laws, regulations, powers to monitor and 
powers to enforce the regulations (Saxena, 2003). In fact the legal framework 
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for trading in the derivatives market is a very important part of the regulatory 
framework required before introduction of derivatives trading. 
The introduction of the Securities Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1995 was the 
first step. This lifted the prohibition on options in securities. Subsequently the 
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 1998 allowed the inclusion of 
derivatives in the definition of securities in the SCRA. Thus, trading in 
derivatives was then possible under the ambit of the SCRA. 
The Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 1999, formally defines derivatives as: 
1. a security derived from a debt instrument or risk instrument, and, 
2. a contract which derives its value from the prices or index of prices of 
underlying securities. 
The Act also clarified that contracts in derivatives are legal only when traded and 
settled on a recognized stock exchange. This then disallowed Over-the-Counter 
trade in derivatives. 
Whilst the 1999 Act paved the way for trading in derivatives, the definition of 
derivatives precluded weather derivatives from being traded because they do not 
come under the formal definition of derivatives. 
8.1.13 Accounting standards 
The parliamentary committee set up to go into the Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Amendment Bill 1998, had recommended that the Institute of 
Charted Accountants of India (ICAI) should go into the issue of accounting 
standards. This was done in consultation with the stock exchanges. 
8.2 International regulation of derivatives 
The International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) is an inter-
institutional set-up comprising regulators from various countries and includes 
SEBI as a member. 
IOSCO has identified 14 non-exclusive general principles for the oversight of 
screen based trading of derivatives. These principles identify areas of common 
concern in the regulatory aspects of derivatives trading and relate to legal 
standards, regulatory policies, risk management mechanism and disclosure of 
attendant risks. 
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To see this in an overall prospective the IOSCO framework brings out 3 
objectives of regulation which are discussed below: 
a) Market Efficiency and Integrity. There must be some economic utility of 
the derivative products and these must be designed so that they address 
priorities of risk transfer and of price discovery. Market manipulation is 
given a lot of attention and is addressed though various methods of 
prevention including direct surveillance, prudent design, and position 
limits. 
b) Financial Integrity. The need to emphasize on provision of good clearing 
and settlement facilities is stressed. This is brought out as a universal 
regulatory concern. Margin requirements and levels of margin again 
need to be determined by the relevant exchange and should be 
determined with respect to volatility. 
c) Customer Protection/Fairness. Regulations need to include integrity and 
skills of the intermediaries, conduct of business including execution of 
orders, disclosure standards to ensure transparency of a high order and a 
procedure and forum for customer grievances resolution. 
8.3 Existing framework for derivatives in India 
The framework is essentially based on the report and the recommendations of 
the LC Gupta Committee and the JR Varma group. 
There is a clear emphasis on exchange level regulation with a division of 
regulatory responsibility between the exchange and SEBI. Some of the 
suggestions made by the JR Varma group for risk containment measures 
include: 
(i) calculation of margins 
(ii) position limits 
(iii) exposure limits 
(iv) reporting and disclosure 
The regulatory framework, in the Indian context, for derivatives trading is 
mostly consistent with the IOSCO principles. The points emerging from the 
regulatory framework in India (Saxena,2003) are given below: 
(i) Market efficiency and Integrity Regulations 
a) Statutory recognition for the derivatives markets. 
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b) Satisfaction of economic utility criteria and recognition of derivative 
products under law. 
c) Standard contracts design. 
d) Prevention of market manipulation through direct surveillance, position 
limits and direct regulatory oversight. 
e) Trading rules vk'hich are fair, permit an audit trail and are transparent, 
catering for quick dissemination of price and volume information. 
(ii) Financial Integrity Regulations 
a) Capital based qualifications for intermediaries 
b) Adequate clearing and payment facilities 
c) Margin requirements and oversight over levels of margins 
d) Clearing guarantee which permits multi lateral netting by novation. 
e) Maintenance and relation of financial records 
f) Contingency planning 
(iii) Customer Protection/ Fairness Regulations 
a) Fair order execution requirements 
b) Authorisation based on qualification and good standing 
c) Sales practice standards including required disclosure, prohibition on 
misrepresentation and unauthorized trading 
d) Creation and maintenance of records of transactions including executive 
confirmations and information to customers. 
8.3.1 Some examples of Derivative Contract Specifications in India 
1. S andP CNX Nifty Futures : 
• Contract size- 200 times the index, in Rupees 
• Tick size - Rs 10 
• Expiry date - last Thursday of the month 
• Active contracts - 3 nearest months 
2. BSE-30 Sensex Future: 
• Contract size - 50 times the index, in Rupees 
• Tick size - Rs 5 
• Expiry date - Last Thursday of the month 
• Active contracts - 3 nearest months 
Regulatory issues | 141 | 
8.3.2 Membership criteria at tiie exchanges 
Clearing member 
• Net worth : Rs 300 lakh 
• Interest free security deposit: Rs 25 lakhs 
• Collateral security deposit: Rs 25 lakhs 
• In addition, for each trading member he wishes to clear, the clearing 
member has to deposit Rs 10 lakh. 
The above conditions are the same, both at NSE and BSE 
Trading member 
• Net worth : Rs 100 lakh (NSE); Rs 50 lakh (BSE) 
• Interest-free security deposit: Rs 8 lakh (NSE) 
• Non refundable deposit: Rs 3 lakh (BSE) 
• Annual Fees : Rs 1 lakh (NSE); Rs 25000 (BSE) 
8.3.3 Trading system 
The trading system for derivatives at the NSE is called NEAT. It is based on the 
NEAT system for the cash segment. At the BSE, the trading system is called 
DTSS. The platform of DTSS is different from that of NEAT, but most of the 
features are common. 
8.4 Examples of regulatory approaches in India 
We look at some aspects of the banking sector to see examples of regulatory-
approaches in India. One aspect, which is highly regulated, is deposit 
mobilization. There was a time when in an unregulated regime, deposits were 
being mobilised by many agencies. This had its pitfalls and investor safety was 
difficult to come by or to ensure. Today, in India only banks and approved Non-
banking Financial Corporations are permitted to collect deposits. 
A regulatory approach to universalising financial services access is a priority 
sector obligation, which requires all commercial banks in India to advance 40% 
of their Net Bank Credit in a given year to certain defined sectors, including 
agriculture, small enterprises, micro-credit, rural infrastructure etc. {RBI, 
2007). 
The "Service Area Approach" is another aspect of banking regulation, which is 
applicable in rural India. This approach lays dovvTi geographical areas to be 
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served by designated branches only (Ananth and Mor, 2004). However, it is 
debatable whether this inhibits competition. 
8.5 Regulations for weather derivatives 
8.5.1 Weather insurance vs Weather derivatives 
For a long time now, there has been a debate on whether weather derivatives 
should be classified as insurance. There are, of course, two facets to the 
discussions, but there is a growing acceptance that weather derivatives are not 
insurance and should be construed as an altogether different product 
iO'Hearne, 2004). 
The proponents of the argument that they are essentially the same product, 
bring out the fact that besides just being a nomenclature issue, classifying 
weather derivatives as insurance would bring in some advantages. Insurance is, 
already, a well regulated area and clubbing weather derivatives as insurance 
would provide consumer protections that are commonly associated with 
insurance. Rating systems of weather derivatives would automatically become 
subject to scrutiny (NAIC, 2004). 
The opposite view is that weather derivatives are not insurance when analysed 
under insurance laws [Q'Hearne, 2004). Most legislations lay down certain 
elements which need to be fulfilled in order to call a contract 'insurance'. The 
major elements which are common in legislation across countries are: 
(i) there must be a contract between two parties. 
(ii) there must be a promise to pay if a contingent event occurs. 
(iii)there should be a payment of a premium and a transfer of a "risk of loss" 
from the insured to the insurer, 
(iv) there should be an uncertainty associated with the occurrence of the 
contingent event, 
(v) the insured must have an interest in the subject of the insurance. 
(vi)the insured must suffer a loss. 
The proponents of the opposite view also bring out the argument that in the case 
of weather derivatives, regulatory restrictions and controls by Futures Trading 
Commissions are sufficient and that regulatory benefits in Insurance are not 
required in weather derivatives {O'Hearne, 2004). 
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Pryke M., et al, 2004, bring out that it is critically important to distinguish 
between insurance (as state-regulated service contracts) and derivatives (as 
financial market transactions). By not distinguishing between weather 
derivatives and insurance, we would be inappropriately subjecting the 
derivatives to Insurance laws which were formed keeping very different 
contracts in mind. 
The National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC) in the USA, in the 
NAIC draft paper 10, issued on 2 September 2003, had indicated that weather 
derivatives could actually be construed as insurance contracts. But, realising the 
complications involved, withdrew the draft paper in February 2004. 
Most importantly, in a derivatives contract, no party has to prove a financial 
loss. The New York Insurance Department (NYID) has consistently brought out 
their view that no derivative contract is an insurance contract unless the 
payments which become due through the contract are dependant on proving an 
actual loss. 
In the case of weather derivatives in particular, while they are classified as 
financial derivatives, they do have terms and conditions and a logic very akin to 
that in insurance contracts. One major factor is that there is very little, if any, 
speculation on weather markets. As weather derivatives are very illiquid, the 
standard "risk-neutral' point of view is not applicable to valuate them (Barrieu 
and Karoui, 2002) 
Because of the debates and the various opinions arising, the way the contract is 
documented becomes very important in the case of weather derivatives, so that 
possible overlaps are avoided. 
8.5.2 Benefits of regulation in the weather derivatives. 
An EU directive on financial instruments markets, the ISD-2 (Investment 
Services Directive -2) brings weather derivatives into the ambit of the regulator}' 
framework which exists for all other derivatives (Ananth andMor, 2004). 
The ISD-2 includes exemptions which apply to firms which trade in weather 
derivatives only for their own account and do not act as market makers and 
whose weather derivative business is only ancillary to their main business. 
Ultimately, the aim of the ISD-2 is to help end-users of weather derivatives. 
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It has been recognised by most users of weather derivatives {Bates, 2004) that 
the two obvious benefits of a regulatory framework for them would be: 
(i) barriers to cross-border business in weather derivatives can be overcome 
easily 
(ii) it would make sure that these instruments do not get inappropriately 
treated as insurance contracts and get subjected to insurance regulation. 
8.5.3 Regulatory initiatives required for weatiier derivatives 
As for any other derivatives, for the introduction of weather derivatives 
trading in India, there is a need for a regulatory framework. However, the 
aim needs to be to form broad, overall regulations. If the regulatory 
framework is too prescriptive and too narrow, it could curb the development 
of the weather derivative market, which is already late in India, as compared 
to the USA or Europe. 
Issues which arise with respect to weather derivative are: 
(i) An advantage is that the market for other commodities in India has 
taken off fairly well in the recent past and so lessons learnt from the 
regulatory framework adopted for commodities trading can be 
extended, with exceptions and modifications, to weather derivatives 
trading. 
(ii) Developed markets abroad have vibrant exchange traded markets as 
well as OTC markets in parallel (Gupta, 1997). The former cater for 
players who prefer standardized products with counterparty risk 
being taken care of, while the latter cater for those who are content 
with a higher counter party risk, but who prefer customized hedging 
solutions. Weather Derivatives regulations must cater for both these 
markets in parallel. 
(iii) FII investments in weather derivatives have both advantages and 
disadvantages. The major advantage would be an increase in the 
depth of the markets. 
(iv) The necessity of conducting research and disseminating education on 
and awareness of weather derivatives needs to be built into the 
regulatory framework of weather derivatives. 
(v) Easy and ready availability of economically accessible weather data 
would play a key role in the growth of the weather derivatives market 
in general (Stern and Dawkins, 2004). 
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(vi) Again, the degree of accuracy of weather data will play a key role in 
farmers and other players identifying and managing weather risks. 
(vii) A system of integrating weather forecasts into trading of weather 
derivatives would have to be developed. This would require an 
upgradation of the accuracy of weather forecasts in India. 
If seasonal forecasts display skill, the 'fair value' price of a weather 
derivative option would vary, depending on the seasonal forecast 
{Stern and Dawkins, 2004).This is a principle, which would be of 
importance to hedgers, seeking to hedge weather risk. 
(viii) Going along with this, would be the regulatory issue of dissemination 
on a real-time basis, of weather forecasts on an equal basis to all 
players in the weather derivative markets, including farmers in rural 
areas. 
(ix) Being a new, and not easily understood product, the introduction of a 
weather derivatives market will simultaneously see the growth of 
advisors. These would especially, come up to assist companies in, 
first of all, identifying a company's weather risk, quantifying it in 
terms of how much of a change in weather (temperature/rainfall) 
would affect bottomlines, designing protection in terms of proposing 
a hedge and finally even assisting in placing the hedging transaction. 
Of regulatory importance is the issue that such advisors should be 
barred from taking positions in weather derivatives, so that an 
objectivity in the advice given, is maintained. 
(x) To be able to benefit from the experiences of the commodity 
derivatives exchanges in the last 3 years, it would be prudent that a 
new derivative, like weather derivatives, should be introduced in 
existing exchanges and not in a separate exchange. 
(xi) It would be crucial to have an appropriate regulatory and legal 
environment for weather derivatives so that this aspect of the 
derivatives exchange can develop in a healthy manner. If not, this 
could lead to friction between market sectors (banking, derivatives, 
securities) over the prerogative of regulation. An inappropriate 
regulatory and legal environment could also lead to scandals, 
corruption, uncertainly about equality in the application of 
regulations, and market failure. 
(xii) Policies and regulations will need to be in place with respect to 
trading in weather derivatives in foreign derivative exchanges. By 
allowing trading in these products between local and foreign 
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exchanges, it would help in increasing liquidity by providing 
arbitrage opportunities. More importantly, this would also allow 
better portfolio management through transfer of risk between 
countries. 
(xiii) A large amount of government subsidies have been and are being 
channelled into crop insurance schemes. These could be re-
channeled into building up infrastructure for a large number of 
reliable weather stations and a communication system linking these 
to a central data base, which is then available as a Public Sector 
Information. Structuring and marketing of weather derivatives could 
then be left to private players. 
A case in point is the Japanese experience. In 2004, CME 
introduced temperature based contracts in Japan. It was found that 
most contracts were small end-user deals, unlike in the USA and 
Europe, where most weather derivatives deals are with big energy 
companies (Lyon, 2004). Part of the reason of the active embracing 
of the weather risk market by end-users in Japan, unlike in the USA 
and Europe, is that Japan has more high quality weather stations and 
exceptional quality meteorological data, when compared to the rest 
of the world {Jeivson, 2004). This reduces basis risk. 
(xiv) Experience in the commodities derivatives market shows that during 
the pre-take offstage, there is a trade off between regulation and 
development (Kolamkar, 2002). Taking a cue from this, it would be 
prudent to have a 'bare minimum' approach to regulation in the 
weather derivative market, until it develops. 
8.5.4 Legal issues which arise for weather derivatives 
The FCRA, 1952, the SCRA and the Indian Contract Act (ICA) and the various 
amendments to these Acts, determine the legal environment for weather 
derivatives. It needs to be borne in mind that these laws were designed and 
introduced without derivatives regulation in mind {Gupta, 1997). At the same 
time, these laws have been time tested, and need only amendments and some 
fine tuning for adoption to the weather derivatives market. 
Some legal issues which arise are: 
(i) The FCRA 1952 envisages a 3-tier regulatory system for commodities 
future trading. These are: (a) the association itself (self regulation), (b) 
the FMC and (c) the central government. 
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The same procedure could be adopted for weather derivatives 
trading, with a clause mandating a separation of weather derivatives 
from other derivatives, for the purposes of rules and regulations, at the 
iirst level itself. The third level role, i.e. that of the government, should 
be limited to firstly, an oversight (or a disciplining) role and secondly, an 
enabling role (through providing the regulatory frame work). 
(ii) Section 20 and Section 16 of the SCRA refer to "options in securities" and 
"contracts in securities". A notification would be required to the effect 
that weather derivatives are securities. 
(iii) Weather data collection and the security of the processes of data 
collection would come under the legal ambit and would call for 
regulatory directives. Also in the same ambit, would be the quality 
control of the weather recording equipment and of the data collected. 
(iv) Practices in most countries do not permit employees of observing weather 
stations to trade in weather contracts. 
(v) There will have to be an equal access to weather products and services to 
all players so that there is a level playing field. 
(vi) Weather forecasts will play a role in the prices of weather derivatives. As 
such, weather forecast verification would also come under the legal 
ambit. Those involved in issuing weather forecasts would also need to be 
barred from trading in weather contracts. 
(vii) Bankruptcy and insolvency laws would need to be prescribed so that the 
right of weather derivative product holders are protected in the event of 
insolvency or winding-up of intermediaries. 
(viii) Disclosure laws would be needed for firms involved in trading of weather 
derivatives. The laws would need to bring in mandatory disclosures for 
business risk, systematic risk, operational risk etc. as also a firm's 
performance in being able to manage these risks. This would ensure 
enhanced transparency. 
(ix) Regulatory intervention by the government, at the third level of the 3-tier 
regulatory system for weather derivatives, should be highly active only at 
the initial phases of the establishment of the market. Beyond this, it 
should be persuasive in creating the culture of self-regulation in the 
exchange and among the participants. 
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8.5.5 Tax issues which arise for weather derivatives. 
(i) In taking decisions about various aspects of weather derivatives 
taxation, the interests of hedgers will have to be balanced against 
those of speculators. 
(ii) Tax treatment of weather derivatives expenses and income would 
need to be considered. 
(iii) Tax treatment for FIIs investment in weather derivatives would need 
to be considered and made clear, so as to facilitate it. 
(iv) In view of the practical difficulties which would arise in the 
administration of tax in the case of weather derivative products, 
especially since the aim is to target small and marginal farmers for 
hedging their weather risks, a special tax treatment would need to be 
bestowed on weather derivative trades. This would also help in 
promoting weather derivatives and in providing a level playing field 
to hedgers and speculators. 
It would be prudent to keep weather derivative contracts out of the 
purview of speculative transactions and, instead, tax them as normal 
business gains or capital gains. This could be done along with a 
specified threshold below which there would be no capital gain tax, 
so as to benefit small and marginal farmers. 
8.5.6 Structuring issues which arise for weather derivatives 
The Forward Markets Commission (FMC) is the regulator of the commodities 
derivatives market. It is only logical that the same body should have regulatory 
rights over the weather derivatives markets. However, FMC regulation should be 
at the 'broad' issue levels e.g. assessing risk management at the clearing house, 
acting as an arbitrator, education and awareness generation and marketing to 
the public. Micro issues should be through the process of self-governance at the 
exchange level. 
Some structuring issues which arise are: 
(i) Requirements for contracts documentation. 
(ii) Capital adequacy norms for intermediaries 
(iii) Standards for brokers, including qualification criterion etc. 
(iv) Periodic reporting requirements for players/intermediaries 
(v) Accounting and disclosure standards. 
(vi) As weather derivatives are introduced into the market, they will 
necessarily have to be priced on a 'mark-to-model' basis. However, as 
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liquidity increases, a 'mark-to-market' system will have to develop, so 
as to build up investor confidence. 
(vii) Contract designs - these would include available maturities for 
weather derivative contracts. As for other commodities, the exchange 
should obtain permission from the FMC for every new contract it 
trades. 
(viii) Trading mechanisms - timing of the exchange for trading, price 
limits (up or down); need for very transparent mechanism to 
disseminate prices. 
(ix) Clearing - similar as for other derivatives; the exchange would have a 
clearing house which records transactions including the size and the 
priceof the trade. 
(x) Settlement - obviously weather derivative contracts would need to be 
cash settled since there would be no delivery in the contracts - this is 
a major departure from other commodity contracts. 
(xi) Governance at the exchange. Governance of exchanges has been an 
issue of debate in India and across the world. The issues are 
essentially the same whether in a developed market or an emerging 
market. There is strong support, especially in the scenario of self-
regulation at the exchange level, for the exchanges to be 
demutualised and being run by a professional management team. 
The major advantage is the dissociation from the traditional form of 
exchange being both managed and operated by the same people who 
also intermediate between investors and the financial instrument. 
There have been many cases of abuse of power in the traditional 
system {Thomas, 2002). 
(xii) Information collection & dissemination - on Bid and Ask prices of 
traded contracts. 
(xiii) Transaction costs - the fee for the exchange, the fee for brokerage 
etc. would need to be decided. 
(xiv) We need to keep in mind that financial markets will always be more 
liquid than agricultural markets {Tsetsekos and Varangis, 2000). 
8.5.7 Other issues 
(i) As there is a build-up of the availability of high quality 
meteorological data and weather forecasts, there will have to be 
directives for the re-use and sale of information generated by the 
public sector. These would include equitable availability of 
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information, clarity and transparency in conditions for as well as 
charges for re-use of information, methods for fixing of charges as 
well as upper limits for these charges etc. 
(ii) In most exchanges, worldwide, the regulatory structures are 
prescribed and exercised through the authority of the government, 
usually under parliamentary laws {Tsetsekos and Varangis, 2000). 
The same could be followed for weather derivatives in the Indian 
context. 
(iii) The Regulatory scope, while being defined, should include a 
reference to geological variables, which might later come into the 
ambit of innovative weather derivative products. As an example, 
volume of river flow might be a derivative product in future. 
(iv) Since options contracts offer better flexibility in risk management 
(Thomas, 2002), it would be prudent to consolidate the market with 
options on weather parameters, initially, and go in for other 
structures, eg. futures in weather parameters, at a later date. 
(v) A survey would be the best method of determining the kind of 
weather derivative contracts required. However, a-priori, a large 
number of contracts with various underlying indices and expiry 
periods, will be useful. 
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9.1 Introduction 
Weather Derivatives could be structured as swaps, call options or put options 
based on a particular weather index. The structure of the derivatives could be 
innovatively designed to manage weather-related risks of various kinds. The 
market would consist of not only farmers, but a large number of players whose 
businesses are affected in some form or the other by the vagaries of weather. 
Insurance and reinsurance companies would also be market players. 
While the scope of weather derivatives is enormous, there are the accompanying 
challenges of valuing and pricing the derivatives to not only be financially viable 
instruments, but also be instruments with appeal to the financially weaker 
sections of society, viz. the farmers. 
Whilst the methods of valuing equity options are fairly well defined, this is not 
so in the case of weather derivatives. The major reason is that, unlike as in 
equity options, we cannot assign a monetary value to the underlying ie. the 
weather, in the case of weather derivatives. Thus a no-arbitrage option pricing 
model such as the Black-Scholes model {Black and Scholes, 1973) is not a 
practical pricing tool for weather derivatives. 
In the case of weather derivatives, two methods of valuation can be perceived. 
The first is to determine the value based on the probabilities of possible 
outcomes. This is called actuarial pricing. The second is to use market price as 
the value. Obviously the second method would only be possible if an observable 
market for weather options exists. This not being the case in India at present, 
weather options pricing based on actuarial techniques is probably the way 
forward. 
An interesting observation made by Jewson and Brix (2005) relates to the 
applicability of the Capital Asset Pricing Model {Sharpe, 1964) to weather 
derivatives. CAPM states that the excess return from an investment, over a risk-
free rate is proportional to the relationship between the performance of the 
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instrument and the performance of some wider market. So investments with a 
higher correlation with the wider market would have a higher return, whilst 
those with low correlations would have a return which would be closer to the 
risk-free rate. According to the CAPM then, we cannot have instruments which 
have a low correlation with the wider market, and at the same time have a high 
return above the risk-free rate. 
As can easily be comprehended, there would be very little correlation between 
the weather and the financial markets. Thus, according to the CAPM, the low 
correlation should imply that the returns from weather derivatives should 
actually be close to the risk-free rate. However, Jewson and Brix (2005) point 
out that, in-fact, the CAPM does not apply very well in the weather market 
mainly because weather derivatives are not considered as an investment class by 
most investors, and so the lower demand results in a lower valuation than the 
low correlation and the CAPM may suggest. Also those organisations which 
invest in weather derivatives expect them to yield a decent return above the risk-
free rate, inspite of the low correlation with other assets. 
Thus weather derivatives could be an investment with a low correlation with the 
wider market, but with a higher than expected return. 
9.2 The contracts 
Weather derivatives would generally be of three types: 
(i) Swaps 
(ii) Futures 
(iii) Call/Put options 
Commonly used indices could be based on temperature, rainfall, snowfall etc. 
For the purpose of this thesis, we will consider weather derivatives in the form of 
call/put options because these are the types of contracts that we would expect 
small farmers to be interested in. Also, we will consider indices based on rainfall. 
In the absence of a market in the Indian context, we will be discussing a 
hypothetical market, and how a contract could be structured when weather 
derivative trading is introduced. 
We define a rainfall index future as an agreement to buy or sell the value of the 
index at a pre-defined date in the future. A rainfall call option would be a 
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contract where the owner has the right G u^t not the obHgation) to buy a futures 
contract at a price which is correlated to a pre-specified 'strike' on the index. 
Similarly, a put option would be a contract where the owner has the right (but 
not an obligation) to sell a futures contract at a price which is correlated to the 
'strike' on the index. 
The buyer of a put option, for example, pays the seller a premium upfront ie. at 
the beginning of the contract. In the situation that the actual rainfall at the end 
of the contract is less than the strike value of the index, the option would be in-
the-money and the buyer of the option may want to exercise the option. 
In the contract, we would also specify a 'tick size', which would be the amount of 
money in rupees that the holder of a put option receives for every millimetre 
that the actual rainfall is below the strike level, in the period specified in the 
contract. 
If K denotes the strike level (on the index), x the amount of actual rainfall (the 
index), t the tick size and n the period, then the payout of a put option would 
be: 
We would also assume that the options are European style, which means that 
they can only be exercised on the date of expiration of the contract period. 
The gain or loss which would accrue to someone who is long on a put option, is 
depicted in fig 9.1. 
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Figure 9.1 Gain/loss from a put option 
9.3 Pricing 
One of the main reasons for the upsurge in volumes in the financial derivatives 
market in the 1980s v^as the general acceptance of the Black-Scholes model for 
pricing of options. Such a common model is still not in place in the case of 
weather derivatives, which has an acceptance across all prospective players. 
This highlights the need for a simple method for pricing weather derivatives, so 
that it can be universally applied and is transparent enough for the players in the 
market to comprehend it. 
9.3.1 Actuarial techniques 
The conventional actuarial technique is a purely statistical approach where 
historical records of the rainfall are used as a source for calculation of the payout 
Pn . To this is added the administrative costs or overheads, in order to 
determine the fair value of the option premium. 
Bum Analysis. This is a simple method, where the pricing of the option is 
based on an analysis of how a contract would have performed in hypothetical 
markets in the past. In this case, the historical settlement values are directly 
converted into payouts. These historical payouts are then used to find the mean 
and the standard deviation of the payouts. 
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Index modelling. On the other hand, index modeHing involves the fitting of a 
distribution to the historical index values. This allows the model to include 
outcomes which might not have actually occurred in the past. The steps which 
would be followed would typically be: 
(i) Obtain historical data of the weather parameter being considered, 
preferably on a daily basis, 
(ii) Clean the data and aggregate it year-wise for the periods of the 
proposed contract, 
(iii) Fit a statistical distribution to the historical values, 
(iv) Do a monte-carlo simulation from the distribution 
(v) Convert each simulated figure of the aggregate value of the weather 
parameter into a simulated payout, 
(vi) Determine the mean and the standard deviation of the simulated 
payouts, 
(vii) Add a percentage of the mean payout value to cover administrative 
and other costs, in order to determine the fair price of the option 
We can thus determine the price of a weather derivative through simple 
statistical analysis of historical weather data. 
Ofcourse, this method does not take into account any market consideration 
whatsoever. 
A short discussion of literature in respect of weather derivatives pricing is given 
below. 
Hamisultane (2006b) has pointed out that since there now exist a fair number 
of market contracts in weather derivatives, taking these into consideration 
would improve the prediction pricing of weather derivatives. 
Cao and Wei (2004), while discussing temperature- index related weather 
derivatives, find that temperature is significantly correlated with energy 
consumption and that the market price of weather risk is significantly different 
from zero. They suggest the use of a consumption based asset pricing model to 
price weather derivatives. 
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Richards et al. (2004) use a model where a utility function, which depends on a 
stochastic consumption, is maximised for individuals. 
Hamisultane (2006a) has estimated a relative risk aversion coefficient and used 
it in the above model. 
Yang et al. (2003) adopt the indifference pricing approach to price weather 
derivatives considering the marginal changes they cause to the investor's asset 
portfolio. Through simulations, they illustrate the portfolio effects on pricing of 
weather derivatives. 
9.4 Pricing a put option on rainfall atJhalawar 
We consider data from the point of view of farmers growing Soyabean in district 
Jhalawar in the state of Rajasthan. 
Soyabean is grown in the Kharif season, usually sown in the month of June. It 
has a germination stage of about three weeks, a vegetative growth stage of about 
twelve weeks and a grain formation/maturity phase of about four weeks. The 
crop is usually harvested in end October/November. 
Data for soyabean yield in Jhalawar district was obtained from the Directorate 
of Economics and Statistics, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Whilst data was 
obtained for a period of 23 years, ie from 1982 to 2004, an obviously discernible 
change in the yield pattern was noticeable in the periods prior to 1990 and post 
1990. This is attributable to the use of a shorter duration, high yield variety from 
1989-90 onwards {Deosthali et al., 2005). Based on this, it was decided to use 
the yield data from 1990 onwards. 
Data for rainfall was purchased from the India Meteorological Department. 
Daily rainfall data for Jhalawar was obtained for the period 1990 to 2004. 
However, there were gaps in the data and a fair amount of cleaning was resorted 
to. Daily rainfall data for the 15 years was then aggregated, in order to obtain the 
rainfall in the period 16 June to 15 October in each year. 
Yield data was regressed against rainfall data for the 15 year period and a second 
order polynomial was fitted. Leaving out outliers, another regression was done 
with the remaining data. The result is shown in Fig 9.2. 
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Figure 9.2 Regression data: Yield and rainfall 1990-2004 
The Minimum Support Price announced each year by the government is 
assumed to be the price which a farmer can obtain for his produce. The MSP 
announced for each of the years being considered in the data set was inflated to 
2004 levels. 
We now take the case of a farmer with one hectare of land on which he has 
grown soyabean and who wishes to buy put options on rainfall in order to hedge 
his yield risk. We also initially assume that he is willing to pay 8.896 of the 
maximum payout as premium for the option. This is the figure established 
through the willingness to pay analysis of the survey data obtained from villages 
in Jhalawar and Tonk districts as indicated in Chapter 7. We also assume that 
the average yield of soyabean in district Jhalawar is what the farmer obtains 
from his land under cultivation. 
Based on past data, we can see that the average rainfall at Jhalawar in the period 
16 June to 15 October was 870.18 mm, with the highest rainfall in this period 
being 1098.6 mm in 1993 and the lowest being 572 mm in the year 2002. We 
also note that the farmer would have had a mean yield of 0.99 tonnes of 
soyabean from his land over the 12 years being considered, with the highest 
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yield being 1,39 tonnes in the year 2004, and the lowest being 0.50 tonnes in the 
year 2002. 
The correlation between the rainfall and the yield is seen to be 0.71. 
Using the values of MSP, inflated to 2004, the farmer would have received a 
mean sale income of Rs 922.33 , with the highest being Rs 1289.69 in 2004 and 
the lowest being Rs 472.03 in the year 2002. The average devaation of the sale 
income of the farmer in the period under consideration is 235.66. 
We now consider a hypothetical situation vAth the availability of rainfall options 
on an index which is the aggregate rainfall in the period 16 June to 15 October, 
and where the farmer has been long in one put option every year in the past. 
The premium which could be charged from the farmer can be calculated from: 
P = WTP X (K-o) X t 
where P = premium 
WTP= farmer's willingness to pay 
t = tick size 
K = strike value 
We take K=870.i8, which is the mean of the rainfall in each year. The tick size 
would need to be specified in the contract. Varying the tick size would not only 
vary the premium, but would also vary the net income of the farmer in two ways: 
first because of a variation in the income from the exercise of the option (when it 
is in-the-money) and second because of the variation in the premium itself, 
which the farmer pays up-front. 
The fair price of the option would be the mean of the payout against the sale of 
the option in the period considered. In our method of determining the price of 
the option, we do a sensitivity analysis on the variation of the tick size, and 
determine a tick size which gives us the maximum reduction in the average 
deviation of the farmer's income. In other words, we are striving for a situation 
where the intention is to steady the farmer's income to the largest extent 
possible by hedging the weather risk to his crop yield. 
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With this social welfare target in mind, we will tiy to see whether the amount of 
premium determined through using the willingness to pay figures, determined 
through our survey in Jhalawar, would make the put option financially viable 
from the point of view of the seller of the option. 
Payout from a put option on the rainfall index is taken as : 
OPTNINC = t . Max (o , K-x) 
Where x = actual rainfall 
t = tick size 
Through a sensitivity analysis, the ideal value of the tick size is determined to be 
Rs 2.40 (shown in Fig 9.3). This implies that the put option, when exercised, 
would receive a payout of Rs 2.40 for every mm that the actual aggregate rainfall 
in the period 16 June to 15 October is less than the strike value (which we take 
as the mean value of the rainfall in the 12 year period). Accordingly, the 
maximum premium which the farmer would be willing to pay is determined to 
be Rs 183.70 . This is for a maximum possible payout of Rs 2088.43. 
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Figure 9.3 Sensitivity analysis on tick size 
With the above contract specifications, the incomes of a farmer at Jhalawar, 
growing soyabean on one hectare of land, in the 12 years being considered in the 
past, without hedging, and with hedging through being long on one put option, 
are indicated in fig 9.4. Also indicated on the same graph are the gain/loss in 
each of the years which the farmer would have had. 
Pricing; options on rainfall 160 
a: 400.00 
200.00 
0.00 
-200.00 
-400.00 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
- Income without Option 
- income with option 
Gain/Loss by going-in for Optron 
Year 
Figure 9.4 Income of the farmer with and without hedging 
9.4.1 Monte-Carlo simulation 
We now proceed to see if an option with this structure would he financially 
viable for the seller of a put option. 
Since the amount of data available (12 years) is small, a monte-carlo simulation 
was done to generate values for the payout from the option with random values 
for the actual rainfall. This was done on EXCEL, using the RISKSIM add-in. A 
total of 500 simulations were done. 
The rainfall data is assumed to be normally distributed. To corroborate this 
assumption, the best-fitted probability density function (pdf) model was 
identified using the goodness-of-fit criteria through MINITAB. In all 7 different 
parametric pdfs were fitted. The estimated p-values for different models for the 
rainfall data is provided in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 Different probability models with p-valuesforthe rainfall data (the best fit model 
has been shown in bold) 
Distribution 
Normal 
Lognormal 
Exponential 
Gamma 
Weibull 
Logistic 
Loglogistic 
p-value 
0.867 
0.616 
< 0.003 
>0.25 
>0.25 
>0.25 
>0.25 
The mean value of the payout to the put option over 500 simulations was 
determined to be Rs 161.07 when the strike value is fixed as the mean of the 
rainfall in the 12 years considered. 
This implies that the seller of the option has a surplus of 14.05% over the mean 
payout, if he collects a premium of 8.896, which is the maximum willingness- to-
pay indicated by the farmers in Jhalawar for hedging weather risks to yield. This 
amount is likely to be adequate to cover administrative and other costs. 
If the strike is taken as 95% of the mean, then the mean value of the payout to 
the put option over 500 simulations is Rs 153.64, giving a larger surplus to the 
seller of the option. 
The results of the simulations are given in Appendix III to this thesis. 
The figures derived indicate the feasibility of introducing weather derivatives as 
an investment option for small farmers to hedge the weather related yield risk 
which they face. 
Summary, conclusions and limitations of 
the study 
10.1 Summary and conclusions 
The agricultural sector occupies a key position in the Indian economy. About 
65% of the working population of the country is employed in this sector. 
However, incomes are dependant, to a fair extent, on the success of the 
monsoons. In such a situation, weather risk mitigation measures become 
imperative. 
Weather derivatives are a form of weather-related risk hedging, with all the 
benefits of crop insurance and with added advantages. In India, there has been a 
prolonged debate on the introduction of these instruments, not only for farmers, 
but also for other stakeholders. A few regulatory hurdles remain, but weather 
derivatives, as financial instruments, are likely to be permitted in the ver>' near 
future. 
This thesis looks at the opportunities and the challenges that will be thrown up 
as we adopt this newer form of risk management of crop yield, in the country. 
A summary of the important findings in the thesis are enumerated below: 
1. An empirical estimation of the willingness-to-pay by farmers growing 
soyabean in the Jhalawar district of Rajasthan, based on a theoretical 
model, yields a figure of 5.5% of the average MSP for soyabean. 
2. Basis risk is an important consideration in weather derivatives. Based on 
a study of rainfall patterns at two weather stations, located close to each 
other, it was concluded that for short-term rainfall-index based weather 
derivative contracts, the location of the weather station assumes 
significance. For longer term contracts, the use of proxy weather stations 
could be justified to a n extent. 
3. 98% of farmers go through mental stress, worrying about the affect of 
abnormal rainfall on their crops. 
4. Awareness levels of existing crop insurance schemes are low. 
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5. The proposed weather derivatives schemes were received enthusiastically 
by the farmers; 92% farmers feel that weather derivative schemes would 
help them in mitigating weather-related risks. 
6. A very large proportion of farmers prefer to go in for weather derivative 
schemes offered by the government 
7. Willingness-to-pay for weather derivatives is determined to be 
approximately 8.8% of the maximum payout of the weather derivative 
contract. 
8. Especially in the initial stages of introduction of weather derivatives in 
India, pricing of weather derivatives needs to be done through actuarial 
techniques, keeping in mind the social welfare aspect of stabilising the 
farmers' income against the vagaries of weather. 
9. Some initiatives required while introducing weather derivatives are listed 
below: 
(i) Infrastructure. One of the important requirements for the 
spread of weather derivatives in India would be the availability 
and reliability of weather data. In order to minimize basis risk, 
and to increase investor confidence, there would be a need for 
real-time availability of village-level weather data. Whilst it 
might not be so important for temperature based derivatives, 
rainfall derivative contracts would only be successful if village-
level rainfall data is made available real-time and in a reliable 
form. Even while we have argued for a larger entry of private 
players in the weather derivatives market, it would be too much 
of an investment for any one provider. Infrastructure, in the 
form of computerized mini-weather stations at village level, will 
need to come up in the form of public goods, providing real-time 
weather data. The government could play a major role in this and 
one suggestion is to divert the money going into subsidies for 
crop insurance schemes to providing weather station 
infrastructure and letting private players come up with innovative 
weather derivative products. 
(ii) Payment facilities. With the spread of ICT kiosks at the village 
level, farmers could be encouraged to trade in weather derivatives 
and make payments/receive money through the internet. This 
would require a fair amount of awareness generation and 
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training, but it could considerably lower transaction costs of the 
weather derivatives. 
(iii) Pilots. The regulatory agency for weather derivatives would 
need to encourage providers to carry out a large number of pilot 
projects in weather derivative products in order to understand 
the needs, to assess the kinds of products structuring required 
and to address the challenges. 
(iv) Pricing. There are two issues in pricing. Firstly, the market 
makers, or the agencies which decide to, as an example, be short 
in put options on rainfall, would need to be convinced that the 
pricing of the options is such that their risk is either covered, or 
can be reinsured in some other market. Secondly, the pricing has 
to be such that it is v«thin the amount that buyers of the put 
option, say farmers, are veiling to pay. 
(v) Experimentation. The regulatory and policy environment 
should be such that experimentation in innovative products is not 
discouraged. 
(vi) Dissemination. Results and recommendations from academic 
studies and learning's from pilot projects would need to be 
actively disseminated. This could be done through stakeholder 
workshops. 
(vii) Government role. The government would need to move away 
from an "intervention" role, (for example government 
intervention takes place through subsidizing crop insurance), to 
that of a "facilitator" for weather derivatives. Similarly, subsidies 
provided by the government would need to be re-channeled. 
Directly subsidizing financial services would discourage 
innovations by providers, in product designs and pilot testing. As 
an example, the various crop insurance products subsidized by 
the Central/State government have dissuaded private players 
from participating by coming up with their own products. 
(viii) Information sharing. Credit information sharing between 
various players could help in reducing risks and costs. This aspect 
needs to be studied further for implementation. 
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10.2 Limitations of the Study 
Whilst in developed countries, people have realised that they can no longer 
blame lov^ profits on the weather, this realisation has not come about in 
developing countries. The large market foreseen for weather derivatives in India 
is in the agriculture sector. However, a significant number of farmers are either 
illiterate or unaware of possibilities of weather risk hedging. Issues surrounding 
the provision of a hedge against weather could be complex in the face of 
heterogeneity of opinion on the efficacy of a scheme like weather derivatives 
trading. A lack of awareness of the possible benefits of such instruments, itself, 
might influence the willingness of a farmer to opt for them. Although a very 
serious attempt was made to educate the farmers on weather derivatives, prior 
to their answering the questionnaire, this might not be adequate to give them a 
comprehensive understanding. 
As such, a study of willingness to invest might be affected by factors other than 
socio-economic factors. 
Weather derivative products are significantly linked with meteorological data. 
The availability of or the need for a very large number of weather stations might 
affect the growth of the market. Regulatory issues would therefore be guided, to 
an extent, by infrastructure constraints. 
As such. Regulatory and Policy recommendations suggested would have 
considerably large monetary and fiscal implications, which would have to be 
borne in mind. 
A fairly limited amount of work has been done in pricing of weather derivatives. 
The selection of a relevant index, itself, would be governed by a plethora of 
factors. Some of the work done in the area is considered proprietary and so 
details of these are not available. 
The Contingent Valuation study may have the following limitations: 
i. The answers to the valuation questions may actually bring out 
feelings that the farmer may have on the issue at hand, rather 
than his actual willingness to pay. 
ii. There may be a fundamental difference in the manner in 
which the respondent makes a hypothetical decision as 
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compared to an actual decision which he may need to take 
later, when weather derivatives are actually introduced, 
iii. Respondents might not have taken the willingness to pay 
questions seriously, since they do not have to pay the stated 
amount, 
iv. The starting bid may have had an effect on the respondents' 
answers 
v. Respondents might have given strategic answers ie. they may 
have answered in a way which they feel might influence the 
outcome of the study to their benefit. 
10.3 Scope for Further Research 
With Weather Derivatives being in their nascent stage, the scope for further 
research is enormous. An attempt is made to detail out some of the areas in 
which future research can be done, but this list is by no means exhaustive. 
i. The ideal situation, and one in which the scope of cost reduction 
would be maximum, would be where weather derivatives are in 
demand not only by farmers, but also by different businesses. As 
brought out in the introduction to this thesis, a large number of 
businesses would have their revenues affected by weather, and 
weather derivatives would be a source of hedging for them. Similar 
research, bringing out the demand, the willingness-to-pay, and the 
valuation of weather derivative products for different businesses 
would help in determining the structure of products which would be 
in demand across businesses. 
ii. One of the findings of this research is that a sizeable number of 
farmers would be interested in weather derivatives based on a 
composite index of rainfall and temperature. Future research could 
focus on building a composite index. Such an index would possibly be 
most relevant in tropical conditions. 
iii. As suggested in this thesis, government subsidies to crop insurance 
schemes could be diverted to building-up the infrastructure required 
for up-scaling the access and quality of weather derivatives. One of 
the first requirements, in order to reduce basis risk in these products, 
would be to have a large network of reliable weather stations capable 
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of recording basic weather parameters. Future research could go into 
the geographical requirements and the costs of setting these up. 
iv. Research could be done on the effect of meteorological forecasts on 
weather derivative prices. Would farmers, for example, be willing to 
buy weather derivatives, as a hedge against low rainfall, at a higher 
price if the meteorological forecasts predict a lower than normal 
rainfall? However, this research would be meaningful only when 
market data for weather derivative trades are available. 
V. From a speculator's point of view, individual weather derivative 
contracts will be fairly risky propositions. However, research could be 
done on the amount that his risk can be reduced by holding a 
portfolio with diversified weather contracts in different locations, or 
by holding a portfolio consisting of weather contracts along with, say, 
correlated energy/electricity contracts. 
vi. Again, once market data for weather derivative trades is available, 
research can be done into possible correlations between weather 
derivative contracts and commodity futures prices. Infact, there 
could be the possibility of use of weather derivatives to improve the 
efficiency of forward markets for foodgrain commodities. 
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Hedging Rainfall Risk by Farmers 
Growing Soyabean in Jhalawar District: 
A Theoretical Analysis of Willingness to Pay 
Rajiv Seth 
Valeed A. Ansari 
Manipadma Datta 
Rainfall risk to the yield of a crop can be hedged, to an extent, by the use of weather 
derivatives. The paper considers a theoretical model which maximises the expected utility 
of a farmer growing a crop, with respect to planned production. An option to hedge the 
weather risk to yield, through purchase of weather derivatives, is introduced. The case of 
farmers growing soyabean in Jhalawar district ofRajasthan in central India is taken as 
an example in order to determine the theoretical willingness to pay to hedge volumetric 
risk to yield. 
Keywords; Crop Yield Risk, Weather Derivatives, Willingness to Pay 
JEL Classification: Q14 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In India, about 78 per cent of farmers are small and marginal, and are mostly 
poor (Agrawal 2000). Apart from not being in a position to use the right inputs 
for the crops they grow, they are largely dependent on rainfall. Most crops are 
highly dependent on the vagaries of the monsoons. If rainfall is less than normal 
in a particular year, yield is very low because of the lack of water; if rainfall is 
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very high, particularly during blossoming, there is poor grain setting and the 
matured grains germinate on the panicles. 
In this context, the development of financial instruments in the form of 
weather derivatives could help farmers hedge part of the volumetric risk in yield. 
Weather derivatives are a fairly new concept in India, but they offer a means to 
manage exposure to unpredictabilities in rainfall. 
Oilseed crops occupy about 10 per cent of the total cultivated area and con-
tribute approximately 10 per cent to the production of food crops in India 
(Deosthali et al. 2005). Noticeable efforts have been made to increase the yield 
of soyabean over the years, with the result that it has increased by 490 per cent 
between 1983 and 2004. The real increase in area under soyabean cultivation 
came about in 1989-90 with the use of short-duration, high-yield varieties. 
Despite this, the average yield of Indian soyabean, at 1.074 tonnes/ha, is still 
far lower than the world average of 1.8 tonnes/ha and the Asian average of 1.3 
tonnes/ha fDeosthali et al. 2005j. 
Soyabean is a legume crop, yet it is used widely as an oilseed and, in fact, is 
now the second largest oilseed in India after groundnut. It grows well in warm 
temperatures and requires fair-to-heavy rainfall during its growth cycle. It is a 
highly nutritive crop and can supply much needed protein to the human diet, 
as it contains approximately 43 per cent protein and 20 per cent oil. In addition, 
it contains essential amino acids particularly glycine, tryptophan and lysine, 
similar to cow's milk. 
The soyabean crop requires water, especially during its germination, flowering 
and pod-formation stages. Lack of water during vegetative growth and seed 
development can reduce yield considerably. 
The minimum support price (MSP) for soyabean, which is the government 
announced price aimed at ensuring remunerative prices to farmers for their 
produce, has varied from Rs 1,002 per tonne in 1981-82 to Rs 933 in 1991-92 
and to Rs 930 in 2003-04 (at prices inflated to 2003-04) (Central Statistical 
Organisation [CSO] 2006). More importantly, the yield per hectare of soyabean 
in Jhalawar district (in southern part of Rajasthan) has varied from 0.538 
tonnes/ha in 1981-82 to 1.387 tonnes/ha in 2003-04. Whilst a large portion 
of the variability in yield could be attributed to technological developments, a 
substantial variability arises from weather-related effects. 
In the central, northern and western parts of India, where rainfall is high and 
winters are fairly cold, only one crop of soyabean (the kharif crop) is grown 
during May-November. Typically, soyabean is sown in June and harvested in 
mid- or end-October. 
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In Rajasthan, the total production of soyabean in the 2006 kharif season was 
4.930 lakh tonnes with 5.803 lakh hectares being sown with the crop. 
The theoretical framework in the soyabean yield scenario is based on the 
model used by Simmons and Rambaldi (1997). It builds in simplifying assump-
tions and includes the cost of and the gain from a possible hedge on the por-
tion of yield variability, which could be attributed to rainfall dependence. An 
empirical analysis, based on the gross production of soyabean in Jhalawar, is 
carried out to give a rough estimate of the aggregate willingness to pay to cover 
yield risk. 
Probably the only way to assess the inclination of soyabean-growing farmers 
to hedging volumetric risk attributable to the vagaries of weather is to physically 
carry out a survey. However, prior to this, a theoretical framework is attempted 
to give an estimate of the 'willingness to pay' for hedging weather risks. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The expected utility of a farmer who cultivates a crop can be expressed as: 
E ( U ) - E ( S ) - C - R (1) 
Where E(U) is expected utility, E(S) is expected sale price, C is the cost of inputs 
and R is a risk premium. The risk premium can be defined using the Pratt Co-
efficient (Pratt 1964) of absolute risk premium, k as: 
R= - E [ ( S - E ( S ) ) ^ ] (2) 
So, 
E ( U ) = E ( S ) - C - - E [ ( S - E ( S ) ) ' ] (3) 
In actuality, the risk premium, R, would be dependent on the wealth of the 
farmer, but we assume it to be constant as has been done in other studies 
(Edwards and Simmons 2004). 
We consider yield in a one-year cycle, so that utility in period (is maximised 
with respect to the information in period, f-1. Yield is expected to follow a 
Margin—ne Journal of Applied Economic Research 2:2 (2008): 199-212 
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naive model, which includes a trend component, attributed to technological 
advancements (T) and a multiplicative error term (1+e) which is attributable 
to variation in weather. 
So, Yt = (Y + aT)( l + e) 
(where Y is the mean yield across the sample) 
and production q^  = AY^  
(4) 
( 5 ) 
(where A is the area under cultivation). 
The selling price is taken as the MSP announced by the government—which 
is generally the price at which the farmer is able to sell his produce. It is assumed 
that selling price follows a naive model: 
S = S ( l + f ) (6) 
Where (1+/) is a multiplicative error term and S^ is the price at the start of 
the season. 
So, income from sales = S q 
= s' (i+f)A(Y+aT)(l+e) (7) 
Input costs can be taken as a total quantity decided upfront, based on planned 
production, q^, and can be written as the sum of fixed costs and variable 
costs which are dependent on the amount of planned production, q^. Variable 
costs would mainly include the cost of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. Fixed costs 
would be dependent on the area under cultivation and would include all other 
input costs. 
So, C = C A + C q 
f V *t 
Expected utility can be written as: 
(8) 
E„(U,) = S „ q , - C ^ A - C , q , - - £ „ 5^1 +f)A{Y + aT)il + e)-S^A{Y + aT) 
-S^q, -CfA-C,q, -lisliY+ aTYA'E^ 
f Y 
(l + / ) ( l + e ) - l 
V ) 
(9) 
= S „ q , - C , A - C , g , - - S „ V £ „ [ ( e + / + e/)^] 
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For maximisation of utility with respect to planned production, 
s-c (10) 
••• H, = kSX[{e + f + efY] 
We now consider the case where the farmer has an option to hedge the weather 
risk through purchase of weather derivatives. 
We note that e and /a re aberrations which can be hedged by the farmer. 
Whilst the farmer can hedge / by going in for forward contracts, weather in-
surance or weather derivatives would be the only ways to hedge e. We will, in 
this analysis, assume that the farmer is not as concerned with price risk as he 
is with volumetric risks. Thus, he will opt for hedging e to an extent within his 
means and his risk appetite. 
We take h as the proportion of e which the farmer wants to hedge, and the 
cost of hedging as r, so that the amount paid by the farmer is rh. This amount 
will be included in the cost of inputs so that: 
C = C A + C q + r h 
f V ^ t 
and income from sales 
SJl+f)AiY + aD(l+(l-h)e) 
Utility at time t can be written as 
E„(U,) = £„(S,)-C,-^£„[(S,-£„(S,))^] 
orE„(U,) = S „ q , - C ^ A - Q q , - r f t - - £ „ 
[iS„{l + f)A(Y + aT){\ + {\-h)e)-S^q,f] 
k 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
= S„q, ~C^A-C^q, -rh-^Slq'E^ (l + / ) ( l + ( l - / i ) e ) - l 
= S„q,~C^A-C^q,-rh~!^Slq^E^[A + h'y-2hy] 
where A = e^  + f + e^ f and y = e^  + e^ f ^  
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First-order conditions are derived by differentiating E(UJ with respect to 
planned production q^ and the amount of hedging h: 
dE(U,) 
dq, 
= S„-Q-fcS„^q, £ „ [ A + ^^Y-2 /7Y] -0 (14) 
and ^E^^-r-kSWE^hY-y] = 0. (15) 
oh 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We obtain the model parameters from a dataset of soyabean production, inputs, 
etc., for the 23-year period between 1982 and 2004 in Jhalawar. Data on the yield 
of soyabean was obtained from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Rainfall data for Jhalawar for the same period 
was purchased from the India Meteorological Department. 
In the first place, the yield of soyabean was regressed against time in order to 
obtain a value for a from the trend which we attribute to technology advance-
ments and for the value of Y. We get, 
Y = 0.725 tonnes/ha 
a = 0.017 
Using equation (4) and values of the error term for each of the 23 years of the 
dataset, we obtain the mean value for e, 
e = -0.00087 
with a variance cr =0.0681 
Similarly, using equation (6) and values of the error term in the MSP for the 
23 years, we obtain the mean value for/, 
f =-0.00291 
with a variance a - 0.00104 
The MSP for soyabean for each year in the 23-year period 1981-82 to 2003-04 
was inflated (using the Wholesale Price Index [WPI]) to 2003-04 levels and a 
mean obtained: 
S^= Rs 9,720 per tonne 
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The mean yield per year from 1981-82 to 2003-04: 
Y,= 0.933 tonnes/ha. 
(See the Appendix.) 
3.1 Correlation of Yield with Rainfall 
Figures for the yield of soyabean in Jhalawar district were correlated with rainfall 
data in the 23 years, for the period 16 June-15 October. A positive correlation 
of 30 per cent was noticed, indicating a fair degree of dependence on rainfall. 
Similarly, residuals of Y^ indicated a positive correlation of 33.3 per cent with 
rainfall in the same months. 
In order to calculate the variable cost of inputs, C ,^ the cost of seeds, fertilisers 
and pesticides used per tonne of soyabean produced was calculated. Data was 
available for 1996-97 for the costs of fertilisers and seeds required per hectare of 
soyabean crop. Using the yield of soyabean in the same year, the cost per tonne 
of the produce was arrived at and inflated to the 2003-04 levels. Also, the total 
amount of N-P-K fertihser consumed in 1996-97 was applied to arrive at an 
approximation for fertiliser used for soyabean production through a ratio of 
area sown vis-^-vis gross sown area. A similar calculation was carried out for 
pesticides, using the cost for monocrotophos pesticides. Both these input costs 
were inflated to 2003-04 prices. 
We obtained 
C^= 3,243 rupees per tonne. 
The Pratt coefficient of absolute risk premium, k, was arrived at using the 
method defined by Rambaldi and Simmons (2000). Risk premium in this 
study has been calculated as the difference between the expected selling price 
and actual selling price. 
The coefficient of relative risk is arrived at from a study by Antle (1987) who 
carried out an econometric estimation of risk attitudes of farmers in Aurepalle 
village in Andhra Pradesh. The data is based on an experimental measurement 
of risk attitudes of farmers in the same village (Binswanger 1980). The relative 
risk premium arrived at was 0.144. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is a 'unit free' measure of risk aversion 
that allows comparisons between groups and results from different studies. It 
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is measured in our study as P x /c, where P is the variable profit (S^ - C )^ and k 
is the coefficient of absolute risk premium. This gives us: 
k = 2.9826X10'' 
These coefficient and variable values are used to solve for planned production, 
q^ and the amount of hedge, h. From equations (14) and (15), we get: 
6477 - 0.019377 q , - 0.00159 q, h' + 0.00318 q, h = 0 
and 
r - 0.00159 q/ h + 0.00159 q/ = 0 
On solving these two equations, we can see that as r approaches 0, h approaches 1; 
that is, farmers would be willing to hedge completely if the cost of hedging is 
zero. We also see that the amount they would be willing to hedge, h, approaches 
zero as the cost of hedging, r, tends to Rs 531.40 per tonne. 
This translates to a theoretical willingness to pay of approximately 5.47 per 
cent of the MSP. 
As such, we could infer that there exists a demand for weather derivatives as 
a shield against volumetric risk in soyabean production in Jhalawar district; it 
would be around 5.47 per cent of the sale price that a farmer would get from 
his produce. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Based on the fact that there is an element of rainfall dependency in the yield 
of soyabean, we see that there exists a demand for weather derivative products. 
This study is done for soyabean production in a selected district in Rajasthan 
and only indicates a theoretical demand for weather derivative products. 
Farmers in other areas could possibly be willing to pay differently for weather 
derivatives. An ideal situation would be to carry out a survey to ascertain actual 
willingness to pay. 
Thus, these products may need to be introduced selectively in certain areas 
for certain crops after area-based surveys. 
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Annexure 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY AMONG FARMERS TO ASSESS THEIR WILLINGNESS 
TO PAY FOR WEATHER DERIVATIVES 
Project title .lob No Ostnr. Serial No. 
m 
visn No 
(As applicable) 
SP No. 
J_L 
C'ont. No. 
J_J_ 
Inlv. No. 
Week No 
( lo r 
tracks) 
Kanclom I 
Booster.. 
Questionnaire I ype' : Quanti 
FIKI.I) CON IKOL INFOKMAIION 
Date of 
Interview 
Date Month Year 
Interviewer tu fill in 
DISTRICT NAME: VILLAGE NAME: TYPE OF RESPONDENT 
Subscriber.. 
Interviewer Name: 
Interview 
Start lime 
AM/ 
PM 
Interview end 
time 
Non Subscriber 2 
AM/ 
PM 
TT" 
Total interview 
lime (in min) 
PLACE OF INTERVIEW 
Home 1 .Agricultural field. Street intercept....3 Others 4 
QUALITY CHECK DETAILS 
.Accompanied. 
Supervisor/ Executive Name (Ace by) 
Supervisor ID NO 
Back Check done. Scrutiny done. 
Personal I I Telephone 2 
l l Q t l -
Supervisor/ Executive Name (BC by) 
Supervisor ID .NO 
I declare that interview ha.s been carried out .strictly in accordance with your 
specifications and instructions, written and oral, with a person unknown to 
me, as per study requirements and strictly in accordance with ESOMAR cade 
of conduct. 
Personal...! I Telephone... 2 
Hate 
Supervisor/ Executive Name (Scrtv 
by) 
Supervisor ID NO 
Signature ( Inteniewerl 
IDENTIFICATION PARTICULARS: 
Introduction: Namaskar. "My name is....' "We are carrying out a study to understand the awareness levels 
of villagers/farmers on agricultural insurance schemes. This study will further evaluate the nature of insurance 
demands and willingness of the respondents to pay for weather derivatives. Hence, we have come to your place to 
request you to participate in the interview based on the questionnaire for the purpose of this study. Your views are 
important to us, as they will help in designing interventions for people like you. Your participation is voluntary and 
you may end the interview at any time. The survey will take roughly 30 minutes to complete. Please be assured that 
the information given by you will be treated in strict confidentiality and will be used for research purposes only 
"^r^^^^ ! iR] ^ m ^ I FH ?frrr ^ f[^] Tq?m J^  sn^  ^  cM ^ ^ VJH-IC^ )!.?! CPT J^^ R W^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^J^ ^  t 15^ 
s-c'c^/f mT ^ SPT ami? 5R^ E^TTf^  I 3fra^ w} wf^ f^ ^ H^^^ t J^Jft^  T^ ^ 3niR?i s^ff^ cft ^ gcrrto; zfKirTR) 
QNo. Questions and filters 
What is your name? 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
BLOCK LETTERS 
Coding categories and codes Skip to 
Address: 
Sex of the respondent Male 5S^ 1 
Female "^efi 2 
What is your age? 
(Mention in complete 
years) sm^ H? cpn t 
(^ g^g ^cn4)? 
Respondent is the head 
of the household? 
Yes ft 1 
No ^ 2 
What is your 
educational 
Qualification? 
armgft t^fi?^ zft^ j^fri CWT t ? 
a. Non Literate arttrfefa 
Primary amftg; 
c. Secondary >TiEqft^  
Higher Secondary w^ 'TCgf^ 
Graduate v^^m^ 
f Post Graduate >nid*^ Ti>i 
What is the primary 
occupation of your 
family? 
a) Cultivation ^ ^ 
b) Agri-labour ^ ^ ' ' ^ 
c) Non-agri-labour ^ ^ 3RTM f^?^  3Jk H^ '^fl 
~d) Others, pis. Specify 3f^ . w ^ ^ 
No. of minors (< 16 yrs.) ^ ^ How many persons are 
presently residing in 
your household? 
No. of adults (> 16 yrs.) 
•ER ^  ^ lift WEIIT (> 16 WB) 
Can you please tell us 
about the sources of 
income for your 
household? 
t? 
(Multiple Response 
Possible) 
Income Sources 3iivif1R*i '$ ^ 
a) Cultivation ?M 
b) Agri-labour ^ M ^ Huji^ '?! 
c) Non Agri-labour ^Ml ^ aerrm f^ rtft UCFN c)f) HV1<^ '?I 
r v _ 4 . i ^ . I • _ 1*1 -I r III J I (j». J j . i I d) Petty business Pter-tter ftvii^-n 
e) Sale of animal products (milk, eggs etc.) 
??], ^?qK ^ f ^ ^ ^ , 3 t t 3nf^ 
0 Remittances from migrated family members 
MRCIK C^  ^f^TO ;at 9T?^ ^ f , ^ ^ gKT 1 ^ ^ ^ "W 
g) Others (specify) ^r^, ^PT^ ^ 
10 
11 
Can you please assess 
your average monthly 
income (in Rs.) today? 
J^ T^OT 3 m ^ clffHH H I R H * 
Less than 1000 1,000 ^ j pT 
d) 
1000-2500 
2500 - 5000 
5000 - 8000 
jL 
g) 
8000-12000 
12000-15000 
More than 15000 15,000 3ik i^^ Ki 
In a 
approximately 
month, 
how 
"a) Nil R<Hc{>H ^ 
b) 50-100 
QNo Questions and filters Coding categories and codes Skip to 
much are you able lo 
save? 
c) 100-300 
d) 300-500 
c) 500-1000 
0 1000-3000 
g) More than 3000 iTooo sftv i^^ jra" 
12 us Please provide 
information about your 
landholding? 
5^  a r^^ srarfti ? 
(a) Land 
owned: 
(b) Area 
leased in for 
own farming: 
«f2T^ T? eft t 
Rainfcd: Acres 
f^TETi^  •?; fen; JfKici ^ tR aiiaTf^ V'*.s 
Irrigated Acres 
Rainfcd: 
Irrigated Acres 
Rffrlcl St= 
Acres 
I T ^ f ^ 
(a) Repeated droughts H'liriw J^jai T ? ^ ^ }^fNw" 13 Whether any part of this 
land is uncultivated? IF 
YES Give reason for 
not cultivating: 
r^ar 5^ ^ JPT ^ w^ 
w^ % ? 3w? ?t , (it ?M 
(b) Bad returns SS^ra7^^m"?T^ST"5~^T^ 
(c) Lack of money to invest in farming 
(d) Lack of interest t ^ ^ '^ ^ cMg ^ 
(e) Others (specify) 31^ . "P^ ^ 
14 Please provide us 
information about 
livestock owned by 
you? 
(a) No livestock owned 
(b) Cows/ Buffaloes 
(c) Sheep/ Goats 
(d) Poultry 
(e) Camels ^ 
(0 Others (specify) 
NOS. fticH 
Nos. f^Pci^ 
Nos. (^ci^ 
Nos. f^d^ 
Nos. ftHH 
15 How many crops do you 
harvest in a year? 
Sm V^ Wcf ^ fW^ iJiTTcf 
(a) One. (b) Two. © More than two 3 
(^ ^ J^irr^  
16 Is irrigation water 
supply available to your 
land? 
fcrt i^ tpft 3TRTT t ? 
Yes ?f 
No ^ . . 
Goto 18 
Goto 
Q17 
17 IF No THEN, please 
state the source of water 
supply: 
3FK ^ : rit T^OT i^ T^ ft J|ft 
(a) Dependence only on rainfall 
(b) Personal groundwater bore well pRft •'pra i^t^  ^ 
(c) Common bore wells wjfl^ ff «ft^  ^ 
(d) Other (Please specify) 
3 T ^ , T q ^ ^ 
QNo. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Questions and Alters 
If yes, do you feel the 
quantity of water 
supplied is adequate for 
your needs? 
3PVI Ft , eft swJJi «rait^ 
t^ ^m anWt wm % f^  
UJIrfl t . i) sm^ ^^fyfifi 
^ fcT^ Tqfca t ? 
On an average, what is 
your produce in a year: 
3ft'(^ d^  R>ri41 ikraH gtcft 
How sure are you of 
what the quantity of 
your produce will be? 
g?t TTST ^ ^Jfr? tctm ? ^ 
H7E DlfJTjH Hh^ 5 7 
How do you sell your 
produce? 
At an average what 
price do you get for 
your produce? 
? 
(READ OUT) 
Do you feel mentally 
stressed in case of 
abnormal rainfall? 
(EXCESS OR LESS) 
IF YES THEN How 
much it bothers you? 
31TR ft, eft i | mJ^ f c ^ 
Ftmt? 
Coding categories and codes 
Yes ?t 1 
No ^ 2 
(a) Crop (specily) 
Wf^ (FTC ^) 
(h) Crop (specify) 
^qtH (7<re si)^) 
(c) Crop (specify) 
^ira ( R ^ Jfi^ ) 
(a) Very sure «(gd iHR^ d^ 
1 1 1 1 
quintals 
Rhcied 
1 1 1 1 
quintals 
Rhcjdd 
1 1 1 1 
quintals 
(b) Sure f^ rftqcT 
X r ^ r ^ 
(c) Somewhat sure 'H]4\ 9\\i^K\ 
\ r^ i~^ 
(d) Somewhat unsure syi-si ai|i||?Tjd 
rt r^ 
(e) Unsure 3)Pif?^ id 
^ ^ (f) Very Unsure ^id aiPlRtJd 
(a) Self in Local Mandi ? « n ^ ^ t^ if g;? ^ 
(b) Through an intermediary fNtfcft) J^  gRT 
,^  
(c) Other buyers ^-^ <M?\«H 
(d) Don't sell my produce ^ r^ar ^ |^ 
(a) Govt, announced Minimum Support price 
<H<*K ElKI tiffed -^HdH TRat? 7^\^^ 
(b) Less than Minimum Support price 
-iJHdH ^TTjaf^  qft»l?I ^ 5P1 
(c) More than Minimum Support price 
-iJHdl ^fmaf^ g5tTO^ ^HiT^ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I 
2 
3 
Yes ft 1 
No ^ 2 
w 
(a) Stresses me out to a very large extent ^^ ^HIRT f^ Rn g?T 
t^ t^ ra 
(b) Stresses me somewhat ^ F? rra5 fiRn ^ f^m^ 
(c) Haven't given a thought to this ?^ «IT^  *t ^  #iiT ^ 
1 
2 
3 
Skip to 
i 
• 
IF Coded 
4 Then go 
toQ23 
IF Coded 
2 Then go 
t o Q 2 5 
IV 
QNo 
25 
26 
27 
Questions and filters 
Do you feel mentally 
stressed in case of 
abnormal temperature? 
(EXCESS OR LESS) 
IF YES THEN How 
much it bothers you? 
3PR ?f , eft ^ 3M^ fef^  
(READOUT) 
What worries you more, 
variability in yield or 
variability in sale price? 
cfni - y^ RT ?t^ in ton 
Coding categories and codes 
Yes ?t 1 
^ 
(a) Stresses me out to a very large exlenl 
«r|d S^IKI f^RTT ^ f?Wq 
(b) Stresses me somewhat ^ B^ CT^P ftrai ^ fitw 
(c) Haven't given a thought to this ?^ siT^  J? ^  #cn t 
(a) Variability in yield ^<]tu ^ *'i - vi|i<;i sldi 
(b) Variability in price t^^ Pra ^ ^^ - S^'JKT ?t^ 
(c) Both equally ?W T^TH ^w ^ 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Skip to 
IF Coded 
2 Then go 
toQ27 
I would now like to tell you that theoretically you could, at a cost, hedge 100% of the weather risk to what you 
expect to earn for your livelihood. The cost, obviously, would be proportional to the amount of hedge. (We check 
out their attitude towards hedging weather risk) 
28 
29 
30 
What is the amount of 
weather risk which you 
would want to hedge by 
paying for it: 
yldiild wlIlaH l*'(Tl d^l* 
Are you aware of the 
earlier schemes like the 
Comprehensive Crop 
Insurance Scheme or 
the National 
Agricultural Insurance 
Schemes? 
3T^  ^ «TH^ f 7 
If you have taken this 
scheme then what was 
your experience with 
the earlier schemes? 
illuHI f^ ar tit ^ ^ 
y1^di J^  W8J sn^ RTT ar^ H^ 
(a) The entire weather risk HI'HH -Meirad |i'<i ^^ illiiH 
(b) 75% of it 
(c) 5 0 % of it 
(d) 2 5 % of it 
(e) 10% or less of it 
10 Ufct?ld TU ^ J ^ tjR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No ^ 2 
(a) Not taken 
(b) Highly satisfied 
(c) Somewhat satisfied 
after ^ T : ^ 
(d) Unsatisfied 
aKHnjie 
(e) Highly unsatisfied 
a<c^ l?)ct) at'ti-Tjte j 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
if coded 2 
then go to 
Q32 
IF coded 
1/2/3, 
then go to 
Q32 
QNo 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
1 
Questions and filters 
Why were you not 
satisfied ? 
3 M fitTfl cTST? ^ '^•^""i 
Are you aware of the 
Varsha Bima / Sookha 
Suraksha Kavach / Rabi 
Wheat Insurance 
Scheme introduced by 
the Agricultural 
Insurance Company in 
2005? 
*»^ -Tl gNT cl^  2005 A ^ 
Where did you learn 
about this scheme from? 
(MULTIPLE 
RESPONSE 
POSSIBLE) 
tb^l •(H \J1H*I<1 iHdl yi ? 
Did you ever subscribe 
to the scheme? 
TOT arw^ 5nff 5^ iiluni ^ 
f?r^ f^ njT f ? 
What was your 
experience with Varsha 
Bima / Sookha 
Suraksha Kavach 
scheme ? 
^ ^ / ^q^- ?^JWT 
3Tg>ra 4v«T Tfl ? Why were you not 
satisfied ? 
am f^ ^!R^ 3(-H-^ k; 0 
? 
What is your opinion of 
the modalities adopted 
for claim entitlement? 
4<AH ^*<;m (c^ M) * fa^ 
1 
Coding categories and codes 
(a) Because of lime taken in claim settlement 
(b) Because 1 felt that the 'Area Approach' was 
disadvantageous to me. 
??jf^ 5?l wu f^  k'f^r tjHfc} gnr^  f?iJl -p^^i^ra^ ^ 
3HJ , W ^ JP<! 
Yes ?t I 
No ^ 2 
(a) TV ^.*. 
(b) Newspaper 3ra«fR 
(c) From other farmers ^-^t Icyxii-il -d 
(d) Internet kiosks i-xii-^t l*iJH<t) 
(e) Other (please specify) 
3r^ , Ttre g^ 
Yes ?f 1 
No ^ 2 
(a) Highly satisfied 3R?jftJ^  •»-^f^ 
(b) Somewhat satisfied a?Wi •(1-T1'<; 
(c) Unsatisfied ^{•H-^V. 
(d) Highly unsatisfied 
(a) Because of time taken in claim settlement 
ctdH * l •l^oMW-) H d ' l •HHil * <iy1^ •() 
(b) Because I could not understand the procedures. 
ctiil'f^  ^ 'RT>«ffSt?I Uffbiliaff ^ Wta ^ ?^T5iT 
(c) Other reasons (please specify) 
, ^ , , , , i r* 
(a) Very clear and transparent «igd -(Hi* 3n< ^ u<im 
(b) Somewhat clear a?t^ ^^ TFP 
(c) Not clear f^rre ^ 
(d) Feel that the process is grossly unfair 
6H <^'M\ 8 1* ijll Ml*iji -Jimg"! ^ t 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I 
2 
3 
I 
2 
3 
4 
Skip to 
IF coded! 
then go to 
Q41 
IF coded 
2 then go 
toQ41 
IF coded 
1/2, then 
gotoQ 
37 
VI 
QNo 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
i 
Questions and filters 
If you are entitled to a 
claim then which of the 
following is correct? 
(READ OUT) 
For rainfall insurance, 
are you in agreement 
with the figure of 
rainfall on the basis of 
which claims were 
paid? 
cR^ ft^ n^^IT t ? 
For rainfall insurance, 
what is your opinion of 
the amount of 
premium? 
ft; iflRiiiH JfSt TTIIT ^ VT^  ^ 
If not insuring your 
crop, what is the reason 
for not doing so? 
3PV! sm 3?ir=ft fTfra w 
frH\ ^ JP^ ^ . cfi ^ ^ 
Have you taken any 
type of loan in the last 3 
years? 
A ^ 5F^ feTOT t ' 
If you have outstanding 
loans, what is the reason 
for not returning the 
loan on time? 
Coding categories and codes { Skip to 
(a) 1 was able to get the claim amount easily 
j}5l <?#t ^ ^i(^ artflr-fl ^ Pts n^t afl 
(b) The process look loo long 
(c) 1 lad to pursue the matter myself 
^ ' m i ^ '<?rf^  i r ^ 
(d) Claim still not paid for over two months 
2 Tt 3 t t o ^ii^ ^ ^^H 3 r ^ (T* ^ ^ m ^ at 
(a) In agreement Tf^ tjT $ 
(b) Felt it was slightly less^^ ?pn ^ i> afrsi ^w ^ 
(c) Felt il was much l e s s ^ cTm f?P ^ tifa ^w t 
(d) Felt it was m o r e ^ ?PTT fcp ^ r^iiRT # 
(e) Have not even given a thought to this 
5 ^ «tT^  jf =T^ H^hfT t 
(a) Feel that it is too high 
(b) Feel that it is alright 
CJ'iHT cH'M 15; ii Relct^ol •(HSt 6 
(c) Feel that it can be raised 
(a) Unaware of schemes ^Jt^ a^ ^ «n^  ^ ^ S^TPT^  
(b) Hassles of insuring 
^ t ^ cfRT^ it 'i^ H•MI J^ cf^ af ^ 
(c) Lack of faith in such schemes 
Q-H tMHI H m^W Hgl cb^d 
(d) Lack of money for premium 
(e) Consider the premium too high iTlHiiH ^ ^sira t 
No =Ti^  2 
(a) No outstanding loan 
(b)Less yield of farm produce due to lack of rainfall 
(b) Less yield of farm produce due to excess rainfall 
(c) Less yield of farm produce due to high temperatures 
ui|ii;i dlMHH *1 cluj^ <) ifrjTei g?t ^^it 4 ^ M 7 
(d) Other reasons (specify) 
' 1 
2 
-57 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
IF 
CODED 
1/2/3 
THEN 
Go to 42 
If coded 2 
then go to 
Q44) 
V l l 
QNo. 
44 
45 
Questions and filters 
Have any members ol' 
your family 
discontinued school / 
college education due to 
a tight monetary 
situation resulting from 
low farm yield? 
m\ 3m^ nfi^H ^ f^ r?ft 
Has a low farm yield 
resulted in light 
monetary situations 
which affected health 
conditions in your 
family? 
^ cTJrg ^ 3fra^ 4Rc(K c|5T 
W^T?«j 5r>nf^  gw 1 7 
Coding categories and codes 
Yes i?T 1 
No "-f^  2 
Yes ?r 1 
No ^ 2 
Skip to 
I will now tell you about weather derivatives and how they could be structured to act 
as a hedging tool for farmers. 
^ 3?^ a n w t v^j ^ j^hiFTT ^ ^ ^ "iciivjjJii ^ % T f ^ m P * m \if\fbm gjt ^^r ^g?^ ^ 4,HJ^H'< 
S^TTyT ^ flTTif^ g ^ 11 ^ ^Wr i i l^Hi c^  ^ ^ 3 n w t uiHcbi>51 ?Mti f ^ r ^ ^ r^gsr ^>i^ Hicr ^?i\ 
yracTT^ cPRcF5 Tjg5 ^ ^tft^RT t ftR# g M fcfTfTHt ^ -^TJT ITT 'G^TT^ cT^ cT dNHH ^ ? t ^ cTT^  <^ byH|c|1 
^R"ll*lf ^ T^TFcT m ^ FT f^Tcfnfr 11 ^-^TFm ^ feTlt V ^ f^vHH c^  ^ TJ 3000 f^KTl vJc^ TKH ? t ^ C^T*TcT f 
^ ^ ^ 10^ ytrt f?rK^ cfft ^ XT^  30,000 ^ . ^ OTTf^ irticff t eft S^TT f^ ETcft ^ f^ > f^TT^ yTefcITg >^T?EP 
%iRT 4 ?Tf^  10,000 75. ^ victTKH ^ fi^ ^ ^ T .^R^f^cl cf^ 3T%lT?n f^J^TcTT t f ^ T ^ 1200 ^ ! j f^ cT^ 
3 r j l T f % t cWT <^ 20^ . , / l j fTe t 3fl^ vJtil^x;"! ^ cff? q ^ 500^. tfrf^WfT ^ ^^ TTTCT 3TTcfr 11 f % ^ 
'Cjf^f^8TfM ^ Tjf^ cT^ 1200 5 j f ^ cf5t ^JFI? 1000 ^ ! j f^ ?kft t cfT K3^ f^TfTH gjt ^gJ^TT^ ^ ^KqT^ #q; 20 
^ . yfrf ^ j f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 4000 ^ . y i ^ ?tTr I 3Tcr: ^3^ R»HM gJt 3500^, cPT ^^ TTH ? W T I CT^ 3Tk ifr cff^ F l ^ 
cf?r f^ erfrT ^ 4)iijcji 3fk ifr ^HIT^ ^t ^chcii 11 
1) ^R^ cf5t ^gf?tm g >!^dim - - ^ cm f^rakor ufriRn xihTeT tr^ ^si^^m. ^«^<t ^ g^ftTErr ^ % m ;3TT 
f^T^fRTT t l 
2) isft^ ^ fitffft 3TT^TT^ #, t j c f ^ c p ^ , ^ ^ c p ^ a r r q ? ^ zf^sr^ gsj aif^j^^ui CR ^ {rg^ ct 11 
3) ^\\Mdp]^ 3lf^ R<W y^TTcT ^^ ZJWT t - ?^Tf^ Wm^ cFT F W I 
4) ? f ? ^ Tffg ^ in^T^ T^^ r^r ^TT^ % ^ R^Tf^fr ^f^?H ^mH ^m^rf i 
5) ^eici l t j cmW TJ^  ^ i [ ^gf[^ 7TT i ^ vm f^TcT^ f T?cT %?TT^ i ^ ^ ^ STcfT^ ^ cHJirrft ^ <h^9\m i f t 
? ^ o - f l q i l W t^RT ^ETltrti x i t i l ^W ^ f^ TtJ ifm^ ifV W^^ ^JTef^ ^?T?^ fmj gJT ?^^^TTef cfTff cf^ Ft^ 
^ f^ S^PTRT tr?T^ g y ^ yfsTt% f^^TT^ ^jerr^ cr^ c^  f ^ ? i f t ^ i s^-. ^\^^ t f^^feg gn ^ W ^ c^^ 
Vll l 
QNo 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Questions and filters 
Do you think weather 
derivatives as explained 
could help in relieving 
financial stress? 
(READ OUT) 
Why you feel so? 
Which weather factor 
worries you the most as 
being detrimental to 
your crop yield? 
(READ OUT/SINGLE 
CODE) 
If you were to go in for 
weather derivatives, you 
would opt for a hedge 
against? (READ OUT) 
3rfR 3TFRi) ifrfm ^ R ^ 
;iR^(Sc| ^^ l^ si . d) 3)14 
You would want to 
hedge against low 
rainfall only if it is? 
(READ OUT) 
JfR St^ CR ^ ^ REICH14) 
You would want to 
hedge against high 
temperature only if it is 
(READ OUT) 
3)N dNHH ct! f i d ^ UfclSld 
-
The farmers are explained that f( 
could play a role in the yield of t 
formation stage, (v) harvesting. 
The farmers are asked to indicate 
which they can attribute to weath 
% (i) i^ni (2) si^^ (3) ^^ iWtT ^ T 
Coding categories and codes i Skip 
to 
(a) Would help to a very large extent !r|fi ?? CT^JS ^ i ^ PRWI 
(b) Would help to a fair extent ^ W< ff^ •K? ftcW) 
(c) Would help marginally ^ ^ ' n ^ i^ z; CTCJ; TK? ft?\Tfl 
(d) Might not help wq^ n^'^i ^ PTCWI 
(e) Am sure will not help ftlt^ra M^ >!l '^« H^ ffl^ 'fl 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 ^ 
(a) Higher than normal Rainfall <HIHM ^ 3(1&^ «nft?T 
(b) Lower than normal Rainfall flWRi ^ u^^  «nf^ 
(c) Higher than normal lemperature •(HiHi-y vl 3)lt(ct> diH*iM 
(d) Lower than normal lemperature «IHM •(1 *H ai4HM 
S N V 
(a) Temperature variations diWHH * *H - v^Ki SH 'H 
(b) Rainfall variations snf^ ^ T^R - ;^zrra ?)^ ^ 
(c) A mix of temperature and rainfall 
<MWH W\< «(lR!!r <iHl * *^ - vj^ |<i| sIH <^  
(a) 10% below normal VHIHM ^ 10 Mldsid c^ 
(b) 20% below normal <MH\'H 71 20 ulrl^ dd w\ 
(c) 30% below normal •nwi-n i\ 30 wfci^ id 3W 
(d) Only when it is 50 % or less below normal 
^tWRI ^ 50 yfcRTcT ^ ^ ^ ift cPJ^  
(a) 2% above normal <HHM ^ 2 ulrisid f^ilKT 
(b) 5% above normal •HiHi-y ^ 5 yfclsid ^HIKT 
(e) 10 % above normal ^HIHM ^ io nfclsid ^SIKT 
(d) Only when it is 15% or more above normal 
)r the purpose of this study, we have identified five stages where 
•le crop: (i) Sowing, (ii) germination stage (iii) vegetative growth s 
impacts that they have experienced in the past few years to the cr 
er factors 
H * [c1<J ei-^ >f)'«c1 *"! vJHvH <? 6 aiq't*!!^ P w i R a *1 § («I'H*1 'flfl'T, .v3 ?^«t ^ 
ildfl ^ at^ WT (4) 3Hra ^ P R H ^ ara^ sjr (a) ^srf 
iiRti) 'fl'H'fl thif* * M*fiq '(^  el-^  <<l<JI <»jR \)t<JK'l A *»fl/^ <{\cT'{) ^ ^ it ' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
weather 
tage, (i^  
op yieic 
IF 
coded 
1/2/3, 
then 
go to 
Q48) 
effects 
) grain 
n •«*di 
m 
IX 
QNo Questions and filters Coding categories and codes ! Skip 
1 to 
\ c/; „ 
Q 52 TO 56 g?sJi ^3^^ w ^ ^ 
52 
53 
54 
55 
1 
In the sowing stage 
(READOUT) 
In the germination 
stage: 
(READ OUT) 
iflyi Pi*<H-^ * tf i i i 
In the vegetative growth 
stage: 
(READ OUT) 
In the grain formation 
stage: 
(READ OUT) 
1 
Factor 
(a) Excess Rainfall 
(b) Deficient Rainfall 
(c) High temperatures 
^ i t ; i <^\^^\^^ 
(d) Low temperatures 
*H rll4HH 
Factor 
(a) Excess Rainfall 
3T?qf^ «llRs!l 
(b) Deficient Rainfall 
(c) High temperatures 
^^yicil dNHM 
(d) Low temperatures 
4)H d/<^*^H 
Factor 
(e) Excess Rainfall 
(0 Deficient Rainfall 
(g) High temperatures 
(h) Low temperatures 
*H rilMHH 
Factor 
(i) Excess Rainfall 
(j) Deficient Rainfall 
(k) High temperatures 
^ N i drq'HH 
(1) Low temperatures 
*H dNHH 
Kxtcnt to which yield was affected negatively 
f^ S^ cl^ s^ltft H^  ?3^ T^  3RK fOTI 
Very high 
-ergo ^sn^ 
1 
1 
1 
I 
high 
2 
2 
2 
2 
to some extent 
Ego ? ^ cRi 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Negligible 
4 
4 
4 
4\ 
Extent to which yield was affected negatively 
f ^ F 5 c!^ s^fcft ^ ? ^ R r a 3RT? f3fT| 
Very high 
5fa u^Ki 
I 
I 
1 
1 
high 
2 
2 
2 
2 
to some extent 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Negligible 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Extent to which yield was affected negatively 
ftrH ? ? cR> #cft TI^  ?3^ T<I a m ? fSITI 
Very high 
^ | d ^sir?i 
1 
1 
1 
1 
high 
2 
2 
2 
2 
to some extent 
3 
3 
3 
3 
negligible 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Extent to which yield was affected negatively 
ftj^ ^ tR) ^tft IT? ^?ra aTFR gani 
Very high 
I 
I 
1 
I 
high 
2 
2 
2 
2 
to some extent 
ego ?^ T^5) 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Negligible 
4 
4 
4 
4 
QNo. 
56 
Questions and filters 
In the han'esting stage: 
(READ OUT) 
Coding categories and codes 
Factor 
(m) Excess Rainfall 
(n) Deficient Rainfall 
(o) High temperatures 
(p) Low temperatures 
* H dlHHM 
Extent to which yield was affected negatively 
Very high 
1 
1 
1 
1 
high 
2 
2 
2 
2 
to some extent 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Negligible 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Skip 
to 
The farmers are now explained the fact that if they can identify critical periods, and buy weather derivatives only 
for those periods, it would be a cheaper proposition 
<H6| ^\U UJM •iii 1* ^>\i a)14 Hl'fHH H vJ<H ^d^tl] *1 M^iJH d M'HH ^JHut A ^\<i] U'HW y g a 
57 
58 
Would you prefer lo 
buy weather derivative 
cover for specific 
periods, or would that 
be too much of a hassle 
to keep track of? 
wn 3m f^ "(am st^sSi ^ 
(READ OUT) 
More specifically, what 
choice of periods of 
weather derivatives 
(start to time of expiry) 
would you prefer: 
^ fert ftR ^gra iflRii^  ^ 
<i dl -dKclldci ct, HiJ *IHd * H <;s?'ll 1 
(a) Would very much prefer specific period derivatives 
s r a iJlRiid 5^  fird ^ ^ J^tiKT w ? f^ixTft 
(b) Would prefer specific period derivatives 
?jra 'ftftJTS ^ fcT^  irrR cpW 
(c) Would prefer season based derivatives 
^ "Jxt W^T^ ^ ^^ra ^ ^t^?H ^ fcT^ 'TO^ *<i ' l i 
(d) Would very much prefer season based derivatives 
(e) Would be indifferent 
^ W ^ t[%^ 
(a) 1 week 
(b) 15 days 
(c) 30 days 
(d) 45 days 
(e) 60 days 
(f) 90 days 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
XI 
QNo. 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Questions and Alters 
Would you be inlercslcd 
in hedging risks related 
to the date of arrival ol" 
the monscxjn? This 
would be in the form of 
a weather derivative 
with NO payment if the 
monsoon arrives on or 
before a pre-specified 
date and with 
proportional payout 
(with a limit) depending 
on how many days late 
the monsoon arrives. 
frrfSt ^ ^m^ utlRdH ^ 
feRl ^tm E^trt^  1 ? ^ ^ 
frffsT cT^ P "Ixl^ HId ^ 3n^ T? 
3 i N ^ ^ • y m H =T^ 
a n r o t J^T^ T lift iJiTtTR -
•l^ l'i-lld fSfRT^  f^ 1 ? ^ ^ 
f | - ^ j ^ If? Pitjiftft Btnr 1 
With weather 
derivatives, what kind 
of a payout would you 
prefer: 
If the weather station 
recording rainfall and 
temperature is located 
not exactly at your 
village, at what distance 
away from you would 
you be satisfied with the 
recordings being used 
for your village? 
3m^ «l^ (•t^ lc1 art'( dmnn ^ 
R*W ^^ ^rar t ^ •i-i^ M 
f^ era ^ ?t , cit arm wt^ 
W*1I3'I *l <HMH 'llcl ch 
Iny •i<n*K 4"! cH'i ? 
What would give you a 
better sense of comfort! 
Coding categories and codes 
(a) Would be interested x^Wcf) 
(b) Would not be interested 
(a) triggered by a pre-fixed level of the index with a Yes/No 
type of payment 
M^d -i^ l-ll?T^d M'i ^'i 'yJIcflH i^ & if] H6l 
(b) triggered by a pre-fixed level of the index, but paid 
proportional to the amount of rainfall / parameter 
H^d •(•1 w(?r(d -ki-; U>i el-i-illd 3)lR * ^ d l H * 't^'IdM 
(a) Less than 2 Km. 
2 K m ^ ?PR 
(b) 2-5 km. 
(c) 5-10 km. 
(d) 10-25 km. 
(e) Does ot make a difference 
5 ^ Jf^ W ^ R^rm 
(a) Government weather recording stations 
W<t>\i] 4^i Rcblfl'l W ? H 
(b) Private weather recording stations 
(c) Would not make a difference 
5 ^ gJt^  'jnif ^ trtm 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
Skip 
to 
xu 
QNo 
63 
64 
Questions and filters 
You could, 
theoretically, buy 
Weather Derivatives 
either as an individual 
or in groups. Which 
would you prefer: 
T^R^  S or f^mjf^  wi i\ 
3TN JfJt=1 W TO? q ? ^ ? 
(READ OUT) 
Crop insurance and 
weather derivatives 
could be provided both 
by private agencies and 
by the government. 
Which options in your 
village, according to 
you, would be best for 
providing hedging 
against weather related 
risks 
-iH«irad .^R^ldtj W<i'H iU] 
3(\< Ui^ctd *(qP|ijT ElKI ifl 
arajT Y ^ ? 
(READ OUT/SINGLE 
CODE) 
Coding categories and codes 
(a) buying weather derivatives as an individual 
citRri'ld Wi ^ flWt <T^d ^M^cf ?S^ M^T 
(b) buying weather derivatives in small, self-formed groups 
H1>HH mm<\ -^Rclldci cfA i^i]^m wi <^^ A '^'i'^\ 
(c) buying weather derivatives as cooperatives at the village 
level 
(d) buying weather derivatives as cooperatives at the block 
level 
(a) Only government insurance schemes / weather derivatives 
offered by the government 
ftrtf5 i-]-(4,\fi ^m r^g?IiT / ^<5>N SRI few ^ i^crr jfrrm F^ralStcT 
.^ R l^^ ci 
(b) Both government and private agencies' offered insurance 
schemes / weather derivatives 
<;1H1 <^ •<c^ )l^  m wi^d ^'i'.H\\ ^KI l^ iii MA CIHI ^H\ i<f^H / 
(c) Only private agencies' offered insurance schemes / weather 
derivatives 
f ^ Ul^^e V^"<^ ^RT felT ^ (^Tcn 4WT f^g5t^  / jfrjTO T^^ rttJcT 
•^ R l^^ ci 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
Skip 
to 
Goto 
Scena 
rio 1 
Goto 
Scena 
rio 2 
Goto 
Scena 
rio 3 
X l l l 
VALUATION SECTION 
Scenario 1: (Only government schemes) 
You have chosen a scenario 
with only government 
schemes because: 
3Tm^ f?tre W3J? i\ %?5 iM*\^ 
(READ OUT) 
(a) You have more faith in government schemes 
(b) Private players may look for too much gains for themselves 
yiffe *R||^y1 3Tcr^  fcTJ) «(^ ^sjT^ *iy<;i w^ wt^ t 
(c) Private agencies may not be able to survive in the market 
5T5^ V^"(fl ITJfe *f ?TT!R ^ 9t( 
(d) Other reasons (Please specify) 
3R5 c [ )T^ , TO^ q . ^ 
(a) You would be willing to pay Rs 100 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 f^WJ) ^ 5^^ s^  folt 100 Wrt ^ ^ 
If you were to insure your 
crop or purchase weather 
derivatives for an amount of 
Rs iOOO, a premium or 
charge would have to be 
paid for this. We will now 
read out some premiums to 
you. Please tell us if you 
will be willing to pay this 
amount. ( Note: You can 
insure/ purchase weather 
derivatives for more than Rs 
1000 - the premium would 
be for each Rs 1000 
insured) 
3FR 3nWt 1000 ^S^rt ^ f M 
jfrfT^  f^fsrf^ ra tft^fcr ^ ?) , 
r^ai am ^ r^flr 3RT gj^^ ttit^ 
' (HJH ^ : 3Tm 1000 ^ i i^ ^ 
tftfWr ?? 1000 w r t c^  ^)jii ^ 
(b) You would be willing to pay Rs 80 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 ^m^ ^ gicR ^ ftrt 80 'Wfit ^ •SPl 
(c) You would be willing to pay Rs 50 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 "^m^ ^ ?fKR c^  fefd 50 Wdl t^ ^ 
(d) You would be willing to pay Rs 30 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 wr t ^ ^n^R ^ firt 30 "^M ^ ^ 
<t27R t 
(e) You would be willing to pay Rs 20 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 wr t ^ gnR ^ Wi 20 ^wd ^ cfi) 
Yes 5f 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (b) 
Yes ?T 1 
No ^ 2 
I F N O , then proceed to (c) 
Yes ?t 1 
N o ^ 2 
IF N O , then proceed to (d) 
Yes ?f 1 
No ^ 2 
I F NO, then proceed to (e) 
Yes fT 1 
No ^ 2 
.KIV 
What is the maximum 
number of Rupees per 
month (in total) that you 
would be willing to pay for 
insuring your crop or 
purchasing weather 
derivatives? 
Rs 
XV 
Scenario 2: (Both 
1 
2 
You have chosen a mixed 
scenario because: 
(READ OUT) 
For both government, as 
well as private agencies' 
schemes 
cTt ... 
government as well as private schemes) 
(a) Both government and private agencies should be 
allowed to compete equally 
^•i! ^HT*r^  3fl? 01?^ 1^^^ 5fi! «Rrav w^yf ^ 3fcRR f*r?RT e^nflii 
(b) Hntry of private agencies would bring down premiums 
(c) You have equal faith in private players and the 
government 
(d) Other reasons ( Please specify 
3RJ , WC gf^  
(a) You would be willing to pay only equal premiums for 
both types of schemes 
(b) You would be willing to pay more for government 
schemes 
-Mm H'l'biri <<f)H <h M^a ^l<i\ U)WilH i-^ *1 flJJK dl'l 
(c) You would be willing to pay more for private agencies' 
schemes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
XVI 
If you were to insure your 
crop or purchase weather 
derivatives for an amount of 
Rs 1000, a premium or 
charge would have to be 
paid for this. We will now 
read out some premiums to 
you. Please tell us if you 
will be willing to pay this 
amount. ( Note: You can 
insure/ purchase weather 
derivatives for more than Rs 
1000 - the premium would 
be for each Rs 1000 
insured) 
am^ sm^^ looo ^str^ ^ fcTft 
f ^ fcT^ sm^ ego sflP y^H 
WT 3TN ^ ^iftl 3ra cfj^^ ^flM 
? (HJH ^ : sm 1000 O^T^ I ^ 
5frt*WH B^ 1000 • ^ H ^ ^ « f r^ 5PI 
(a) You would be willing to pay Rs 
100 for Rs 1000 covered 
sm 1000 v?^ ^ J^KR ^ frrt 100 ^mi) ^ 
51^  ^ 7 ? 
(b) You would be willing to pay Rs 80 
forRs 1000 covered 
Sm 1000 ^Wrt If; ^ ) ^ ^ IcTJI 80 =?i^ ^ 
(c) You would be willing to pay Rs 50 
forRs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 wfit ^ ^P« c^  fei^  50 wrt ^ 
(d) You would be willing to pay Rs 30 
for Rs 1000 covered 
3m 1000 WT^ ^ ^U^ c^  fcfil 30 "^^ t^ 
(e) You would be willing to pay Rs 20 
forRs 1000 covered 
sm 1000 w r t c^  5icR t^ fcf4 20 ^wrt ^ 
Yes ?i 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (b) 
Yes ?t 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (c) 
Yes ft 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (d) 
Yes ft 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (e) 
Yes f i 1 
No ^ 2 
IF 
YES, 
goto 
Q4. 
IF 
YES, 
goto 
Q4. 
IF 
VES, 
goto 
Q4. 
IF 
YES, 
goto 
Q4. 
What is the maximum 
number of Rupees per 
month ( in total ) that you 
would be willing to pay for 
insuring your crop or 
purchasing weather 
derivatives? 
3 m j?t7T^ ^t^fijci ^ ^ f ^ zn 
^ JRjI^ci # t ^ f ^ F? 
Rs 
XVI1 
Scenario 3: ( Only private agencies) 
You have chosen a 
scenario with only 
private agencies' 
schemes because: 
(READ OUT) 
(a) You have more faith in private agencies' schemes 
sm^ viVi'^ Vy\-<.^ a"; W?IM T^? ^SJKT t^?m^ t 
(b) Private agencies would be able to olTer more innovative 
schemes 
(c) Private agencies would be able to ofTer schemes at lower 
premiums 
(d) Other reasons ( Please specify 
If you were to insure 
your crop or purchase 
weather derivatives for 
an amount of Rs 1000, a 
premium or charge 
would have to be paid 
for this. We will now 
read out some premiums 
to you. Please tell us if 
you will be willing to 
pay this amount. ( Note: 
You can insure/ 
purchase weather 
derivatives for more 
than Rs 1000 the 
premium would be for 
eachRs 1000 insured) 
aPH 3nWt 1000 "^mii ^ 
anwt ^ TftPm ^ 
? ^ "(cllvj'll I c^ 'TIIT SRTT^ 
f^  ^ m 3 m ^ ^#$1 3KT 
^yHI iflfff ? ( K I H ^ : STTT 
1000 ^ffirt i\ 3TlSra> g!T ^^ 'TT 
1000 Wfil '^ ^WT ^ f^ T^T 
(0 You would be willing to pay Rs 
100 for Rs 1000 covered 
sm 1000 wrt ^ JfKR J^  fcf^  100 'WT^  
(g) You would be willing to pay Rs 
SOforRs 1000 covered 
Sm 1000 Wjtl '$ cfn(^ -^ fcf^  80 ^wrf 
(h) You would be willing to pay Rs 
SOforRs 1000 covered 
3Tra 1000 W r t ^ J p ^ ^ fo^ 50 ^ i ) ^ 
(i) You would be willing to pay Rs 
30 for Rs 1000 covered 
Sm 1000 W(^ ^ gjJR ^ fcT^ 30 Wf^ 
(j) You would be willing to pay Rs 
20 for Rs 1000 covered 
3fra 1000 wrt ^ g;^ ^^  frri 20 wrd 
Yes Ft 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (b) 
Yes FT I 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (c) 
Yes ?i 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (d) 
Yes FT 1 
No ^ 2 
IF NO, then proceed to (e) 
Yes FT 1 
No ^ 2 
XVll l 
3 What is the maximum 
number of Rupees per 
month (in total) that you 
would be willing to pay 
for insuring your crop or 
purchasing weather 
derivatives? 
sm jfrfR differ 4W i! 
^ ^ fcfi) W! ^ ^ 
artocw ft'cm ^ t^ ~i 
Rs 
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Appendix I 
Data for rainfall and soyabean production: Jhalawar 
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1984 
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1987 
1988 
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1990 
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1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
YIELD(t/ha) 
0.538 
0.690 
0.856 
0.745 
0.754 
0.733 
1.155 
0.800 
0.928 
0.549 
1.121 
1.390 
1.149 
0.863 
0.836 
1.230 
1.250 
1.181 
0.531 
1.091 
0.498 
1.192 
1.387 
Rainfall (mm) 
16Jun-15 0ct 
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RESIDUAL OUTPUT 
Observation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Predicted Y 
0.741933043 
0.759332249 
0.776731455 
0.794130661 
0.811529866 
0.828929072 
0.846328278 
0.863727484 
0.881126689 
0.898525895 
0.915925101 
0.933324307 
0.950723512 
0.968122718 
0.985521924 
1.00292113 
1.020320335 
1.037719541 
1.055118747 
1.072517953 
1.089917159 
1.107316364 
1.12471557 
Residuals 
-0.203933043 
-0.069332249 
0.079268545 
-0.049130661 
-0.057529866 
-0.095929072 
0.308671722 
-0.063727484 
0.047039042 
-0.349809616 
0.20458628 
0.45630399 
0.198713852 
-0.105122718 
-0.149521924 
0.22707887 
0.229679665 
0.143280459 
-0.524118747 
0.018482047 
-0.591917159 
0.084683636 
0.26228443 
Observation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
yf 
0.538 
0.690 
0.856 
0.745 
0.754 
0.733 
1.155 
0,800 
0.928 
Ybar+aT 
0.741933043 
0.759332249 
0.776731455 
0.794130661 
0.811529866 
0.828929072 
0.846328278 
0.863727484 
0.881126689 
e=(Yt/(Ybar+aT))-1 
-0.27486718 
-0.091306867 
0.102053991 
-0.061867225 
-0,070890633 
-0.115726514 
0.364718668 
-0.073781933 
0.053385106 
XXII 
Observation 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Yt 
0,549 
1.121 
1.390 
1.149 
0.863 
0.836 
1.230 
1.250 
1.181 
0.531 
1.091 
0.498 
1.192 
1.387 
Ybar+aT 
0.898525895 
0.915925101 
0.933324307 
0.950723512 
0.968122718 
0.985521924 
1.00292113 
1.020320335 
1.037719541 
1.055118747 
1.072517953 
1.089917159 
1.107316364 
1.12471557 
e=(Yt/(Ybar+aT))-1 
-0.389315007 
0.223365732 
0.488901861 
0.209013293 
-0.108584084 
-0.151718516 
0.226417475 
0.225105446 
0.13807243 
-0,49673911 
0.01723239 
-0.54308454 
0.07647646 
0.233200675 
Summary 
Mean 
Standard Error 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Sample Variance 
Count 
-0,00087 
0,054447 
0,017232 
0,26112 
0,068184 
23 
MSP DATA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
YEAR 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
WPI 
281.3 
295,08 
317,3064 
337,8413 
352,7502 
373,2851 
403.6655 
433.7646 
466.1141 
513.9351 
MSP soya 
230 
245 
255 
265 
275 
290 
300 
320 
370 
400 
MSP inflated to 2004 
1002.52446 
1018.02334 
985.367471 
961.7673 
955.87763 
952.564113 
911.247803 
904.550348 
973.299177 
954.308044 
f=St/So-1 
0.01546 
-0.03208 
-0.02395 
-0.00612 
-0.00347 
-0.04337 
-0.00735 
0.076003 
-0.01951 
XXIII 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
YEAR 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
WPI 
584.5414 
643.3331 
697.0614 
784.891136 
847.626662 
886.662101 
925.697539 
980.76539 
1012.83021 
1085.3246 
1124.36004 
1162.69842 
1226.131 
MSP soya 
445 
525 
580 
650 
680 
700 
750 
795 
845 
865 
885 
885 
930 
MSP inflated to 2004f=St/So-1 
933.429685 
1000.5995 
1020.22 
1015.40852 
983.651314 
968.003143 
993.411142 
993.891256 
1022.95595 
977.22222 
965.105392 
933.282372 
929.999998 
-0.02188 
0.07196 
0.019609 
-0.00472 
-0.03128 
-0.01591 
0.026248 
0.000483 
0.029243 
-0.04471 
-0.0124 
-0.03297 
-0.00352 
Summary 
Mean 
Standard Error 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Sample Variance 
Count 
-0.00291 
0.006883 
-0.00673678 
0.03228412 
0.00104226 
22 
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Appendix II 
THE STUDY AREA 
Rajasthan agriculture 
A significant portion of the economy of Rajasthan is agrarian. The agricultural sector of 
the state accounts for 22.5 per cent Of the GDP. The arid state thrives on agriculture thai 
is done with irrigation systems and painstaking efforts of the poor farmers of Rajasthan. 
As a major portion of the state is parched and infertile, agriculture becomes very difficult. 
The total cultivated area of the state encompasses about 2Q million hectares and out of 
this only 20% of the land is irrigated. Ground water is available only at a depth of 30 to 
61m. Rajasthan farmers have to depend on different sources of irrigation that include tube 
wells, wells and tanks. The Punjab Rivers in the north, the Narmada River in the south 
and the canals from Haryana and Uttar Pradesh provide water to the dry land of 
Rajasthan. Northwestern Rajasthan is irrigated by the Indira Gandhi Canal. 
Rajasthan has two principal crop seasons-
- Rabi 
• Kharif 
The rabi crops are winter crops and are sown in the months of October and November 
and are harvested in the months of March and April. The principal rabi crops are wheal, 
gram, and pulses. 
The kharif crops are the crops that are grown in the summer season and are seeded in the 
months of June and July. These crops are harvested in the months of September and 
October and include soyabean, bajra, pulses, jowar, maize and ground nuts. 
The regions that are highly irrigated or receive abundant water supply are utilized for the 
cultivation of improved high-yielding varieties of rice. 
Some places in Rajasthan see the growth of major cash crops like cotton. In some regions 
tobacco is also grown. 
Apart from these crops, an assortment of fruits and vegetables are also grown in 
Rajasthan in the local gardens and some fertile regions. These fruits include oranges, 
guavas, lemon, pomegranates and mangoes. 
Rajasthan soil is also suited for the growth of some spice plants, especially red chilies. 
Other spices grown are cumin seeds and methi. (See Figure 1) 
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Figure 1 Agriculture in Rajasthan 
Districts selected for the study 
Jhalawar 
Area 
• 6,219 sq. km. (1.82 per cent of the state). 
Location 
Jhalwar district is situated in the south-east corner of Rajasthan at the edge of Malwa 
plateau. On the south-west and east it touches the border of Madhya Pradesh State. In the 
north, the Mukandra range, running from north- west to east forms a rough boundary 
between the two districts viz. Jhalawar and Kota. 
Distance from major cities 
• Jaipur-330 kms. 
• Kota-85 kms. 
• Delhi-584 kms. 
Climate and rainfall 
• The minimum temperature in the district varies from 1 to 5 degrees. 
• Maximum temperature in the district varies from 43 to 47 degrees. 
• The normal annual rainfall in the district is 104.47 cm. 
XXVI 
Administrative setup 
There are three sub-divisions, Jhalawar, Akiera, Bhawani Mandi. There are six panchayat 
samities Jhalrapatan, Khanpur, Pirwa, Manohar Thana, Dag and Bakani, six towns and 
1,589 villages in the district. 
Human resources 
Table 1 Indicators of human resources 
Population Persons 
Density of population persons per sq. km 
Literacy percent 
Working Population per cent of population 
Percentage distribution of work force 
Cultivators percent 
Agriculturaliabourers percent 
Servicing and repairs percent 
Other works percent 
11,80,342 
190 
57.98 
38.00 
63.02 
19.19 
1.39 
16.40 
Major crops and their production 
Table 2 Production: 2004-05 (Tonnes) 
Wheat 
Maize 
Gram 
Jowar 
Paddy 
Bajra 
1,61,160 
67,290 
15,010 
15,010 
660 
90 
Infrastructure 
Water 
As the ground water is available at a depth of 15 to 20 metres, drinking water does not 
pose any problem. The medium size irrigation projects in the district are Bhim Sagar 
Project, Champi Dam and Harish Chandra Sagar Project. 
Road transport 
Almost all the towns and most of the important places are well cormected with the district 
headquarters. The Jaipur-Bhopal National Highway also passes through Jhalawar. The 
total length of different category of roads in the district was 1,360 km as of March 2000. 
(Source: www.rajasthan.gov.in ) 
Tonk 
Area 
• 7,194 sq.km. (2.1 per cent of the state). 
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Location 
It is bound in the north by Jaipur, in the east by Sawai Madhopur, in the south by Bundi 
and Bhilwara districts and in the west by Ajmer district. 
Distance from major cities 
• Jaipur-82 kms 
• Delhi-359 kms 
• Ahmedabad-707 kms 
• Mumbai-1,258 kms 
Climate and rainfall 
• The climate of the district is generally dry except in the short south-west monsoon 
season. 
• Maximum temperature in winter is 22 degrees Celsius 
• Minimum temperature in winter is 8 degrees Celsius 
• Maximum temperature in summer is 45 degrees Celsius 
• Minimum temperature in summer is 26 degrees Celsius 
• The average annual rainfall in the district: 61.36 cms. 
Administrative set up 
The Tonk district at present has two sub-divisions viz. Tonk and Malpura, comprising six 
tehsils and six panchayat samities. 
Resources human 
Table 3 Indicators of human resources 
Total population 
Density of population 
Literacy 
Total wor1(ing population 
Percentage distribution of work force 
Cultivators 
Agricultural labourers 
Household industry manufacturing, 
processing servicing and repairs 
Ot/ier workers 
persons 
persons per sq.km. 
percent 
percent 
percent 
percent 
percent 
percent 
12,11,343 
168 
52.39 
35.97 
59.93 
12.06 
2.55 
25.46 
Major crops and their production 
Table 4 Production: 2004-05 (Tonnes) 
Jowar 
Bajra 
Maize 
Groundnut 
Guar seed 
Wheat 
Bariey 
17,880 
53,710 
14,660 
5,570 
3,320 
1,69,040 
9,770 
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Infrastructure 
Water 
Wells and tanks are the main source of irrigation, seasional rivers in district are Banas, 
Mahi, Daian, Sohadra and Bandi. These help the cultivators irrigate their lands either by 
using the stored water in tanks or by lifting water. The depth of underground water in the 
district is reported between 2 mtrs. in Niwai to 16.25 mtrs. in Tonk. 
Road Transport 
The total road length of Tonk district is 1,105 kms. National Highway No. 12 (Jaipur-
Jabalpur) passes through Niwai, Tonk and Deoli panchayat samitis for a distance of 111 
kms. Road length in the district was 1,770 km. as on 31 March 2000. 
Figure 2 District map of Rajasthan 
(Source: www.rajasthan.gov.in) 
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Villages selected for the study 
i) Salawad. This village, with a population of 1429 (Census, 2001), is located in 
Tehsil Jhalrapatan in District Jhalawar, 15 Km South of Jhalawar town. Of this, 720 
are males and the number of children below 6 years of age is 260. The literacy level is 
close to 50% (Census, 2001). 
ii) Donda. Village Donda also lies in the same Tehsil in Jhalawar district, 12 Km 
south of Jhalawar town. Its population is 1537, of which, the male population is 793 
and the number of children is 258. The literacy level is 44% (Census, 2001). 
iii) Khanpuriya. Khanpuriyavillageinthe Jhalrapatan tehsil of Jhalawar district has 
a population of 1070 of which 562 are male and 166 are children below the age of 6 
xxix 
years. It is located lO Km SW of Jhalawar town. The literacy level in the village is 
close to 65%.(Census, 2001). 
iv) Deopura. This village is in the Tonk tehsil of district Tonk. Located 10 Km from 
Tonk town, near Soran village, it has a population of 1040, with a male population of 
543. The number of children, below 6 years, is 205. The literacy level is 35%. 
{Census, 2001). 
v) Chandlai. Village Chandlai is in the same tehsil in Tonk district, 8 Km south of Tonk 
town . With a population of 1528, it has 814 males and 300 children. The level of literacy 
is less than 38%. (Census, 2001). 
vi) Soothra. Village Soothra is located in tehsil Uniara of district Tonk on the 
SawaiMadhopur Road near Dhikoliya Mor, 30 Km SE of Tonk. Its population is 2608, of 
which 1375 are males. The number of children below the age of 6 years is 500 and the 
literacy level is slightly less than 30% {Census, 2001). 
Figure 3. Map of Jhalawar district indicating villages surveyed 
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Figure 4 Map of Tonk district indicating villages surveyed 
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Appendix III 
RESULTS OF MONTE-CARLO SIMULATIONS ON 
INCOME FROM PUT OPTION 
TAKING STRIKE AS MEAN OF RAINFALL VALUES 
Column 1 
Mean 
Standard Error 
Median 
Mode 
Standard Deviation 
Sample Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
161.0727 
10.81753 
0 
0 
242.1291 
58626.48 
4.784049 
1.987161 
1473.687 
0 
1473.687 
80697.44 
500 
Risk Simulation Histogram 
Number of Iterations = 500 Random Number Seed = 0.2235 
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Risk Simulation Cumulative 
Distribution 
Number of Iterations = 500 Random Number Seed = 0.2235 
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TAKING STRIKE AS 95% OF MEAN OF RAINFALL VALUES 
Column 1 
Mean 
Standard Error 
Median 
Mode 
Standard Deviation 
Sample Variance 
Kurtosis 
Skewness 
Range 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Sum 
Count 
153.6423 
11.73735 
0 
d 
262.7175 
69020.49 
3.138398 
1.914511 
1310.28 
0 
1310.28 
76974.79 
500 
XXXIII 
Risk Simulation l-iistogram 
Number of Iterations = 500 Random Number Seed = 0.2709 
X 3. 
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Risk Simulation Cumulative 
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